Realism with a Human Face

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Be patient toward all that is unsolved in your heart and try to love the *questions themselves* like locked rooms and like books that are written in a very foreign tongue ... *Live* the questions now. Perhaps you will then gradually, without noticing it, live along some distant day into the answer.

-Rainer Maria Rilke,
Letters to a Young Poet

Let us be human.

-Ludwig Wittgenstein,
Culture and Value

Introduction by James Conant

The title of this volume, *Realism with a Human Face,* alludes to Alexander Dubcek's slogan "Socialism with a Human Face," which was the rallying cry of the Prague Spring of 1968. "Socialism" originally stood as the name for a dream of realizing some of humanity's most cherished aspirations. Yet somehow in the course of its development, Dubcek felt, what was called socialism in his country had turned into the enemy of everything it once stood for. The title Hilary Putnam has chosen for this volume proposes that the history of philosophical realism represents a parallel development. Having originally stood for the dream of realizing our natural human aspirations to knowledge and objectivity, "philosophical realism" now names an intellectual current that ultimately serves only to corrode our conviction in the possibility of attaining either. Putnam draws a distinction in the title essay of this volume between what he calls "Realism with a capital 'R'" (the currently regnant metaphysical image of the world in analytic philosophy) and "realism with a small 'r'" (our commonsense image of the world). He proceeds to argue that while claiming to serve as its representative, the former gives up on everything in which the latter believes. The Realist begins by offering to rescue us from the threat of philosophical skepticism and to vindicate our commonsense belief in the reality of the external world and the possibility of objectivity and truth, and ends by giving us back a world in which common sense no longer has a home; thus he begins by promising to save the world and ends by dehumanizing it. The essays collected in this volume argue that the cognitive values of objectivity and truth are only able to retain their sense within the framework of an overarching ideal of human flourishing. Hence, in attempting to wrench certain cognitive ideals from our overall conception of human flourishing, philosophical realism ends by undermining itself (and precipitating a

backlash of philosophical skepticism). In order to fulfill the philosophical program of providing an accurate and coherent account of the nature of knowledge and objectivity, our image of knowledge and objectivity must wear a human face.

In calling for "socialism with a human face," Dubcek's hope was to rehumanize the movement in Czechoslovakia by confronting it with the fact that it had betrayed its original motivations. In giving a similar name to his philosophical program, Putnam is evidently also calling for reform. The suggestion would appear to be that the time has come to rehumanize philosophy, to call upon the prevailing currents within this field of activity to attend to the gap between the present condition of the subject and the human aspirations that philosophy should (and once claimed to) represent. Like Dubcek's before it, Putnam's call for reform will no doubt strike some people as out of touch with reality-just another instance of starry-eyed idealism rather than a serious program. Hence the allusion might also appear to be an unfortunate one in that Dubcek's attempted revolution is famous for having ended in disaster. As I write, however, momentous changes are taking place: enormous crowds are assembling in the streets and public squares of Prague, brandishing placards that call for, among other things, "a time when people can begin to live as human beings"; the Berlin Wall has come down-a structure that was once the single most concrete symbol in our contemporary world of human aspiration divided against itself. The spark of Dubcek's vision is therefore not only being rekindled in Czechoslovakia but has caught fire and is presently spreading like a blaze across all of Eastern Europe. In the light of these developments, it would appear that Putnam's title is an apposite one.[1]

I came to know Putnam first as a teacher of philosophy. I attended his classes at Harvard and was repeatedly struck by the following peculiar feature of his pedagogic practice: he would usually motivate the approach he wished to take to a contemporary philosophical issue through a discussion of the work of some philosopher whom he admired. One's first fleeting impression would therefore perhaps be of someone unable to arrive at.ideas of his own-an impression, however, that would vanish as one came to realize that Putnam's readings of philosophers tended to be no less idiosyncratic than his own approach to philosophical problems. The lectures for any given course that Putnam gave were peppered with numerous, though often puzzling, references to his current philosophical hero(es). An index of

how his readings of philosophical texts would tend to parallel developments in his own personal philosophical views is afforded by the following remark he made in one such course: "I find that as I keep getting clearer about these issues, Aristotle keeps getting clearer about them, too." Nonetheless, each decisive shift in Putnam's thought is generally accompanied by the concomitant abandonment of some (previous) philosophical hero and the inauguration of a new one-sometimes a thinker whom he had previously (and sometimes even famously) denounced. Thus the membership of Putnam's constellation of heroes, not unlike his own substantive philosophical views, tends to exist in a condition of perpetual flux; at any given point in his career, one has only to glance at the current membership of this constellation to ascertain the general philosophical direction in which he is (often quite rapidly) moving.

The present stage in Putnam's intellectual trajectory does not constitute an exception to this general rule of thumb. Scattered throughout the essays collected in the present volume, one finds the names of four philosophers in particular who are of interest in this connection: Immanuel Kant, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Stanley Cavell, and William James. Each of them is invoked at a critical juncture in the book; each functions as an exemplar of a particular aspect of the philosophical calling to which Putnam wishes to remain faithful. My aim in this introduction is to say something about what it is that Putnam admires about each of these philosophers. This endeavor has already been partially preempted by Putnam himself, since two of the essays collected here are devoted primarily to exploring the extent to which contemporary philosophers can still learn from the work of William James; therefore I have confined myself to a consideration of Putnam's relation to the other three of these figures. My aim in doing so is to say something of a general nature about the ways in which the-work collected in the present volume represents a departure from Putnam's earlier work. I have tried, in particular, to shed light on the present character of Putnam's overall conception of philosophy and on what he (at least for the time being) thinks philosophy may reasonably hope to achieve.

Putnam's Kantianism

It should come as no surprise to readers familiar with Putnam's recent work that the pair of lectures that constitute the title chapter of this

volume are dedicated to Kant. Still, some readers may be surprised by just how strong a claim Putnam is prepared to make for the contemporary relevance of Kant's work. Indeed, this volume opens with the following remark: "I hope it will become clear that my indebtedness to Kant is very large ... For me, at least, almost all the problems of philosophy attain the form in which they are of real interest only with the work of Kant." This remark is as striking as it is sweeping-especially in view of the fact that in Putnam's first two volumes of philosophical papers there is no sustained discussion of Kant's work. At that stage Kant does not appear to constitute a significant influence on Putnam's own philosophical outlook; although his name makes an occasional appearance, it almost always stands for the figure that analytic philosophy was, in those years, forever distancing itself from: a deplorably influential dead German philosopher who held misguided views about the synthetic *a priori* nature of geometry and arithmetic. It is only in Putnam's last three books that Kant's name begins to stand for a figure from whom contemporary analytic philosophy still has much to learn. In the first of these books, Kant's attack on the correspondence theory of truth is identified as a pivotal chapter in the history of metaphysics;' the second book takes its bearings from the role of the concept of autonomy in Kant's moral philosophy;' and the third praises Kant's delicate treatment of the mind/body problem." What happens in these books is not that Putnam undergoes a conversion to Kantianism; rather, his entire picture of Kant's achievement and its position in the history of philosophy is transformed. As Putnam's own philosophical views develop, his philosophical agenda increasingly comes to resemble the one he finds in Kant. The result is both an increasing interest in Kant and a deepening appreciation of the extent to which he succeeded in grasping and defining the problems that continue to plague contemporary philosophy. Kant's achievement, on this view, lies not primarily in the answers he provided but rather in the manner in which he pressed the questions. The aim throughout this volume is therefore not so much to defend or rehabilitate any specific solutions to standing problems that Kant himself tried to tackle, as to recapture an overall perspective on the character, structure, and interrelationship of the basic problems that have preoccupied modern philosophy.

In the first of the three books mentioned above, *Reason, Truth, and History,* Putnam credits Kant with being the first philosopher clearly to point the way toward the position in metaphysics' that Putnam

himself seems now to favor: "Although Kant never quite says that this is what he is doing, Kant is best read as proposing for the first time, what I have called the 'internalist' or 'internal realist' view of truth.?" The significance of Kant's example for Putnam in this regard is perhaps best summarized by saying that Kant offers the first serious attempt in the history of philosophy to explicate the concept of genuinely objective knowledge in a fashion that does not presuppose the coherence of the notion of an "absolute conception" of the world-the notion that there is some conception of the world that captures the way the world (already) is, in and of itself, independent of our particular (human) conceptions of it.? This Kantian quest for a coherent conception of what is "objective humanly speaking'v-s-a conception that avoids the twin perils of a relativism that denies the possibility of objective knowledge and of a metaphysical absolutism that transcends the limits of what is coherently conceivable-has emerged as perhaps the single most pervasive theme in Putnam's recent work. The essays collected in the present volume subserve this ideal in different ways. Those in Part I are concerned specifically with diagnosing the various sources of the traditional metaphysical picture of objectivity and showing that the abandonment of that picture does not require that we give up on the notion of objectivity itself. The essays in Part II argue that our everyday means of adjudicating practical disputes on matters of ethical and aesthetic controversy often represent what may be properly termed "objective resolutions of problematical situations"-and that *that* is "objectivity enough.?" Thus the argument of the essays in Part II depends on the argument of those in Part I. The overarching claim is that the ways in which philosophers have attacked the possibility of genuine ethical or aesthetic knowledge have generally turned on their allegiance to a false (metaphysical) conception of objectivity, It is the burden of the essays in Part I to advance a critique of this traditional conception of objectivity. Putnam's so-called internal realism-s-or, as he prefers to call it here, "realism with a small 'r' "-aims to set forth a conception of objectivity that is more faithful to our actual (both everyday and scientific) practices of adjudicating conflicting knowledge-claims and achieving forms of rational consensus.

The doctrine of "internal realism" (of which Putnam discerns a version in Kant's work) has been summarized by Putnam in several different places and in a number of different ways. Many of the essays in this volume represent further attempts at its formulation from a

variety of complementary perspectives. One such formulation sheds light on the relationship between Putnam's views and those of Kant:

> My own view is that the success of science cannot be anything but a puzzle as long as we view concepts and objects as radically independent; that is, as long as we think of "the world" as an entity that has a fixed nature, determined once and for all, independently of our framework of concepts ... If we do shift our way of thinking to the extent of regarding "the world" as partly constituted by the representing mind, then many things in our popular philosophy (and even in technical philosophy) must be reexamined. To mention just two of them: (1) Locke held that the great metaphysical problem of realism, the problem of the relation of our concepts to their objects, would be solved by just natural scientific investigation, indefinitely continued. Kant held that Locke was wrong, and that this *philosophical* question was never going to be solved by empirical science. I am suggesting that on this subject Kant was right and Locke was wrong ... (2) Since the birth of science thousands of years ago we have bifurcated the world into "reality"-what physical science describes-and appearance ... I am suggesting that this is an error, and a subtle version of Locke's error. The "primary/secondary" or "reality/appearance" dichotomy is founded on and presupposes what Kant called "the transcendental illusion"-that empirical science describes (and *exhaustively* describes) a concept-independent, perspective-independent "reality,"!"

The importance of Kant's work for Putnam is connected not only to Kant's insight into the incoherence of the seductive idea of a "concept-independent, perspective-independent reality" but also to his appreciation of the ways in which certain forms of moral confusion are fueled by this species of metaphysical confusion.

In *The Many Faces of Realism,* the second of the three books alluded to previously, Putnam again looks to Kant-this time as an important source for "ideas that may be the beginning of a kind of 'internal realism' in moral philosophy,"!' Kant receives credit here for offering "a radically new way of giving content to the notion of equality'"? through his "radical" and "deep"!' explication of the concept of autonomy. What Putnam emphasizes most in this discussion is the intimacy of the connection revealed between ethics and metaphysics. Kant's views on moral philosophy flow naturally from his rejection of a metaphysically loaded conception of objectivity: "Kant's glory, in my eyes, is to say that the very fact that we cannot separate our own

conceptual contribution from what is 'objectively there' is not a disaster ... Similarly, I am suggesting, Kant rejects the idea that we have something analogous to the medieval 'rational intuition' with respect to moral questions. And again here he argues that this is not a disaster, that on the contrary it is a Good Thing. The whole Kantian strategy, on this reading ... is to *celebrate* the loss of essence.?"

Although there is little specific discussion of Kant's views on moral philosophy in the present volume, in Chapter 13 ("Taking Rules Seriously") Putnam does take recent Anglo-American moral philosophy to task for assuming "a derogatory attitude toward rules and toward the Kantian account" of the place of rules in moral reasoning.*is* Putnam points out that Kant does allow an important role for the pursuit of happiness in his moral scheme;" that, rather than devaluing the significance of happiness, Kant was concerned to keep its pursuit from being "allowed to degenerate into a consequentialist ethic;"? and that consequently there is room for considerably more harmony between Kantian and Aristotelian ethics than has hitherto generally been acknowledged." Outside of his remarks in this one essay, however, Putnam devotes no further attention to the details of Kant's own moral theory. The feature of Kant's philosophy that resonates most in the present volume is the insistence on the interconnected character of metaphysical and ethical confusion. In particular, Putnam finds in Kant a concern with the way in which the metaphysical realists' picture of scientific objectivity leads to a devaluation of the objectivity of moral judgment. The pervasive attention to the ethical implications of prevailing metaphysical assumptions-and, in particular, to the subtle mutual influences exercised by prevailing conceptions of objectivity in philosophy of science and moral philosophy-represents perhaps the most significant sense in which the essays collected here constitute an important shift in the focus of Putnam's philosophical interests. It is not that these issues receive attention here for the first time in Putnam's work. However, as his conviction in their significance for philosophy (and in their impact on our culture as a whole) has deepened, they have come to assume an unprecedented degree of centrality. In this connection, I will simply note the extent to which the essays pervasively register the pressure of the following two questions: What are the moral (or political) implications of a given philosophical view (in metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, or philosophy of science)? How do our analyses in various areas of philosophy impinge on our understanding of our everyday practices of

ethical reflection and criticism? My suggestion is that the manner in which these questions haunt the pages of this volume itself forms a further significant affinity between Putnam and Kant.

In *Representation and Reality,* the third of the three books mentioned earlier, Kant's claim concerning the impossibility of giving a scientific account of "schematism"!? is acknowledged as an antecedent version of one of Putnam's central claims: namely, the inability of a thoroughgoing physicalist or materialist view of the world to provide a coherent account of intentionality." This feature of Kant's influence also surfaces in a variety of ways in Putnam's most recent work." Putnam argues, for example, that Kant's thought marks a decisive break with the Cartesian tradition: "Note that Kant does not say there are two 'substances'-mind and body (as Descartes did). Kant says, instead, that there are 'dualities in our experience' (a striking phrase!) that refuse to go away. And I think Kant was, here as elsewhere, on to something of permanent significance.?" What is of permanent significance here is Kant's idea that the relation between mind and body should not be pictured as a binary opposition, a dualism of two incommensurable kinds of entity, but rather as a *duality:* two complementary poles' of a single field of activity-the field of human experience. Putnam goes on to suggest that the clock was turned back and that philosophy of mind in the Anglo-American world retreated for several decades to a pre-Kantian formulation of the mind/body problem: "It was with the decline of pragmatism and idealism and the rise of logical positivism that English-speaking philosophy reverted to its traditional, empiricist way of conceiving mind-body issues."23 Recent developments in the philosophy of mind (in particular, the functionalism controversy), however, have had the salutary effect, in Putnam's view, of finally bringing a variety of Kantian "topics and concerns back into English-speaking analytic philosophy in a massive way,"?"

The various passages quoted above offer some indication of the magnitude of the achievement that Putnam wishes to claim for Kant's contributions to philosophy-in metaphysics, moral philosophy, and philosophy of mind-as well as the degree to which Putnam feels philosophical progress is to be attained by returning to Kant and reconsidering many of the traditional problems in the terms in which he formulated them. That one of the leading figures in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy should reach *this* conclusion is a development worth pondering. I have attempted to indicate here that, despite the exceptional diversity of the topics that are taken up in this volume, one legitimate way of grouping their various concerns under a single heading is to note how they all tacitly participate in a single project: to inherit, reassess, and appropriate Kant's philosophical legacy, with the aim to take up philosophizing at the point at which he left off.

Given that in each of his last three books, Putnam has singled out a different aspect of Kant's view as playing a formative role in shaping his own work, the question naturally arises: What about *this* book? Is there a further Kantian problematic that emerges here and that can be recognized as now playing a decisive role in structuring Putnam's preoccupations? Or to shift the question slightly: Insofar as Putnam's reflections in these essays represent a further departure from his previously published work, do they in any way also represent a further step toward Kant? The frequency with which Kant's name recurs at critical junctures certainly encourages such a question. Yet it is difficult to specify the appropriation of any additional point of doctrine that would mark a further approach toward Kant. This is no doubt partly because the peculiarly Kantian flavor of many of these essays stems not from a new departure in Putnam's thought, but rather from the flowering of a tendency that has been maturing for some years. Earlier I specified one symptom of this process of maturation: the pervasive responsiveness of these essays to questions about how the formulation of issues in certain areas of philosophy (metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of science) both determines and is determined by the formulation of (often apparently unrelated) issues in moral and political philosophy. Reflection on the nature of the relationship between these different branches of philosophy is the explicit topic of only a few of the essays in this volume." Implicitly, however, this concern shapes almost all of them. Indeed, it would not be much of a distortion to summarize the underlying agenda of the volume as a whole in the following terms: Putnam wishes to draw limits to scientific reason in order to make room for ethics. Sacrificing the strictness of the parallel with Kant, it would be still more accurate to say: Putnam wishes to find a way to make sense of both our scientific and everyday practices of adjudicating disputes and arriving at truths in a way that also enables us to make the right kind of sense of our moral lives. Consequently, as with many of Kant's works, many of Putnam's

essays in this collection that are overtly concerned with epistemology or metaphysics can be viewed, from a certain perspective, as exercises in moral philosophy.

Earlier we saw Putnam praising Kant's characterization of the mental and physical as constituting (not a dualism of substances but rather) a "duality of experience." The notion that these two poles constitute a *duality* is meant to indicate that neither pole is completely reducible to, nor completely separable from, its counterpart. The philosophical task here becomes one of doing conceptual justice to the intricacy of the relations of mutual interdependence and relative autonomy that obtain among the phenomena. For Kant, the field of experience is constituted by the *joint* exercise of the human faculties of understanding and sensibility. He writes: "To neither of these powers maya preference be given over the other. Without sensibility no object would be given to us, without understanding no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind."26 The "duality" that Kant detects in the nature of human experience lies in the manner in which its constitution depends on the *interplay* of these two complementary faculties of sensibility and understanding, and the manner in which the character of human experience hence reflects their respective constitutive aspects of receptivity and spontaneity.

I would like to suggest that Putnam's most recent step forward toward Kant can be found in the extent to which his work increasingly registers the tension of yet another duality--one that Kant detects in the very nature of the enterprise of philosophical reflection itself. Kant characterizes it, in the section of the *Critique of Pure Reason* entitled "The Architectonic of Pure Reason," as a duality of two different concepts of philosophy-the scholastic concept of philosophy *(der Schulbegriff der Philosophie)* and the universal or cosmic concept *(der Weltbegriff):*

> Hitherto the concept of philosophy has been a merely scholastic concept-a concept of a system of knowledge which is sought solely in its character as a science, and which has therefore in view only the systematic unity appropriate to science, and consequently no more than the logical perfection of knowledge. But there is likewise another concept of philosophy, a *conceptus cosmicus,* which has always formed the real basis of the term 'philosophy,' especially when it has been as it were personified and its archetype represented in the ideal of the *philosopher*. On this view, philosophy is the science of the relation of all knowledge to the essential ends of human reason."

It emerges that the duality indicated here (as belonging to the nature of philosophical reflection) parallels the one that obtains between the moments of receptivity and spontaneity that characterize human experience, insofar as Kant goes on to suggest that it would be equally correct here to assert with respect to these two aspects of the field of philosophical activity: "To neither of these powers may a preference be given over the other." Thus the field of philosophical experience depends on the interplay of these two complementary concepts of philosophy.

The *Schulbegriff* (the scholastic concept) embodies philosophy's aspiration to the systematicity and the rigor of a science. Kant does not exactly say here that philosophy aspires to be a SCience, for It IS neither exactly a science nor something alongside the other sciences; rather, he says that it aspires to "a system of knowledge which is sought solely in its character as a science." It is sought and valued as a science ("wird als Wissenschaft gesucht") for two reasons: first and foremost, because it strives to clarify the foundation of the other sciences (properly so-called) and to lay a groundwork for them; and second because it provides a fertile breeding ground for scientific ideas.i" Philosophy, pursued under the aspect of its *Schulbegriff,* will occasionally lay open to view new domains of inquiry and will thereby act as a midwife to new branches of science. Even the development of the methods of particular sciences-although these sciences themselves may be oblivious to this fact--ean often be traced back historically to philosophical investigations into the sources and nature of the varieties of human knowledge. The crucial feature of the *Schulbegriff* of philosophy that Kant pauses over here, however, is its esotericism-the fact that it is the province of a few professionals, In this respect as well, philosophy can come to resemble a science: it requires of its practitioners a thorough knowledge of detailed matters of doctrine, method, and terminology. Its practice presupposes a mastery of all the elaborate tools and technicalities that come with any highly developed and specialized discipline. Philosophy's aspirations to clarity, rigor, and completeness exert a pressure for it to become a field in which a narrow class of specialists write only for one another. Insofar as philosophy aspires to gain a secure foothold in the academy,

the forces of professionalization that prevail there will tend to ensure the ascendancy of the *Schulbegriff* over the *Weltbegriff*.

The high tradition of analytic philosophy-which traces its roots back to the seminal writings of Frege, Russell, and the Vienna Circle-represents perhaps the fullest realization of the aspiration of philosophy in its *Schulbegriff*. Russell inaugurated this development by calling for the application of the methods of the sciences (in particular the mathematical method of the logical construction of entities) to the questions of philosophy. Putnam's early mentors in philosophy, Hans Reichenbach and Rudolf Carnap, both began as followers of Kant and admirers of Russell, and in their mature years they continued (while scoffing at most of his views) to praise Kant for having clarified philosophy's relation to the natural sciences. They championed a conception of philosophy that they believed could be traced back to Kant: philosophy as the logical analysis of science. However, the ascendancy of the *Schulbegriff* reached what one might consider its metaphilosophical apotheosis in the work of Putnam's colleague and erstwhile mentor, W. V. O. Quine, who defends the (ultimately extremely un-Kantian) conclusion that philosophy simply *is* one of the empirical sciences." For Quine, all philosophy worthy of the title falls squarely under the *Schulbegriff* of philosophy,"

In distinguishing between the *Schulbegriff* and the *Weltbegriff,* Kant refers to them as two *concepts* of philosophy. This suggests that, for Kant, it is not a matter of delineating two different kinds of philosophy but rather of discriminating two different poles of a single field of activity-the implication being not only that each of these concepts has a claim to the title of "philosophy," but that the philosophical enterprise itself can achieve full fruition only when piirsued under the aspect of each. Hence, on this view, it would seem that in order for the subject to thrive, philosophy in the form of its *Schulbegriff* must flourish as well. It is this feature of Kant's conception of the subject that one could argue has been particularly enshrined in both the practice and the ideology of analytic philosophy. Few readers familiar with his previous work will be surprised to find Putnam vigorously espousing a latter-day version of this conception in one of his earlier writings: "If any further evidence were needed of the healthy state of philosophy today, it would be provided by the hordes of intellectuals who complain that philosophy is overly 'technical,' that it has 'abdicated' from any concern with 'real' problems, etc. For such complaints have always occurred precisely when philosophy was significant and vital! ... The sad fact is that good philosophy is and always has been *hard,* and that it is easier to learn the names of a few philosophers than it is to read their books. Those who find philosophy overly 'technical' today would no more have found the time or the inclination ... to read one of the *Critiques,* in an earlier day,"!'

Putnam comes by this particular affinity with Kant's conception of philosophy (namely, that in order for philosophy to flourish its *Schulbegriff* must flourish as well) through the philosophical culture in which he has been educated and to which he has contributed some of his own most important work. That is to say, the fact that Putnam has this much in common with Kant fails to distinguish him from most of his colleagues. What does distinguish his recent work, however, is the degree to which it has come implicitly to embody an insistence on the complementarity-rather than the opposition--of the two concepts of philosophy that Kant discriminates. I believe Putnam today would no longer be comfortable with the way in which the passage just quoted appears to endorse the equation of the following two complaints concerning his own philosophical culture: (1) "It has become too 'technicaL'" (2) "It has 'abdicated' from any concern with 'real' problems." More specifically, I believe he would no longer be comfortable with pairing these two criticisms in a fashion that suggests that their relative degrees of justification are necessarily a straightforward function of each other. Although Putnam continues to remain a committed advocate of philosophy's *Schulbegriff,* he has become increasingly concerned to draw attention to how this commitment can lead (and has led) to a neglect of philosophy's *Weltbegriff*. For example, in Chapter 12 of the present volume we find the following charge: "Part of what makes moral philosophy an anachronistic field is that its practitioners continue to argue in ... [a] very traditional and aprioristic way ... They are proud of giving ingenious arguments-that is what makes them 'analytic' philosophers-and curiously evasive or superficial about the relation of the premises of these arguments to the ideals and practices of any actual moral community."

In the passage from *The Critique of Pure Reason* quoted earlier, Kant tells us that the *Weltbegriff* (the universal or cosmic concept) of philosophy is concerned with "the relation of all knowledge to the essential aims of human reason." He adds further: "The universal concept is meant to signify a concept relating to what must be of interest toeveryone.":" And he speaks of it as embodying an idea that

"exists everywhere in the reason of every human being."33 Philosophy, viewed under the aspect of this concept, is radically *exoteric:* both its sources and its aims are rooted in the very nature of what it is to be human. The sources of philosophy-and, in particular, the sources of philosophical perplexity-eonstitute the guiding topic of the second division of the *Critique of Pure Reason,* entitled "The Transcendental Dialectic." It emerges clearly in these pages that, for Kant, philosophy consists in the first order not primarily of a technical discipline reserved only for specialists, but of an elucidatory activity that aspires to illuminate those confusions of thought that ordinary human beings cannot escape entering into. Kant attempts to show that philosophical reflection derives from the natural human propensity to reason, and its problems stem from reason's equally natural propensity to transgress the limits of its own legitimate scope of employment: "Human reason has this peculiar fate that in one species of its knowledge it is burdened by questions which, as prescribed by the very nature of reason itself, it is not able to ignore, but which, as transcending all its powers, it is also not able to answer.'?" The *Weltbegriff* of philosophy is grounded in the fact that every human mind, by virtue of its sheer capacity to reason, harbors a philosopher. Each of us, as we reason, under the prodding of the philosopher within us (whether we wish to or not), concomitantly implicates himself or herself in the activity of philosophizing; and hence each of us is subject to the pressure of those questions that it lies "in the very nature of reason" both to pose to itself, and to be unable to answer, since "they transcend the powers of human reason." This is the province of what Kant calls *transcendental illusion:* "Transcendental illusion ... exerts its influence on principles that are in no wise intended for use in experience, in which case we should at least have had a criterion of their correctness. In defiance of all the warnings of criticism, it carries us altogether beyond the empirical employment of the categories.t'"

The impact of this aspect of Kant's thought on Putnam's own metaphilosophical views is evident throughout the pages of this volume." Equally pertinent, however, is the notion of a transcendental *dialectic* that Kant derives from his conclusions concerning the unavoidable character of transcendental illusion:

> Transcendental illusion ... does not cease even after it has been detected and its invalidity clearly revealed by transcendental criticism ... This is an *illusion* which can no more be prevented than we can prevent the sea appearing higher at the horizon than at the shore For here we have to do with a *natural* and inevitable *illusion* There exists, then, a natural and unavoidable dialectic of pure reason-not one in which a bungler might entangle himself through a lack of knowledge, or one which some sophist has artificially invented to confuse thinking people, but one inseparable from human reason, and which, even after its deceptiveness has been exposed, will not cease to play tricks with reason and continually entrap it into momentary aberrations ever and again calling for correction."

Kant views our recurrent state of philosophical confusion as an unwittingly self-imposed condition of intellectual entanglement that arises through our natural propensity to follow what we take to be "fundamental rules and maxims for the employment of our reason.":" The form of entanglement in question here is therefore one that is imposed on the human mind by the human mind as a natural and inevitable symptom of the pressure of taking thought. It follows from this not only that some degree of philosophical confusion belongs to the natural condition of any creature endowed with reason, but that as long as the human animal wishes to enjoy the fruits of reason he must also expect to pay the price of repeatedly overstepping its limits. Hence as long as there are human beings there will be a need for philosophy. The idea that humanity has an enduring need for the vocation of philosophy is one that recurs in a number of the essays in the present volume-it is a region of Kant's thought in which Putnam sees deep affinities with certain strains in the teaching of the later Wittgenstein.

We saw earlier that the *Weltbegriff* of philosophy was radically exoteric in a second, intimately related sense as well: namely, through its activity of reflection on (as Kant puts it) "the essential ends of human reason." The object of all philosophical reflection, from the standpoint of its *Weltbegriff,* is that which relates to every rational being by virtue of his or her ability to reason, to that which must, as Kant says, "be of interest to everyone." The *Weltbegriff* represents philosophy's mandate to address, clarify, and illuminate those questions that naturally arise and come to perplex us in the course of exercising our capacities for deliberation and reflection. Kant begins the passage in which he distinguishes two concepts by speaking of a philosophy that is "merely scholastic"-merely scholastic because, insofar as the practice of philosophy confines itself to the satisfaction

of the aspirations of its *Schulbegriff,* it fails to live up to what Kant terms "the ideal of the philosopher." The philosophical inquirer who neglects (or repudiates) the aspirations of philosophy's *Weltbegriff,* in Kant's view, betrays (or abdicates) the central responsibility of the vocation of philosopher: the responsibility to address the universal intellectual needs of his fellow reflective beings. If the practice of philosophy is not only pursued exclusively *by* specialists but, in addition, addresses itself exclusively *to* the needs and interests of specialists, then it should not properly be called "philosophy": "There is also the *Weltbegriff* which has always formed the real foundation of that which has been given the title [of philosophy}":" Kant amplifies the point in the paragraph that follows: "The mathematician, the natural philosopher, and the logician, however successful the two former may have been in their advances in the field of rational knowledge, and the two latter more especially in philosophical knowledge, are yet only artificers in the field of reason. There is a teacher, [conceived] in the ideal, who sets them their tasks, and employs them as instruments, to further the essential ends of human reason. Him alone we must call philosopher.?"

Kant's idea here that the ideal of the philosopher should correspond to a certain ideal of the *teacher--one* who seeks to further the essential ends of humanity-is one that we will encounter again in considering the relation between Putnam's recent work and that of Cavell. The related idea that there is such a' thing as the *responsibility* of philosophy-and that it is abdicated by the confinement of the pursuit of philosophy to the interests of its professional practitioners-is one that finds increasing resonance in Putnam's recent writings, as in the following passage: "Metaphysical materialism has replaced positivism and pragmatism as the dominant contemporary form of scientism. Since scientism is, in my opinion, one of the most dangerous contemporary intellectual tendencies, a critique of its most influential contemporary form is a *duty* for a philosopher who views his enterprise as more than a purely technical discipline."!' This notion of a philosophical duty-a duty that binds every philosopher "who views his enterprise as more than a purely technical discipline"-is woven into the fabric of the arguments threaded through the essays in the present volume, controlling the focus and direction of analysis throughout. It constitutes a reasonable neighborhood in which to look for an answer to the question raised earlier-namely, what new Kantian dimension can be found in these essays that cannot be discerned as clearly in Putnam's earlier work? To view philosophy as no more than "a purely technical discipline" is to view it only under the aspect of its *Schulbegriff-to* ignore its calling to address the intellectual needs of our time. Kant's distinction between the *Schulbegriff* and the *Weltbegriff* of philosophy closely parallels the distinction between argument and vision that Putnam adapts from Burnyeat:

> I would agree with Myles Burnyeat who once said that philosophy needs vision *and* argument. Burnyeat's point was that there is something disappointing about a philosophical work that contains arguments, however good, which are not inspired by some genuine vision, and something disappointing about a philosophical work that contains a vision, however inspiring, which is unsupported by arguments ...
>
> Speculation about how things hang together requires ... the ability to draw out conceptual distinctions and connections, and the ability to argue ... But speculative views, however interesting or well supported by arguments or insightful, are not all we need. We also need what Burnyeat called 'vision'-and I take that to mean vision as to how to live our lives, and how to order our societies. Philosophers have a double task: to integrate our various views of our world and ourselves ... and to help us find a meaningful orientation in life.?

This emphasis on the philosopher's obligation to formulate an overall guiding vision that emerges in Putnam's recent work is particularly striking when one bears in mind the degree to which this notion of a philosophical duty runs against the grain of the traditional ideology of analytic philosophy. Of course, Putnam's commitment to philosophy's *Weltbegriff* does not, in and of itself, constitute a distinctively Kantian moment. This is a feature his work shares, for example, with currents in both pragmatism and continental philosophy. (Indeed, the emergence of this commitment in Putnam's own writings is unquestionably connected to his increasing interest in, and sympathy with, philosophers such as James and Kierkegaard.)? The characteristically Kantian moment here lies in the complementarity of Putnam's philosophical commitments: in the extent to which his recent philosophical work engages the aspirations of both the *Weltbegriff* and the *Schulbegriff* of philosophy and attempts to think productively in the tension that is the inevitable result of bringing them into each other's proximity. What is distinctive about so many of these essays is the cheerful and optimistic tone in which they carry off their attempt to

sustain intellectual life in the atmosphere of that tension-a mood that differs significantly from the nihilistic tone that prevails in much contemporary philosophy on either side of the Atlantic.

The most characteristically Kantian aspect of *Realism with a Human Face* is, I am suggesting, its insistence on the *duality* of these two different concepts of philosophy-its insistence that the esoteric and exoteric aspects of contemporary philosophy constitute complementary moments in a single enterprise of reflection. Hence these pages are also pervaded by an insistence on the *unity* of philosophy: an opposition to any form of metaphilosophical dualism that takes philosophy's twin aspirations of rigor and human relevance as the hallmarks of two distinct and incommensurable kinds of philosophical activity. One could summarize the character of the dual nature envisioned here by performing the appropriate substitunc ,in Kant's famous aphorism concerning the relation between the concepts of the understanding and the intuitions of sensibility: the *Weltbegriff* of philosophy without the *Scbulbegrif]* is empty, and the *Schulbegriff* of philosophy without the *Weltbegriff* is blind." These two alternatives--emptiness or blindness-represent the two forms of catastrophe that face the polar tasks of popularizing and institutionalizing the practice of philosophy. The former alternative awaits philosophy whenever-in its eagerness to achieve the sound of profundity and to assume the posture of the sage-it compromises its aspirations to perspicuity, clarity, systematicity, and rigor. (Hence all too often philosophers living in exile from the academy tend to be suspiciously eager to take reassurance from the fact that it has always been a mark of honor in philosophy to be opposed by those who claim to speak in the name of philosophy-to rescue the vocation of philosopher from its usurpers.) The latter alternative ensues whenever philosophy's practitioners, in their preoccupation with excavating some narrow slice of territory, lose sight of why it was that they had originally wanted to sink their spades into that particular plot of ground in the first place. (Thus philosophy in its professionalized form often purchases the security of a stable set of projects at the cost of severing contact with most people's original motivations to the subject.) Every attempt at philosophizing remains poised somewhere between these twin perils: the emptiness of pseudo-profundity and the barrenness of pedantry. The former danger has particularly haunted Continental philosophy in its least productive phases, whereas the latter has proved to be analytic philosophy's most characteristic form of infertility.

It is worth reflecting on the fact that Kant is the most recent common figure to whom these two traditions can trace themselves back. He represents the crossroads at which the history of Western philosophy branches. It is as if the task of inheriting his monumental legacy caused our philosophical culture to split into two unfriendly halves, so that the twin aspirations to philosophy that Kant had hoped, once and for all, to balance against each other entered instead into a state of continuous disequilibrium. The result is a philosophical cold war in which the *Weltbegriff* and the *Schulbegriff* each insists on its own respective sphere of influence, and each views the incursions of the other as acts of subversion. Indeed, each has its characteristic mode of intellectual terrorism. (Carnap accused Heidegger and his kin of uttering "pseudo-propositions" that were "devoid of cognitive content." Heidegger accused Carnap and his kin of dwelling in a state of "forgetfulness," oblivious to the "essential questions." Each represented the danger inherent in philosophy that the other most abhorred: charlatanry and philistinism. Each felt that his counterpart paid the price of the one danger because of his excessive fear of the other.) Hence it has become customary to speak of philosophy as having divided into two different "traditions." Kant might have been more inclined to think of this development as philosophy itself dividing into halves-as if each "tradition" had chosen to excel in expressing what the other repressed in the aspiration to philosophy.

In his recent writings, Putnam has been led to remark in a number of places on how the direction of his thought has impelled him "to think about questions which are thought to be more the province of 'Continental philosophy' than of 'analytical philosophy.'"[45] He has also become particularly fond of remarking on certain patterns of convergence that are beginning to emerge between these two cultures-sometimes favorably (for example, the affinities between Rawls's Kantian constructivism and the views of the Frankfurt School)" and sometimes unfavorably (for example, the parallel forms of pressure toward relativism in Rorty and Foucault;"? or the parallels in Quine's and Derrida's theories of interpretation)." One of Putnam's motivations for returning to Kant, and for taking his philosophical bearings from Kant's formulations of the traditional problems, would appear to be to heal this rift: to find a piece of nonaligned ground, somewhere within earshot of both sides. Surely one precondition of clearing such a piece of ground is finding a way to bring Kant's two concepts of philosophy back into a stable equilibrium with each other. For the situation is still one in which each half of the contemporary

philosophical world conducts itself as if it had been granted only one half of the Kantian inheritance, guaranteeing that philosophy everywhere would remain deprived of some part of its birthright. Putnam's increasing interest in the later work of Wittgenstein can be attributed in part to a conviction that, of the alternatives that have emerged thus far in the twentieth century, it comes closest to exemplifying a mode of philosophy that holds forth some promise of healing the rift which currently separates the analytic and Continental traditions of philosophy and which has left philosophy in our century divided against itself. Indeed, there are good reasons why Putnam might find in Wittgenstein-an Austrian, first schooled in his native country in the writings of Kierkegaard and Schopenhauer, who then came to study and eventually to settle in the Cambridge of Russell and Moore-someone who was uniquely placed to soothe the quarrel between the Anglo-American and Continental European philosophical cultures concerning which of the two concepts of philosophy should be granted ascendancy over the other. Putnam sees in Wittgenstein someone who succeeds in reconstituting the scaffolding of the Kantian architectonic, rejuvenating Kant's legacy to philosophy by fashioning a stable equilibrium between his two concepts of philosophy.

Putnam's Wittgensteinianism

A number of Putnam's earlier papers, including some of the most famous, have been devoted to attacking views such as the so-called criterial theory of meaning" and various conventionalist theories of mathematical truth[50-views] that both he and others have often dubbed "neo-Wittgensteinian." Against this background it can come as a surprise to find Putnam increasingly disposed in recent years to indulge in remarks such as the following: "In my view, Wittgenstein was simply the *deepest* philosopher of the century,"!' The apparent tension between Putnam's professed admiration for Wittgenstein in remarks such as this one and his recurring impatience with the forms of neo-Wittgensteinianism currently in vogue in philosophy of language and philosophy of mathematics can be perplexing. The appearance of a contradiction here, however, is eased somewhat by the discovery that Putnam also declares Wittgenstein to be "the most misunderstood" philosopher of the century." This declaration issues not so much from a conviction that Wittgenstein's epigones have simply misrepresented his substantive philosophical *views,* as from a

sense that they have misrepresented Wittgenstein as a philosopher who held views. On a number of occasions in the present volume, Putnam argues that Wittgenstein was not a philosopher who wished to put forward anything that could properly be termed a "philosophical view" of his own. In fact, he occasionally suggests that Wittgenstein should not even be thought of as wishing to put forward "arguments" in any traditional philosophical sense." This raises the question: if it is not his philosophical views or his arguments, what is it about Wittgenstein that Putnam professes to admire? The answer would appear to be the *manner* in which Wittgenstein philosophizes: his means of arriving at insight into what fuels and what relieves the tensions of philosophical controversy. Wittgenstein, on Putnam's reading of him-unlike the neo-Wittgensteinians mentioned above-is not concerned to arrive at anything a traditional philosopher would consider a "solution" to a philosophical problem. It does not follow from this that he wishes to debunk the philosopher's questions: "Wittgenstein is not a 'debunker': the philosophical *search* fascinates him; it is answers that he rejects.?"

It is at this point that we find perhaps the most striking mark of convergence between Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy and the one that informs Putnam's recent work: namely, the idea that it is the philosophical search itself that is of most interest in philosophy-the peculiar character of the questions that exercise philosophy-as opposed to any of the specific answers with which various thinkers have attempted to soothe the recurring insistence and mystery of the questions. Indeed, one aspect of the peculiarity of philosophy's questions lies in the very fact that they consistently tend to outlive the answers that are foisted upon them. Putnam begins Part Two of the title essay of this collection by invoking Wittgenstein in connection with the theme of "the death of metaphysics" and then goes on to issue the following summary statement of his own metaphysical credo:

> I take it as a fact of life that there is a sense in which the task of philosophy is to overcome metaphysics and a sense in which its task is to continue metaphysical discussion. In every philosopher there is a part that cries: "This enterprise is vain, frivolous, crazy-we must say, 'Stop!'" and a part that cries, "This enterprise is simply reflection at the most general and abstract level; to put a stop to it would be a crime against reason." *Of course* philosophical problems are unsolvable; but as Stanley Cavell once remarked, "there are better and worse ways of thinking about them."

To a reader primarily familiar with Putnam's early work, the most surprising words in this entire volume may consist of Putnam's remark here that "philosophical problems are unsolvable"-with the sole exception, that is, of the even more surprising words that immediately precede this remark, namely, "*Of course!*" Does Putnam wish us to take it as *obvious* that philosophical problems are unsolvable? Then why should we occupy ourselves with them? Putnam is here paraphrasing a passage in which Stanley Cavell says of the questions of philosophy that "while there may be no satisfying answers to such questions in *certain forms,* there are so to speak, directions to answers, *ways to think,* that are worth the time of your life to discover.T" To say that there are no satisfying answers to such questions in *certain forms* is to say that part of how one makes progress with such questions is by transforming them, by shifting the terms in which they present themselves to us. The trickiness of this position lies in its combining two perceptions that have traditionally competed with each other: first, that philosophical problems do not admit of satisfying answers (at least in the forms in which they have usually been posed), and second, that there is such a thing as philosophical progress (and that something of human importance hinges on its achievement). Cavell, in the passage in question, is summarizing what he takes to be Wittgenstein's teaching concerning the character of the questions that preoccupy philosophy. He makes this explicit, for example, in the following remarks:

> [Wittgenstein's] philosophizing is about philosophy as something that is always to be received. Philosophy in him is never over and done with. The questions on his mind are perennially,How do philosophical problems begin? and How are they momentarily brought peace? When Wittgenstein says that he comes to bring philosophy peace, it's always a possible answer to say, "Listen to this tortured man. How can what he does be seen as bringing philosophy peace? If that's what he wanted, he certainly failed." But that assumes that what he wanted to do was to bring philosophy peace once and for all, as though it was to rest in peace. And some people are perfectly ready to take him that way, as showing that philosophy came to an end at some point in cultural time. Even he flickeringly thought that might be the case. But what I take him constantly to mean is that just as you don't know a priori what will bring philosophy peace, so you never know at any crossroads what will cause another beginning. His work cannot be exempted from-and is not meant to be exempt from-such a view of what philosophy is, a view in which philosophy always lies ahead of him."

On this reading of Wittgenstein, philosophy stands both for those questions that, in the forms in which they impose themselves, do not admit of satisfying answers *and* for the activity of searching out directions to answers, ways to think, that relieve us of the perplexity with which such questions can torment us. Philosophy, so understood, is not an activity that comes to an end.'?

We can now see that in the passage by Putnam quoted above, he is summarizing a formulation of Cavell's which, in turn, is intended in part as a way of summarizing certain formulations of Wittgenstein's concerning the nature of philosophy's questions. Part of what Putnam takes from Cavell's reading of Wittgenstein here is the idea that any attempt to offer a straightforward solution to a longstanding philosophical problem constitutes a form of philosophical *evasion* insofar as it does not seek to come to terms with why it is that the purported "solution" is so unsatisfying to most people who are gripped by the question for which it was proposed as an answer-insofar, that is, as it does not seek in any way to contribute to our understanding of how it is that such problems persist in exercising the kind of fascination that they clearly do and clearly have for so many people for so many centuries. Putnam remarks elsewhere: "If philosophical investigations (a phrase made famous by another philosopher who 'changed his mind')" contribute to the thousands-of-years-old dialogue which is philosophy, if they deepen our understanding of the riddles we refer to as 'philosophical problems,' then the philosopher who conducts those investigations is doing the job right.':"

Putnam aligns himself with Wittgenstein here by describing the work in which he aspires to engage as consisting of "philosophical investigations." Such investigations, rather than proposing solutions, aim to "deepen our understanding of the riddles we refer to as 'philosophical problems.'" The comparison of a philosophical problem with a riddle is itself one that derives from Wittgenstein: "For in riddles one has no exact way of working out a solution. One can only say, 'I shall know a good solution if I see it.' "[60] According to Wittgenstein, both a riddle and a philosophical question consist of a form of words still in search of a sense. The sense of the question, he suggests, is a borrowed one that can only be fixed once we have an answer in hand." The form of words constrains the range of possible

answers but does not, in itself, uniquely determine the sense of the question. In Wittgenstein's view, in order to answer straightforwardly a question posed by such a form of words we must first specify a language-game in which it has a home. Yet it is also internal to Wittgenstein's teaching that such an answer (which provides a comfortable home for the question) will generally not satisfy us, for the answer will seem to drain the question of its original appearance of profundity'? Philosophical problems, Wittgenstein writes: "have the character of *depth*. They are deep disquietudes ... let us ask ourselves: why do we feel a grammatical joke to be *deep*. (And that is what the depth of philosophy is.)"63

In 'order to preserve its character of depth, the question must preserve its likeness not only to a riddle, but to a riddle that still awaits its solution. Each proposed answer that is imposed upon the question threatens to rob it of some of its characteristically philosophical peculiarity. Riddles, unlike philosophical questions, are posed by someone who has a specific, perfectly fitted answer already in view. A good riddle is carefully tailored to match its preexisting answer. Philosophical questions are more like riddles with no preexisting answer, riddles to which no answer quite fits-though various directions of answer suggest themselves. Hence Putnam writes: "Philosophy is not a subject that eventuates in final solutions, and the discovery that the latest view-no matter if one produced it *oneself-still* does not clear away the mystery is characteristic of the work, when the work is well done.?" This will strike some readers as an astounding conclusion for a philosopher like Putnam to reach. Yet, in some ways, it is a not at all surprising development that the contemporary analytic philosopher most famous for both propounding and converting his colleagues to a wide range of different solutions to philosophical problems should now propound the conclusion that "philosophy is not a subject that eventuates in final solutions." In the past, frustrated critics of Putnam's work have sometimes dismissively labeled him a "moving target," referring to his infamous tendency to change his mind." As John Passmore, a historian of twentieth-century Anglo-American philosophy, observes, Putnam can be considered the Bertrand Russell of contemporary philosophy in this respect." Passmore not only remarks that "Putnam shares Russell's capacity for changing his mind as a result of learning from his contemporaries.t"? but goes on to complain that trying to characterize "Putnam's philosophy [in particular, his swings between realism and anti-realism] is like trying

to capture the wind with a fishing net."68 Indeed, this has often served as a rallying point for Putnam's critics, who have charged that his string of metamorphoses serves as evidence that in his philosophizing Putnam is unable to preserve a stable relation to his own convictions-as if a responsiveness to one's convictions could be measured by one's unwillingness to change. Nevertheless, some discussion of Putnam's work crops up in virtually every chapter of Passmore's latest book, entitled *Recent Philosophers,* as if it were undeniably the case that several of the most important recent philosophers all happened to be named "Hilary Putnam." Passmore himself remarks on the oddity of his procedure at one point: "Putnam's Russellian capacity for changing his mind makes him very useful for our purposes. He *is* the history of recent philosophy in outline."69

To many, however, this will still appear to be a dubious form of praise. For even if obstinacy is not an intellectual virtue, surely neither is fickleness-an inability to form genuine philosophical commitments. Is this Putnam's problem? Wolfgang Stegmiiller, in a survey of contemporary philosophy not unlike Passmore's, puts a rather different face on this aspect of Putnam's work: "It is the coincidence of a variety of features, as fortunate as they are extraordinary, that have contributed to Putnam's occupying the central position that he does in intellectual discussion within the contemporary English-speaking world. Foremost among these is his infallible instinct for what, in the unsurveyable diversity of contemporary discussions, is genuinely *significant,* combined with his ability to arrange a confrontation with the issues in a fashion that consistently promises to advance our thinking in some new direction."70 Stegmiiller here portrays Putnam as someone who, far from blowing with the winds of current intellectual fashion, acts as the conscience of our philosophical culture, drawing attention to the strains in our commitments and driving wedges into the cracks in our contemporary dogmas-acting as a force that shapes, rather than merely conforms to, the prevailing intellectual agenda of the time. If there is anything to Stegmiiller's assessment here, then a volume of Putnam's recent work should be of interest to anyone who seeks some glimpse not only of the direction in which philosophy "within the contemporary English-speaking world" is presently headed, but the direction which it might soon be about to take.

Putnam's remark that "philosophy is not a subject that eventuates in final solutions" would appear to suggest that his most recent

change is more than simply a change of mind. It does not simply mark a conversion to some new philosophical position, one that is now opposed to his previously held view, but rather a change of philosophical heart-a movement in an orthogonal direction: an aspiration to a broader perspective on his work as a whole. His search, it would appear, is no longer simply directed toward arriving at a new and more satisfying candidate for the next philosophical orthodoxy, but rather is directed toward a more inclusive and a more historical standpoint, one that allows him to survey and scrutinize the intellectual forces that have fueled the engine of his own philosophical development, provoking his series of conversions over the years--eonversions that have in turn helped to usher in and usher out one form of professional orthodoxy after another. The fact that his work over the past few decades represents the history of recent analytic philosophy in outline has helped to make the topic of the fragile and ephemeral character of philosophical orthodoxy-as well as the cyclical alternation between reigning forms of orthodoxy and heterodoxy-itself a philosophical topic of increasing urgency and centrality for him.

Kant's name for this alternating cycle of orthodoxy and heterodoxy is the dialectic between dogmatism and skepticism." He argues that the dogmatist's and the skeptic's respective pictures--one of Reason's omnipotence and one of its impotence-are based on a common false step. Indeed, this is the point at which Putnam sees an anticipation of a Wittgensteinian theme in Kant's thought-as evidenced in the opening sentence of the *Critique of Pure Reason:* "Human reason has this peculiar fate that in one species of its knowledge it is burdened by questions which, as presented by the very nature of reason itself, it is not able to ignore, but which, as transcending all its powers, it is also not able to answer."

For Kant, as we saw earlier, this propensity of the human mind to pose questions to itself that it is unable to answer is a natural and inevitable concomitant of its capacity to reason. Hence, human beings will always have a need for philosophy. A prevalent reading of Wittgenstein, recently popularized by Richard Rorty, attempts to distinguish him from Kant in this respect, viewing his work as undertaking to quench the human need for philosophy once and for all. On this reading, Wittgenstein is to be understood as teaching that all that there is left for (the good) philosophers to do is to clean up the metaphysical mistakes that other (bad) philosophers have committed. Putnam suggests at a number of points that such a reading of Wittgenstein depends upon a misunderstanding of the role of the meta-

physically inclined interlocutory voice that intervenes on almost every page of Wittgenstein's later writings. Rorty appears to follow the widespread tendency to interpret the presence of this interlocutory voice as a literary device for dramatizing the metaphysical temptations of some misguided other-someone not yet privy to Wittgenstein's vision of how matters stand-a voice that is ultimately to be brought to silence. It is to be sharply distinguished from Wittgenstein's own voice: the voice in his text that rounds on, corrects, and censors the interlocutory voice. Putnam appears to favor a reading in which the two voices that pervade Wittgenstein's later writing-Stanley Cavell calls them the voice of temptation and the voice of correctness'<e-are viewed as locked in an enactment of the Kantian dialectic of pure reason. On this reading, the insistence that drives each of these voices is understood as feeding on and sustaining the other. The antimetaphysical voice (which denies the theses that the metaphysician propounds) contents itself with propounding countertheses that only perpetuate, however unwittingly, the cycle of philosophical controversy. Putnam follows Cavell in holding that Wittgenstein's writing aspires to a further perspective--one that does not take sides in this dialectic of insistence and counterinsistence--one that seeks to bring the philosopher within himself a *moment* of peace. Yet it is important that this be consistent with Wittgenstein's holding that the voice of temptation is one that naturally and inevitably speaks up again-it can be brought to a moment of peace but never definitively silenced. On this reading, "the philosopher" whom Wittgenstein wishes to address is, *pace* Rorty, not primarily some subset of humanity that spends its working hours in university philosophy departments, but rather someone who might best be described as the philosopher in each and everyone of us (including, preeminently, the philosopher in Wittgenstein himself)." In a famous section of his *Philosophical Investigations,* Wittgenstein writes: "The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of breaking off [coming to a pause] in philosophy when I want to.-The one that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring *itself* in question."?' The reference here to philosophy as an activity that the author wishes to be capable of breaking off implies that it is also one that will inevitably be resumed.

Wittgenstein's aim is thus to bring philosophy peace in each of its moments of torment, one by one, as they arise-not, however, to lay philosophy to rest once and for all, so that it may, in Cavell's words, "rest in peace" and never rise again. For Wittgenstein, as for Kant,

philosophy is, on the one hand, the name of that inevitable form of intellectual entanglement that is a natural symptom of the pressure of our taking thought, and, on the other hand, the name of our equally inborn desire for intellectual clarity that ministers to us in our recurring crises of confusion. To undertake to lay the impulse to philosophy within ourselves to rest once and for all would be tantamount to renouncing our capacity for thought. Hence, "as long as reflective people remain in the world," as Putnam, puts it, "metaphysical discussion will not disappear." Not only, on this view, is the impulse to philosophy a constitutive feature of the human, but the impulse to repudiate the philosopher within oneself-the dream of bringing philosophy to an end, not simply for the time being, but for all time-is itself a moment within philosophy. The impulse to repudiate the philosopher within oneself is paradigmatically philosophical, above all, in its human desire to repudiate one's own humanity." Throughout the present volume, the reader will find Putnam suggesting that our philosophical "craving" for an unattainably high pitch of certainty (and the ensuing forms of all-consuming doubt that it precipitates) is rooted deeper in the human animal than has been hitherto generally acknowledged by those who undertake to propose "solutions" to the problems that our craving for philosophy spins off. The suggestion throughout appears to be that it is part of what it is to be human that one be subject to philosophical cravings that lead one to renounce the conditions of one's humanity. An examination of the character and sources of such cravings should therefore reveal something about what it is to be a human being. It follows further that the tendency in philosophical realism to wipe the human face off our image of the world and ourselves in it is itself a deeply human tendency. This adds a further twist to the title of this volume, for it would seem that, in this sense, every form of what Putnam calls "Realism with a capital 'R'" can be said to bear a human face (but then, in this sense, so can every form of totalitarianism be said to bear a human face).

The following theme pervades each of the essays that follow: The answers that philosophers have canvassed, and continue to canvas, as solutions to philosophy's problems are unable to provide satisfaction to most people (including most other philosophers) who are gripped by the questions of philosophy. A number of essays engage this theme by taking up the claim, most vigorously advocated in recent years by Richard Rorty, that we stand on the verge of a "post-philosophical culture" in which, once it dawns, the problems of philosophy will

cease to exercise us any longer." Part Two of the title essay of this volume primarily consists of an argument with Rorty over this issue. Its opening paragraph climaxes in Etienne Gilson's elegant aphorism: "Philosophy always buries its undertakers." Putnam is alluding here to Gilson's suggestion that a proclamation of the end of philosophy-something Rorty trumpets as the latest news-itself forms a constitutive and recurring moment *within* the history of philosophy-an integral phase of the dialectic which drives the subject onward-as if philosophy really would come to an end, that is, a standstill, if at every other juncture someone did not succeed in transforming and revitalizing the subject by calling, in the name of philosophy (that is, out of a fa'ithfulness to philosophy's own aspirations), for the end of philosophy. Hence, having just completed an overview of the history of the subject from the medieval to the modern period, Gilson writes: "Now the most striking of the recurrences which we have been observing together is the revival of philosophical speculation by which every skeptical crisis was regularly attended. As it has an immediate bearing on the very existence of philosophy itself, such a fact is not only striking, it is for us the most fundamental fact of all. ... The so-called death of philosophy being regularly attended by its revival, some new dogmatism should now be at hand. In short, the first law to be inferred from philosophical experience is: *Philosophy always buries its undertakers*" (his emphasis)."

Putnam concurs with Gilson here, summarizing his conclusion as follows: "A simple induction from the history of thought suggests that metaphysical discussion is not going to disappear as long as reflective people remain in the world." However, Putnam is not prepared to rest his case against Rorty on this simple induction from the history of thought. Writing half a century after Gilson, Putnam shares Rorty's sense that the traditional problems of philosophy have come to seem problematic to us in a way that no longer encourages the idea that some traditional form of philosophical speculation, as Gilson had hoped, will soothe our current skeptical crisis: "There is a sense in which the futility of something that was called epistemology is a sharper, more painful problem for *our* period-a period that hankers to be called 'Post-Modern' rather than modern" (Chapter 1, Part Two).

Nevertheless, Putnam is as wary of Rorty's scorn for traditional philosophical controversy as he is of Gilson's optimism that philosophy in its traditional form will continue to prosper. The second half

of the title essay of this volume is devoted primarily to specifying his differences with Rorty and "the French thinkers he admires." In particular, Putnam focuses on "two broad attitudes" toward philosophical problems, both of which he claims are "gripping" for Rorty, and both of which he finds repugnant. He summarizes the first of these attitudes as follows:

> The failure of our philosophical "foundations" is a failure of the whole culture, and accepting that we were wrong in wanting or thinking we could have a "foundation" requires us to be *philosophical revisionists*. By this I mean that, for Rorty or Foucault or Derrida, the failure of foundationalism makes a difference to how we are allowed to talk in ordinary life-a difference as to whether and when we are allowed to use words like "know," "objective," "fact," and "reason." The picture is that philosophy was not a reflection *on* the culture, a reflection some of whose ambitious projects failed, but a *basis,* a sort of pedestal, on which the culture rested, and which has been abruptly yanked out. Under the pretense that philosophy is no longer "serious" there lies hidden a gigantic seriousness."

Putnam's quarrel with philosophical revisionism is one of the motivating sources of his distinction between Realism with a capital "R" and realism with a small "r": "If saying what we say and doing what we do is being a 'realist,' then we had better be realists-realists with a small 'r.' But metaphysical versions of 'realism' go beyond realism with a small or' into certain characteristic kinds of philosophical fantasy" (Chapter 1, Part Two). It will emerge that to call such views characteristic kinds of fantasy is a very particular form of criticism-one that suggests that what these views require is a treatment that will prove therapeutic-that is, that will restore their sense of reality. Putnam defines Realism with a capital "R" (which he also calls "scientific' realism" or "objectivism") as the set of views that depend upon the following two assumptions: "(1) the assumption that there is a clear distinction to be drawn between the properties things have 'in themselves' and the properties which are 'projected by us,' and (2) the assumption that the fundamental science-in the singular, since only physics has that status today-tells us what properties things have in themselves."?"

Such views end by concluding that our commonsense view of the world (along with the commonsense "objects" that it "postulates" such as tables and chairs) embodies a false picture of reality (and hence that tables and chairs, strictly speaking, do not *really* exist).

Such views often, therefore, also tend to conclude that propositions that we ordinarily take to be true are, strictly speaking, false. What Putnam calls "realism with a small 'r'" opposes these conclusions and affirms our ordinary picture of the world and the everyday linguistic practices that it licenses. Putnam remarks in a number of places that what he thinks of as "realism with a small 'r'" is meant to bring out an important point of convergence that he finds in strains of both analytic and Continental philosophy (in particular, in the phenomenological tradition, as represented preeminently by Husserl, and in ordinary language philosophy, as represented preeminently by the later Wittgenstein): an unwillingness to hold our everyday intuitions about what is "reasonable" (or "true") hostage to our philosophical theories: "The strength of the Objectivist tradition is so strong that some philosophers will abandon the deepest intuitions we have about ourselves-in-the-world, rather than ask (as Husserl and Wittgenstein did) whether the whole picture is not a mistake.i"?

Putnam connects the label "realism with a small 'r'" with Wittgenstein's remark that in doing philosophy we tend to forget that trees and chairs-the "thises and thats we can point to"-are paradigms of what we call "real."!' Putnam credits Husserl with tracing the source of our philosophical dissatisfaction with our commonsense picture of the world to the rise of modern science:

> Thus, it is clear that the name "Realism" can be claimed by or given to at least two very different philosophical attitudes ... The philosopher who claims that only scientific objects "really exist" and that much, if not all, of the commonsense world is mere "projection" claims to be a "realist," but so does the philosopher who insists that there *really are* chairs ...
>
> Husserl traces the first line of thought, the line that denies that there "really are" commonsense objects, back to Galileo, and with good reason. The present Western world-view depends, according to Husserl, on a new way of conceiving "external objects"-the way of mathematical physics ... And this, he points out, is what above all came into Western thinking with the Galilean revolution: the idea of the "external world" as something whose true description, whose description "in itself," consists of mathematical formulas.V

The Realist, on the assumption that the scientific picture of the world represents "the One True Image" (or, as Putnam also likes to call it, "the God's-Eye View"), concludes that our commonsense image of the world is second-class. It begins to appear, indeed, to be in certain respects worse than second-class, if one endorses a further

assumption championed by some Realists: namely, that the scientific and the everyday vocabularies for describing and understanding the world embody *conflicting* "conceptual schemes." An allegiance to the former vocabulary is then viewed as naturally entailing various forms of disillusionment with beliefs and practices that depend upon the latter. Putnam follows Wittgenstein in arguing that ordinary language in itself embodies neither a theory of the world (that could so much as conflict with scientific theory) nor an ontology (in the philosopher's sense) which commits the speaker to "postulating" the existence of a set of fundamental objects. Putnam sees Scientific Realism's fixation on the achievement of modern science as leading to philosophical confusion in a further way as well, namely, through its fascination with the *methods* of science-in particular, those of reduction (exhibiting higher-level entities to be constructions of lower-level entities) and formalization (revealing the hidden logical structure, or lack thereof, of ordinary beliefs by rendering them in a formal language). In Chapter 7 Putnam diagnoses the tendency in modern philosophy to extrapolate the application of these methods beyond their legitimate scope of application as a characteristic expression of the pressure of certain philosophical cravings:

> I can sympathize with the urge to *know,* to *have* a totalistic explanation which includes the thinker in the act of discovering the totalistic explanation in the totality of what it explains. I am not saying that this urge is "optional" ... But I am saying that the project of providing such an explanation has failed.
>
> It has failed not because it was an illegitimate urge-what human pressure could be more worthy of respect than the pressure to *know?-but* because it goes beyond the bounds of any notion of explanation that we have.

The implication here is that "the pressure to know," which leads us to legitimate forms of knowledge, is one that also leads us into metaphysical confusion. Since, even if it were possible, it would be self-defeating for us to seek immunity from this pressure, we have no choice but to try to be vigilant about when it pushes us beyond the bounds of sense, stretching our ordinary concepts out to a point where they cease any longer to have an application. Held up against such a stretched-out philosophical concept of knowledge, our ordinary practices and beliefs appear too particular, too subjective, too local, too perspectival. Putnam suggests that insofar as our analyses

of "Objective Knowledge," "Truth," and "Rationality" are tied to certain of these ideals-based usually on a metaphysical picture of what accounts for the success of science-the conclusion will inevitably be forthcoming that our ordinary claims to knowledge are not, strictly speaking, "true," nor are our everyday practices, strictly speaking, "rational." This forces a choice between our prephilosophical intuitions and the conclusions of our philosophical theories. If we opt for the latter, then it appears to follow that full philosophical honesty requires us to call for *revisions* in our ordinary practices. The first two steps, for Putnam, in countering this impetus to what he calls "philosophical revisionism" are to question the coherence of the ideals of objectivity and rationality that are being brought to bear on our ordinary practices, and to diagnose and do justice to the sources of their appeal. At many early junctures in the essays that follow, Putnam is often concerned at the outset merely to draw our attention to how deeply rooted in us "ideas of perfect knowledge" and "ideas of the falsity of everything short of perfect knowledge" are-how deeply such ideas "speak to US."[83] As a given essay progresses, the project in each case takes on a specific focus: to trace some particular contemporary form of philosophical dissatisfaction with our ordinary practices to its source in a disappointment over how those practices are unable to live up to the standard of a philosophical ideal that is being brought to bear on them. When the philosophical ideal turns out on closer examination to be an unattainable one, Putnam tries to show that rather than retracing our steps, we tend to opt for a strategy of despair: we lose confidence in our practices along with the ideals we brought to them. In whatever way a philosophical project of providing a foundation that holds out the promise of satisfying our philosophical cravings falls through, the tendency is then to conclude that the entire superstructure of ordinary practices and beliefs that the foundation was to support is bankrupt as well-to conclude, as Putnam expresses it, that "philosophy was not a reflection *on* the culture, a reflection some of whose ambitious projects failed, but a *basis,* a sort of pedestal, on which the culture rested, and which has been abruptly yanked out." The conclusion ensues that the genuine article (truth, objectivity, rationality) is unattainable. Putnam suggests, as a partial diagnosis, that what appeals to us about such philosophical views (that declare our ordinary practices to be merely second-class) is that they claim to demythologize our lives. Nothing satisfies us more, being the children of modernity that we are, than

the thought that we cannot be duped. Only a view that holds out the promise of having completed the modern project of disenchanting the world, so that a moment of further disillusionment is no longer possible for us, will cater to our image of ourselves as immune to the temptation of self-deception. As Putnam says in Chapter 9, we want to believe that we have *seen through* how things appear to how they really are:

> Our modern revelation may be a depressing revelation, but at least it is a *demythologizing* revelation. If the world is terrible, at least we *know* that our fathers were fools to think otherwise, and that everything they believed and cherished was a lie, or at best superstition ...
>
> I think that this consolation to our vanity cannot be overestimated. Narcissism is often a more powerful force in human life than self-preservation or the desire for a productive, loving, fulfilling life ... We would welcome [a new view] ... *provided* the new view gave us the same intellectual confidence, the same idea that we have a superior method, the same sense of being on top of the facts, that the scientistic view gives us. If the new view were to threaten our intellectual pride ... then, I suspect, many of us would reject it as "unscientific," "vague," lacking in "criteria for deciding," and so on. In fact, I suspect many of us will stick with the scientistic view even if it, at any rate, can be *shown* to be inconsistent or incoherent. In short, we shall prefer to go on being depressed to losing our status as sophisticated persons.

Giving up our "status as sophisticated persons" requires allowing ourselves to be vulnerable to disappointment; hence we are only satisfied with absolute knowledge or no knowledge at all. We prefer the alternative of complete skepticism to the possibility of genuine knowledge with all the risks of fallibility it entails. In Chapter 8, entitled "The Craving for Objectivity," Putnam discusses the example of recent attempts in philosophy to reduce the highly informal everyday activity of interpretation to a set of formalizable rules and the ensuing wholesale skepticism about meaning and interpretation that has followed in the wake of the failure of such attempts. The essay concludes: "The contemporary tendency to regard interpretation as something second class reflects, I think, ... a craving for absolutes-a craving for absolutes and a tendency which is inseparable from that craving, the tendency to think that if the absolute is unattainable, then 'anything goes.'" The title of this essay is derived from a famous passage in which Wittgenstein discusses what he calls the philosopher's "craving for generality." Wittgenstein also diagnoses this craving as arising in part through the philosopher's fixation on the methods of science: "Our craving for generality has another main source: our preoccupation with the method of science. I mean, the method of reducing the explanation of natural phenomena to the smallest number of primitive natural laws; and, in mathematics, of unifying the treatment of different topics by using a generalization. Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics, and leads the philosopher into complete darkness.?"

Putnam's charge against Rorty and "the French thinkers that he admires" is not that they share this widespread philosophical preoccupation with the method of science, but that they falsely imagine themselves to have transcended the confusions engendered by this preoccupation-in particular, they fail to appreciate how much the manner in which they reject philosophical projects guided by such a preoccupation is still conditioned by the same craving which gave rise to such, projects in the first place. In Putnam's view, the character of Rorty's disappointment with certain features of our culture reflects the strength of the hold that the philosophical craving for absoluteness continues to exert on him. It is his equation of objectivity with a certain metaphysical picture of objectivity that drives him to the misguided conclusion that the demise of this picture carries in its train implications for the integrity and security of our ordinary claims to knowledge. Putnam is alarmed by the *ethical* implications of Rorty's antimetaphysical stance, in particular, the moral it draws concerning how we should view our everyday lives-a moral that depends on a "misrepresentation" of "the lives we lead with our concepts.'?" Putnam follows Wittgenstein in proposing that philosophical progress will come from a closer examination of our everyday practices of entering and adjudicating claims about what is true and what is reasonable:

> Rather than looking with suspicion on the claim that some value judgments are reasonable and some are unreasonable, or some views are true and some false, or some words refer and some do not, I am concerned with bringing us back to precisely these claims, which we do, after all, constantly make in our daily lives. Accepting the "manifest image," the *Lebenswelt,* the world as we actually experience it, demands of us who have (for better or for worse) been philosophi-

> cally trained that we both regain our sense of mystery ... and our sense of the common (for that some ideas are "unreasonable" is, after all, a *common* fact-it is only the weird notions of "objectivity" and "subjectivity" that we have acquired from Ontology and Epistemology that make us unfit to dwell in the common);"

In saying that philosophy makes us "unfit to dwell in the common," Putnam follows Wittgenstein in viewing philosophy as an activity that places us not only at odds with what we ordinarily say and do, but also, what is more important, in a position from which we are unable to recover our sense of the ordinary. We become able to view the ordinary only through the lens of a philosophical theory: we lose our sense of the genuineness of our conviction in the reasonableness (or unreasonableness) or truth (or falsity) of certain actions or claims. Our former, prephilosophical conviction now appears to us to be only the consequence of our youthful, unreflective, metaphysical naivete (and hence an effort at self-deception seems to be a necessary precondition of recovering such conviction). Thus the price of intellectual honesty appears to be the abandonment of many of our ordinary ways of talking and thinking. Putnam's summary statement of his disagreement with Rorty over this issue (in Chapter 1, Part Two) encapsulates the philosophical attitude that informs especially the essays concerned with specifically ethical and political matters in this volume: "I hope that philosophical reflection may be of some real cultural value; but I do not think it has been the pedestal on which the culture rested, and I do not think our reaction to the failure of a philosophical project-even a project as central as 'metaphysics'-should be to abandon ways of talking and thinking which have practical and spiritual weight."

Putnam links the hastiness with which Rorty draws revisionist implications from the failure of traditional philosophical projects with a second moment of hastiness--one that issues from the other of Rorty's "two broad attitudes": namely, the contempt with which Rorty dismisses long-standing philosophical controversies. Putnam suggests that this particular failing is, to some extent, characteristic of analytic philosophers: "Rorty's analytic past shows up in this: when he rejects a philosophical controversy, as, for example, he rejects the 'realism/anti-realism' controversy, or the 'emotive/cognitive' controversy, his rejection is expressed in a Carnapian tone of voice-he *scorns* the controversy" (Chapter 1, Part Two). Putnam's

disagreement with Rorty here reflects a further difference in their respective interpretations of the teachings of the later Wittgenstein, as well as that of the major figures of the movement called Ordinary Language Philosophy (Austin, Bouwsma, Wisdom, and Ryle) whose philosophical methods most closely resembled Wittgenstein's. Rorty takes it that the work of these figures, and especially that of Wittgenstein, shows us that what we should do is simply *dismiss* the problems that have most exercised philosophers over the past few centuries. The feature of Rorty's attitude toward philosophical controversy that concerns Putnam here is evident in the following passages from Rorty's review of *The Claim of Reason* by Stanley Cavell:

> Austin, Bouwsma, Wittgenstein, Wisdom, and Ryle all suggested that we just shrug off the claims which Berkeley and Descartes and Moore made on us-that we teach epistemology as the history of some bad ideas. Now Cavell tells us that, unless we take these claims very seriously indeed, we shan't get the full benefit of what Wittgenstein and Austin (in particular) can do for us. We mustn't, he tells us, shrug off skepticism too easily, for then we may miss "the truth of skepticism" .
>
> But if [Cavell] is not concerned about being professional, why worry about "American philosophical life"? The latter phrase can only refer to current trends in fashionable philosophy departments. Among intellectuals generally, Wittgenstein is in fact being read and used more and more. It is only within certain philosophy departments that he, and "Oxford philosophy," are *vieux jeu*. Such parochial matters should not concern Cavell ... One would have expected him to conclude that Wittgenstein would be better served by *forgetting* "events within American philosophical life" than by recapturing them."

This is the voice of a man who is angry about his education. He has come to the conclusion that the history of epistemology has been a "history of some bad ideas." His overwhelming emotion, when faced with the traditional problems of philosophy, is one of impatience-a desire to get on to something more fruitful. Rorty's interest in Wittgenstein therefore is an interest in someone who has managed to put this history behind himself-someone who will enable us to put this history behind ourselves, so that we may distance ourselves from the pain of its pointlessness. Thus he feels that there is an inconsistency in Cavell's being interested in Wittgenstein's work *and* in the problems that preoccupied the great historical figures and still preoc-

cupy "professional" philosophers: "What Cavell wants us not to miss is, to be sure, as important as he thinks it is. But does he *have* to drag us back through Berkeley and Descartes to see it?"88

What Rorty wants to know is why philosophers like Cavell and Putnam do not simply confine themselves to stating what is *wrong* with the traditional views. Why do they insist on motivating the issue from within, dragging us back through the messy details of the traditional philosophical problems? Rorty feels their attachment to the tradition is a mark of their unfaithfulness to Wittgenstein's teaching. Putnam wishes to contest this reading of Wittgenstein. Rorty's reading of Wittgenstein is both a fairly representative and a widely circulated one-with the significant difference that Rorty celebrates what most philosophers deplore in this version of Wittgenstein: namely, the conclusion that the problems of philosophy can be, and should be, "shrugged off." Putnam's reading of Wittgenstein owes much to the writings of Cavell. On Cavell's reading, Wittgenstein's primary philosophical virtue is precisely his *patience-his* willingness to head straight into a confused tangle of issues and to crisscross back and forth across the same piece of philosophical landscape until gradually some perspicuous overview of the terrain can be achieved. Putnam shares with both Rorty and Wittgenstein a deep distrust of analytic philosophy's self-understanding of the integrity of its own projects. He aligns himself with Cavell's reading of Wittgenstein and against Rorty's, however, in order to justify an important presupposition of the philosophical practice that pervades the essays collected here: there is no substitute for (and hence philosophically no more pressing task than) providing a detailed and convincing exposition of where and how the central projects of analytic philosophy come apart on themselves, and where and how they misrepresent our lives.

Wittgenstein has his interlocutor ask: "What is your aim in philosophy?" He responds: "To show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle.':" Rorty's recommendation appears to be that one should leave the fly in the fly-bottle and get on with something more interesting. On Rorty's reading of Wittgenstein, the enlightened philosopher should simply dismiss the traditional problems and leave them to those who are less enlightened. The implication would appear to be that these are not necessarily *our* problems and that to be free of them all we need to do is learn to lose interest in them. This suggests that we *can* "just shrug off the claims which Berkeley and Descartes and Moore made on us"-as if what we required in order to liberate ourselves from the

tangle of issues that has dominated the history of philosophy were primarily a sheer act of will. Contrast this with Wittgenstein's description of our relation to a philosophical problem: "A *picture* held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably,"?"

A philosophical picture holding us captive-this is roughly the opposite of something we can simply decide to "shrug off." The recognition that we are stuck does not by itself provide a means of liberation.[91] However, part of what Wittgenstein means by saying that a *picture* holds us captive is that we cannot recognize our picture of things as a picture-a fixated image that we have imposed-and it is our inability to recognize this that renders us captive. The fly is trapped because he does not realize that he is in a fly-bottle; in order to show him the way out, we first need to show him that we have an appreciation of where he thinks he is, that we are able to understand his view from the inside. In order to show the metaphysician anything, we need to take his questions seriously and register an awareness of what the world looks like from his point of view. On this reading of Wittgenstein, the central virtue of philosophy, as he conceives it, is responsiveness: a willingness always to make the other's questions real for oneself. This, however, is precisely the feature of Putnam's and Cavell's practice at which Rorty bristles: "One would have thought that, once we were lucky enough to get writers like Wittgenstein and Nietzsche who resist professionalization, we might get some criticism which *didn't* remain internal to philosophy.":"

Rorty craves a critique of the tradition that remains *external* to philosophy. Wittgenstein's aim in philosophy was to *change* his readers and with them the tradition in which they participate-this is something that can only be undertaken from within the tradition." Rorty is not interested in transforming the tradition, but rather in simply breaking with it. Hence his picture of the "edifying" philosopher is of someone who "can be *only* reactive," who "falls into self-deception whenever [he] tries to do more than send the conversation off in new directions.'?" Putnam is, above all, concerned to distance himself from this feature of Rorty's picture of "edifying philosophy," as he says in Chapter 1, Part Two: "I think that what is important in philosophy is not just to say, 'I reject the realistlantirealist controversy,' but to show that (and how) both sides *misrepresent* the lives we live with our concepts. That a controversy is 'futile' does not mean that the rival pictures are unimportant. Indeed, to reject a controversy

without examining the pictures involved is almost always a way of *defending* one of those pictures (usually the one that claims to be 'antimetaphysical')."

A further important difference between Rorty's and Putnam's respective readings of Wittgenstein emerges here in Putnam's remark that what the philosophical critic needs to learn to do is to show how both sides of a typical philosophical controversy tend to "misrepresent the lives we live with our concepts." The point is not only that certain features of our everyday lives tend to become distorted when viewed through the lens of a philosophical theory, but, more important, that the nature and character of this distortion are themselves important subjects for philosophical reflection. The specific fashion in which our image of what it is to be human tends to be deformed under the equally specific pressures brought to bear upon it by the demands of our philosophical theories is itself deeply revelatory of part of what it is to be human-that is, to be subject to such cravings to deny one's humanity. Part of what Wittgenstein's work calls upon its reader to do is to acknowledge the attraction such cravings can exercise for him and hence also to recognize the depth of his resistance to such an acknowledgment. In his review of Cavell, it becomes clear that this is the feature of Cavell's interpretation of Wittgenstein that irritates Rorty the most, as well as the one that most separates his own vision of what philosophy should become from the one that Putnam entertains. Rorty says that what frustrates him about Cavell is his insistence that the philosophical questions that have exercised the tradition reveal "something important about *human beings*."[95] Putnam explicitly aligns himself with Cavell, and against Rorty, on this issue: "I think philosophy is both more important and less important than Rorty does. It is not a pedestal on which we rest (or have rested until Rorty). Yet the illusions that philosophy spins are illusions that belong to the nature of human life itself, and that need to be illuminated. Just saying, 'That's a pseudo-issue' is not of itself therapeutic; it is an aggressive form of the metaphysical disease itself" (Chapter 1, Part Two).

Putnam's last sentence echoes Wittgenstein's remark that "the philosopher's treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness.?" Part of what the treatment of an illness requires is compassion; only here we have to do with an illness one of whose symptoms is a form of uncompassionateness---obliviousness to the other. Putnam's observation that Rorty's terms of philosophical criticism offer no possibility for therapeutic progress harks back to Wittgenstein's famous com-

parison of his philosophical approach to therapy," The pertinent feature of the analogy here is the role that the virtue of responsiveness plays in both. Wittgenstein says that only those words which occasion genuine self-understanding are the words we seek in philosophy: "We can only convince the other of his mistakenness [in philosophy] if he acknowledges [what we say] as genuinely expressing his feeling-if he acknowledges this expression as (genuinely being) the correct expression of his feeling. For only if he acknowledges it as such *is* it the correct expression. (Psychoanalysis.)"?"

Eliciting the other's acknowledgment requires correctly identifying the sources of his philosophical insistence. The measure of the accuracy of a diagnosis is the degree of illumination it ultimately is able to afford one's interlocutor. It is a criterion of one's having arrived at the right words in philosophy that the other is able to recognize himself in those words-to recognize the accuracy of one's description of him as grounds for dissatisfaction with himself. "Just saying, 'That's a pseudo-issue' is not of itself therapeutic"; it will only infuriate him. Insofar as he truly is in the grip of a pseudo-issue, simply *denying* what he says will not constitute intellectual progress: the negation of a pseudo-proposition is also a pseudo-proposition. One does not free oneself from a metaphysical picture simply by asserting the negation of a metaphysical thesis. Unless one carefully examines the character of a given philosophical position's seductiveness to those who are attracted to it, as well as the character of the disappointment it provokes in those who reject it-what allows for it to appear initially so innocent and yet the implications of its failure so precipitous---one's gesture of rejecting the picture will inevitably represent a further form of participation in it and victimization by it. Our "antimetaphysical" rejection of one moment will prove to be, as Putnam says, "just another way of *defending*" another, often slightly more entrenched, moment in the metaphysical dialectic. There is a tremendous pressure to formulate our rejection in terms of a counterthesis and to latch firmly onto the ensuing formulation, convinced that it affords the only available refuge from the position from which we wish to escape. Hence each philosophical position bears the stamp of another-ironically, the one from which it most seeks to be free. As Putnam says in Chapter 16, "Very often, the problem in philosophy is that a philosopher who knows what he wants to deny feels that he cannot simply do so, but must make a 'positive' statement; and the positive statement is frequently a disaster."

This way in which we fixate on a counterthesis, Wittgenstein sug-

gests, is one of the sources of "the dogmatism into which we fall so easily in doing philosophy."? A number of the essays collected here are specifically concerned to resist this temptation to lapse into one of a number of classical forms of counterassertion, to indicate a way out of the spiraling dialectic of insistence and counterinsistence; and these essays are often, in addition, concerned to indicate explicitly that their task is one of struggling against philosophical.temptation."" The power and longevity of a given philosophical temptation are themselves something that calls for philosophical reflection. When particular philosophical theories are able repeatedly to resurrect themselves after their obituaries have been written several times over, it no longer suffices simply to rehearse the same old arguments. Putnam takes it as evident "that the brilliant thinkers who propound such theories are in the grip of an intellectual yearning worth taking seriously,"!" Part of the task of philosophical criticism, therefore, becomes to identify and isolate the source and character of the yearning. This requires the cultivation of a nose for what occasions philosophical fixation and, as in therapy, an ear for when someone is inclined to insist a little too loudly that something *must* be the case. Putnam writes: "It is just these philosophical 'musts,' just the points at which a philosopher feels no argument is needed because something is just 'obvious,' that ... [one] should learn to challenge.t'l'" Precisely those claims that a philosopher finds most trivial are the ones we are to learn to look on with suspicion. In Wittgenstein's words: "The decisive movement in the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very one that we thought quite innocent."103

The conception of philosophy that emerges from this-an activity isolating decisive moments in philosophical conjuring tricks-ean seem to be a purely *negative* one.l'" Furthermore, given the outcome of the traditional agenda of analytic philosophy, it can seem as if the only space left for accomplishment in philosophy is occupied exclusively by such negative tasks. Putnam writes in Chapter 3:

> Analytic philosophy has great accomplishments, to be sure; but those accomplishments are negative. Like logical positivism (itself just one species of analytic philosophy), analytic philosophy has succeeded in destroying the very problem with which it started ...
>
> But analytic philosophy pretends today not to be just one great movement in the history of philosophy-which it certainly was-but to be philosophy itself. This self-description *forces* analytic philosophers ... to keep coming up with new "solutions" to the problem of the Furniture of the Universe—solutions which become more and more bizarre, and which have lost all interest outside of the philosophical community. Thus we have a paradox: at the very moment when analytic philosophy is recognized as the "do,minant movement" in world philosophy, it has come to the end of Its own project-the dead end, not the completion.

If one accepts this description of the outcome of the history of analytic philosophy, then the question naturally arises,: is there a serviceable *positive* conception of philosophy that can inherit our aspirations to the subject?

Philosophy as the Education of Grown-ups

At a number of crucial junctures in the essays collected here, Putnam pauses to invoke the words of his Harvard colleague Stanley Cavell. This leads one to speculate on the significance of Cavell's work for Putnam. Regarding Cavell's most recent book, Putnam writes: "If there is one contemporary thinker whose work I could recommend to every sensitive and intelligent young person who is thinking about the future of philosophy ... it is Stanley Cavell.T'?' This suggests that, for Putnam Cavell's work represents a place to begin thinking about the future of philosophy-a source of suggestions for ways to begin addressing the present condition of philosophy. We have already heard Putnam say that analytic philosophy, the tradition of philosophy in which he has worked most of his life, has co,me to a dead end. This suggests that the subject requires a change of direction-s-one that nevertheless represents a stage in the same journey.

Putnam writes that "the phenomenon called 'analytical philosophy' is best understood as part of the larger phenomenon of modernism" and that "the strains and conflicts in analytical philosophy reflect the strains and conflicts in modernism generally,"!" In what sense does the present condition of philosophy reflect the crossroads in the development of modern art that we call modernism? Cavell. writes: "The task of the modernist artist, as of the contemporary cnnc, is to find what it is his art finally depends upon; it doesn't matter that we haven't *a priori* criteria for defining a painting, what matters is that we realize that the criteria are something we must discover, discover in the continuity of painting itself.?"?

If we put these passages from Putnam and Cavell together, we hav,e the following suggestion: the task of the contemporary analytic phi-

losopher is to find out what the practice of philosophy depends upon. It doesn't matter that we haven't *a priori* criteria for defining what philosophy is; what matters is that we realize that these criteria are something we discover through an examination of both our current practice of philosophy and the historical continuity of the subject. (Of course, this works in both directions: what we are presently willing to recognize as philosophy will influence the criteria elicited, and the criteria we elicit will give us an occasion to reflect on what we are willing to count as philosophy.) This suggests that it has only become necessary at this particular juncture in the *development* of "analytic philosophy" that it allow what philosophy is to become its own central question. For Cavell, this is in itself an indication that analytic philosophy represents a peculiar moment in the history of philosophy-one in which the distinction between philosophy and metaphilosophy achieves an illusion of clarity. Cavell writes: "If I deny a distinction, it is the still fashionable distinction between philosophy and meta-philosophy, the philosophy of philosophy. The remarks I make *about* philosophy (for example, about certain of its differences from other subjects) are, where accurate and useful, nothing more or less than philosophical remarks ... I would regard this fact-that philosophy is one of its own normal topics-as in turn defining for the subject, for what I wish philosophy to do."[108]

If it is internal to philosophy that what philosophy is always remains a question for it, then the burden of modernism in the arts is that the arts have come to assume the condition of philosophy. If the phenomenon of "analytic philosophy" has only just come to recognize itself as part of the phenomenon of modernism, then it would seem to follow that there is a sense in which the institution we call "analytic philosophy" has only just come to acknowledge that it partakes of the condition of philosophy-it has only just come to know itself *as* philosophy. Analytic philosophy's own self-understanding has had, in particular, an investment in repressing its differences from science. Putnam argues that "the self-image and self-definition of analytical philosophy have too long been accepted uncritically,"[!] He suggests that, according to its own self-definition, analytic philosophy has the following three salient characteristics: (1) it is nonideological; (2) it consists of piecemeal problem solving; (3) it can pursue its investigations independently of any concern with questions of value: "a concern with literature, the arts, culture, and the history of culture, [are] at best optional for an analytical philosopher."[110] All three characteristics serve to encourage the image of analytic philosoph: as a cousin of the sciences. Putnam contests the accuracy of analytic philosophy's self-image on all three counts:

> The fact is that Carnap and the logical positivists were intensely ideological philosophers, even if their ideology did not take the form of *overt* politics or moralizing. The arguments that analytical philosophers discussed were sometimes piecemeal arguments, but very often they were produced by philosophers who were highly ideological in the sense that Carnap was. Without the motor of a certain amount of ideology which kept producing arguments that divided analytical philosophers into sides, analytical philosophy could hardly have kept going: it has already begun to lose shape as a tendency, with the demise of logical positivism. The fact that analytical philosophers were not interested in cultural history does not mean that they escaped being a part of it.[111]

Putnam's burgeoning interest in recounting various chapters in the recent history of analytic philosophy (which pervades the essays in this volume) is often in the service of highlighting the gap between analytic philosophy's own image of itself and the actual character of its practice and development. It also, however, serves a further aim: "to help us see analytical philosophy once again as a humanistic discipline, and its problems and themes as common problems and themes in the humanities.t'J" Putnam's insistence that philosophy is one of the humanities is meant, first of all, to register the extent to which philosophy must raise for itself anew at each moment the question of what its aspirations should be, as well as how they are best to be achieved. Second, however, it is meant to underscore the significance of the fact that the philosophical endeavor is a literary one as well-an individual quest for a certain mode of *writing:*

> I propose that each philosopher *ought* to leave it more problematic what is left for philosophy to do, but philosophy should go on. If I agree with Derrida on anything, it is on this: that philosophy is writing, and that it must learn now to be a writing whose authority is always to be won anew, not inherited or awarded because it is philosophy. Philosophy is, after all, one of the humanities and not a science ... We philosophers inherit a field, not authority, and that is enough. It is, after all, a field which fascinates a great many people. If we have not entirely destroyed that fascination by our rigidities or by our posturings, that is something for which we should be truly grateful.[':']

This suggests a further sense in which Cavell's work may be exemplary for Putnam: namely, in the way in which he writes philosophy-in the conception of philosophical authorship that his work embodies. This is not to say that Putnam admires Cavell's "style." The concept of style, Cavell himself has argued, has no clear application to modernist work.l'" A clear distinction cannot be drawn here between ways of writing and ways of thinking. This brings us back to a remark of Putnam's that we encountered earlier: "*Of course,* philosophical problems are unsolvable; but as Stanley Cavell once remarked, 'There are better and worse ways of thinking about them."'115 Putnam goes on in this essay to connect this point with the question of the future of philosophy-"the grand question 'After Metaphysics What?"'116-and to suggest that this is not a question that admits of a stable answer: "No one philosopher can answer that question. 'After metaphysics' there can only be *philosophers-that* is, there can only be the search for those 'better and worse ways of thinking' that Cavell called for,"!'? To say that this question regarding the future of philosophy is one we should not evade--one that-we must continue to take seriously, although it admits of no single satisfying answer-is simply to say that it is itself a philosophical question: a question *of,* not simply a question about, philosophy. Hence it is itself a question about which "there are better and worse ways of thinking."

The passage from Cavell that Putnam is referring to throughout these remarks is from his book *Themes out of School*. It is one that attempts to address the question "what makes philosophy philosophy?":

> I understand it as a willingness to think not about something other than what ordinary human beings think about, but rather to learn to think undistractedly about things that ordinary human beings cannot help thinking about, or anyway cannot help having occur to them, sometimes in fantasy, sometimes as a flash across a landscape; such things, for example, as whether we can know the world as it is in itself, or whether others really know the nature of one's own experiences, or whether good and bad are relative, or whether we might not now be dreaming that we are awake ... Such thoughts are instances of that characteristic human willingness to allow questions for itself which it cannot answer with satisfaction. Cynics about philosophy, and perhaps about humanity, will find that questions without answers are empty; dogmatists will claim to have arrived at answers; philosophers after my heart will rather wish to convey the thought that while there may be no satisfying answers to such questions in *certain forms,* there are so to speak, directions to answers, *ways to think,* that are worth the time of your life to discover.118

Having accepted the fact that the questions of philosophy, when they present themselves in certain traditional forms, do not admit of satisfying answers, we can see that the significance of this passage from Cavell lies in the path it glimpses between the prevailing alternative responses to this fact, namely, cynicism and dogmatism. In the distinction that Putnam draws between vision and argument, he remarks that philosophy cannot live on argument alone. Both the dogmatist and the cynic resist this conclusion. The dogmatist insists that he has argument(s) that can settle our questions in philosophy; the cynic, in his dissatisfaction with what argument can establish, affects an air of indifference, concluding that reason can shed no light on these questions. What we require in this situation, Cavell says, is not answers for our questions but "directions to answers"–a form of progress that does not culminate in the assertion of a thesis but in a change of perspective. Such writing must change the way its reader views the problems. In a review article on *Themes out of School* (which quotes this same passage from Cavell), Arnold Davidson offers the following reflection on the character of Cavell's own philosophical writing: "Cavell writes not primarily to produce new theses or conclusions, nor to produce new arguments to old conclusions, but ... to excavate and transform the reader's sensibility, to undo his self-mystifications and redirect his interest. This is a distinctive mode of philosophizing, one which has its own special rigor, in which the accuracy of description bears an enormous weight. In aiming to transform a sensibility, one must capture it precisely, and if one's descriptions are too coarse, too rough or too smooth, they will hold no direct interest, seeming to have missed the mark completely,"?" Davidson goes on to describe the burden of Cavell's writing as one of diagnosing failures that are lapses, not of intelligence, but of "philosophical sensibility,"!" Earlier we saw Putnam equate what he called our need for "vision" in philosophy with a need for orientation. This, he says, echoing Davidson on Cavell, is "a matter of developing a sensibility": "Finding a meaningful orientation in life is not, I think, a matter of finding a set of doctrines to live by, although it certainly includes having views; it is much more a matter of developing a *sensibility*. Phi-

losophy is not only concerned with changing our views, but also with changing our sensibility, our ability to perceive and react to nuances."121

This is a task philosophy shares with aesthetic and moral reflection: something one might call the task of *criticism-the* activity which aims, in Cavell's words, to "make its object available to just response."122 If it is characteristic of philosophy that it leads us to doubt whether we know what we cannot help but know, it is equally characteristic of the activity of criticism that it elicits conviction by attaining a vantage point from which something we cannot help but know reappears to us, once again, as *obuiousP'* But how can a claim be obvious if not everyone finds it obvious? When what is hidden to us lies right before our eyes, it is our conviction that it must lie elsewhere-somewhere hidden from view-that renders it invisible. This, according to Wittgenstein, is the structure of philosophical confusion. Hence Wittgenstein says that what we require in philosophy is not explanation but *description*. Wittgenstein's philosophical investigations, Cavell writes, are "investigations of obviousness."124 Putnam suggests, at one point, that moral confusion has a similar structure: "When a situation or a person or a motive is appropriately described, the decision as to whether something is 'good' or 'bad' or 'right' or 'wrong' frequently follows automatically.'?" Everything depends here on achieving the "appropriate description," on one's ability to find the right words. "The sorts of descriptions that we need" in "situations requiring ethical evaluation," Putnam writes, "are descriptions in the language of a sensitive novelist."126 Such descriptions seek to help us to *see* the world differently, to render what is right before our eyes visible to US.[127] They aim, Putnam argues, to engage and cultivate our sensibility-our capacity for vision. Philosophers, in regarding a capacity for argument as the touchstone of rationality, have tended to paint a distorted picture of moral reasoning, thereby contributing to a distorted image of what it means more generally to be reasonable. Rather than disparaging moral reasoning for not aligning well with the philosopher's narrow conception of reasoning, Putnam argues, we should learn to recognize it as paradigmatic of "reasoning in the full sense of the word," which "involves not just the logical faculties, in the narrow sense, but our full capacity to imagine and feel, in short, our full sensibility,"!"

The narrowness that characterizes the picture of moral reasoning Putnam opposes here parallels the narrowness in the picture of philosophical reasoning which his remarks about the role of vision in philosophy sought to redress: both narrow the space of the reasonable through their insistence that in order for someone to be *reasonably* convinced of something his conviction must be produced by a chain of argument. Philosophers tend to impose an unreasonable ideal of reasonableness upon us, one that requires the mutilation of our actual capacities for sustaining reasonable conviction. Putnam argues that the philosophical project of formalizing the activity of interpretation is an instance of this: "Not only is interpretation a highly informal activity, guided by few, if any, settled rules or methods, but it is one that involves much more than linear propositional reasoning. It involves our imagination, our feelings-in short, our full sensibility,"!"

If interpretation involves our full sensibility, then cultivating our capacities for interpretation involves cultivating our sensibility. A philosophical ideal of rationality that distrusts any form of conviction that is not based on argument will see such an appeal to sensibility as, at best, irrelevant to the enterprise of seeking truth. Such a view will concede that an appeal to sensibility can produce conviction, but not *rational* conviction. A temperamental bias in favor of certain truths is a merely subjective ground for conviction-something we should learn to overcome in the interest of truth. What the prevailing philosophical ideal of rationality occludes, according to Putnam, is that "temperament is subject to criticism."130 Part of Putnam's recent interest in William James (as documented in the chapters devoted to him in this volume) is tied to the ways in which his work challenges this ideal of rationality through his claim that by obscuring the role played by sensibility in the attainment of philosophical conviction-placing it beyond the reach of criticism-philosophers have tended to make themselves the victims of their own individual temperaments. James writes:

> Of whatever temperament a professional philosopher is, he tries when philosophizing to sink the fact of his temperament. Temperament is no conventionally recognized reason, so he urges impersonal reasons only for his conclusions. Yet his temperament really gives him a stronger bias than any of his more strictly objective premises. It loads the evidencefo'r him one way or the other, making for a more sentimental or a more hard-hearted view of the universe, just as this fact or that principle would. He *trusts* his temperament. Wanting a universe that suits it, he believes in any representation of the universe that does suit it.[131]

James concludes: "The history of philosophy is to a great extent that of a certain clash of temperaments."132 Putnam describes this as "the most shocking claim that James makes"133-shocking, that is, to a "professional philosopher" who wishes to restrict himself in philosophy to criticizing questions of argument and principle. The implication that Putnam, following James, draws from the fact that temperament loads the outcome of a philosophical controversy for each of us is not that the philosopher should somehow learn to transcend the influence of his temperament, but rather that he should learn to take *responsibility* for it. This requires acknowledging the role that temperament plays in consolidating his conviction (hence a willingness to speak in the first-person singular) as well as subjecting it to criticism (hence a willingness to explore the character and sources of his experiences of philosophical compulsion). Insofar as every philosophical author aspires to elicit the conviction of his reader, this places as a condition on good philosophical writing that it seek to educate. This commits one, Putnam concludes, to a certain ideal of education: "Philosophy is not only concerned with changing our views, but also with changing our sensibility ... Philosophers are, ideally, *educators-not* just educators of youth, but of themselves and their peers. Stanley Cavell once suggested as the definition of philosophy-'the education of grown-ups.' I think that is the definition I like best." 134

The passage from Cavell that Putnam is referring to is from *The Claim of Reason:*

> In philosophizing, I have to bring my own language and life into imagination. What I require is a convening of my culture's criteria, in order to confront them with my words and life as I pursue them and as I may imagine them; and at the same time to confront my words and life as I pursue them with the life my culture's words may imagine for me: to confront the culture with itself, along the lines in which it meets in me.
>
> This seems to me a task that warrants the name of philosophy. It is also the description of something we might call education. In the face of the questions posed in Augustine, Luther, Rousseau, Thoreau ... we are children; we do not know how to go on with them, what ground we may occupy. In this light, philosophy becomes the education of grownups.t"

To claim that philosophy is the education of grown-ups is to suggest both that its audience is everyone and that its curriculum can never be definitively settled (no subject of human concern being in principle extracurricular to the interests of philosophical reflection). But how is education to proceed under these circumstances? Cavell writes: "In philosophizing, I have to bring my own language and life into imagination." Putnam echoes this in his remark that "what is important in philosophy" when treating a philosophical controversy "is to show that (and *how)* both sides *misrepresent* the lives we live with our concepts.Y':" The implication is that the philosopher in each of us drives us out of communication with the person we ordinarily are in "the lives we live with our concepts." (Putnam follows Wittgenstein in also giving the name of "philosophy" to the activity that brings us *back* into communication with the lives we ordinarily lead.) putnam argues in a number of the essays collected here!" that analytic *moral* philosophy, in particular, has been haunted by a failure to bring our language and our everyday lives into imagination: "There is a weird discrepancy between the way philosophers who subscribe to a sharp fact/value distinction *make* ethical arguments sound and the way ethical arguments *actually* sound. (Stanley Cavell once remarked that Stevenson writes like someone who has *forgotten* what ethical discussion is like.)"!"

The passage from Cavell's *The Claim of Reason* that begins by saying that in philosophizing one must bring one's own language and life into imagination is offered as a reflection upon Wittgenstein's famous remark that "to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life."\39 The imagining of one's form of life is the activity Cavell describes as the "convening of my culture's criteria"-a confronting of the culture with itself, "along the lines in which it meets in me." It involves mapping out for oneself the topology of the obvious, the points at which one's justifications run out. If one is not yet on familiar terms with philosophy this is apt to be an experience of either bafflement or chagrin; if one is, it is apt to be one of exhilaration or irritation. Of course, it is, and always will be, the birthright of every philosopher to continue to press his questions at this point. Part of the point of bringing the life I live into imagination is to recover a sense of the peculiarity of my questions, something a familiarity with philosophy can deaden. In focusing in imagination on where such questions can come alive for me, I clarify what weight they are able to bear in my life. Such reflections, Putnam indicates, will often uncover a point beyond which the philosopher's call for justification ceases to grip us. If I simply shape up to his questions as perfectly *ordinary* questions about what I am able to call into question (this,

of course, may not be the way he wants me to shape up to them) then I may find that the doubt which he wishes to press appears to make no sense in the way in which he wishes to press it. Putnam writes: "These are cases in which I find I have to say: 'I have reached bedrock and this is where my spade is turned.' "[140]

Putnam is invoking here a passage from Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations:*

> "How am I able to obey a rule?"-if this is not a question about causes, then it is about the justification for my following the rule in the way I do.
>
> If I have exhausted the justifications, I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: "This is simply what I do."[141]

This passage has been interpreted in very different ways by different commentators. Some have invoked it to support a reading of Wittgenstein in which justification is simply a function of consensus within a community-as if Wittgenstein were saying here: This is the right (justified) thing to do here because this is, after all, what *we* do. Putnam comments: "That Wittgenstein here uses the first person-where *my* spade is turned-is very important; yet many interpreters try to see his philosophy as one of simple deference to some 'form of life' determined by a community. On this see ... Stanley Cavell's discussion in *The Claim of Reason*."[142] Putnam takes Wittgenstein's use of the first-person singular here to contest the consensus-theory reading of the passage; he takes it for granted that Wittgenstein is not an author who would be careless about such matters. Saul Kripke is the interpreter of Wittgenstein whom, above all, Putnam has in mind here as someone who tries "to see his philosophy as one of simple deference to some 'form of life' determined by a community." Kripke writes: "In Wittgenstein's own model ... if the community all agrees on an answer and persists in its views, no one can correct it ... If the corrector were outside the community, on Wittgenstein's view he has not the 'right' to make anycorrection,"!" According to this view, therefore, truth and warrant amount to nothing more than matters of brute *de facto* communal agreement. Putnam reports: "Cavell has suggested to me that this makes it sound as if Wittgenstein thought that truth and warrant are a matter of *etiquette-wanting* to find a justified (or a true) hypothesis is like wanting to use the same fork my 'cultural peers' use, on such a story. But Wittgenstein would not have thought *this* is a description of OUT form of life at all!"!"

What would Wittgenstein have considered a description of OUT form of life? How does our form of life differ from a set of rules of etiquette? This question dovetails with another. How does philosophy involve the education of our sensibility? How are these two questions related? Both inquire after the character of what we take to be obvious and what we experience as compelling; both inquire against the background of our shared experience of necessity in everyday life and our inability in philosophy to achieve a shared sense of how deep such necessities go. In philosophy the fact that "this is what I do" appears to be a brute convention, floating free of any justificatory ground. Bringing our life back into imagination helps us to recover our sense of the extent to which we are and are not bound by such "conventions." The passage in *The Claim of Reason* that Putnam invokes in the quote given above addresses itself to this issue:

> The conventions we appeal to may be said to be "fixed," "adopted," "accepted," etc., by us; but this does not now mean that what we have fixed or adopted are (merely) the (conventional) *names* of things. The conventions ... are fixed not by customs or some particular concord or agreement which might, without disrupting the texture of our lives, be changed where convenience suggests a change ... They are, rather, fixed by the nature of human life itself, the human fix itself, by those "very general facts of nature" which are "unnoticed only because so obvious/'J" and, I take it, in particular, very general facts of *human* nature ... Here the array of "conventions" are not patterns of life which differentiate human beings from one another, but those exigencies of conduct and feeling which all humans share.!"

Cavell says here that the "conventions" to which Wittgenstein wishes to draw our attention are not of a sort that differentiate human beings from one another. It follows that the concept of a "form of life" should not be understood just in broadly ethnographic terms as the set of rules or customs which distinguish one cultural group from another. Yet this is how the vast majority of commentators have tended to read Wittgenstein. Furthermore, certain passages appear to support their claim that Wittgenstein's idea of a form of life is meant to comprehend an ethnographic dimension. In a recent essay Cavell suggests that it is possible to distinguish two different directions in which Wittgenstein inflects his notion of a form of life, calling these "the ethnological or horizontal sense" of form of life and "the biological or vertical sense.t":" The former inflection encourages the idea that

the sense of "agreement" at work in Wittgenstein's appeals to our "agreement in a form of life" is a conventionalized, or contractual, sense of agreement. The latter inflection of the idea of a form of life, however, contests this. Cavell writes:

> The idea [of a form of life] is, I believe, typically taken to emphasize the social nature of human language and conduct, as if Wittgenstein's mission is to rebuke philosophy for concentrating too much on isolated individuals .. , an idea of Wittgenstein's mission as essentially a business of what he calls practices or conventions. Surely this idea of the idea is not wrong, and nothing is more important. But the typical emphasis on the social eclipses the twin preoccupation of the *Investigations,* call this the natural, in the form of "natural reactions" (no. 185), or in that of "fictitious natural history" (p. 230), or that of "the common behavior of mankind" (no. 206). The partial eclipse of the natural makes the teaching of the *Investigations* much too, let me say, conventionalist, as if when Wittgenstein says that human beings "agree in the language they use" he imagines that we have between us some kind of contract or an implicitly or explicitly agreed upon set of rules (which someone else may imagine we lack).148

The stratum of conventionality that is at issue in this vertical inflection of the idea of a form of life is one-for us, as we stand now-that is pitched deeper than the level of the social. These are "conventions" from which, at present, we are not able to imagine freeing ourselves. But to picture the matter thus, imagining ourselves as shackled to contingencies, is to picture our form of life as a set of constraints that bind us and against which we chafe. Although this is not Kripke's reading of Wittgenstein, it is something like its mirror-image. Instead of viewing us as victimized by brute conventions, Kripke's Wittgenstein pictures us as enforcers of them, "licensed" to victimize one another. Not only do we bring our necessities into existence through our agreements, but these are conceived of as agreements from which we can, in principle, withdraw. Wittgenstein pauses at one point to ask himself whether this view (which is in essence the one Kripke attributes to him) is, indeed, one he wishes to encourage: "'So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?'-It is what human beings *say* that is true and false; and they agree in the *language* they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life."!"

Kripke interprets Wittgenstein's use of agreement here on the paradigm of a contract from which, at any moment, we could, in principle, indecorously withdraw. (Kripke's view differs from a more traditional contractarian view in that agreement will not break down through a withdrawal of consent but through a change in the inclinations to which we are subject. Agreement of the relevant sort arises on Kripke's view because we happen to be inclined in the same ways.) To say that human agreement decides what is true and what is false is to say that these are things *on* which we agree and *to* which we agree. Kripke here imposes on Wittgenstein's text a certain picture of what (the relevant form of) agreement comes to. Wittgenstein contests such a picture in the passage quoted above by saying that human beings agree *in* a form of life. (The English words "agreement in" in this passage translate Wittgenstein's German word *Uebereinstimmen.}* Cavell comments: "The idea of agreement here is not that of coming to or arriving at an agreement on a given occasion, but of being in agreement throughout, being in harmony, like pitches or tones, or clocks, or weighing scales, or columns of figures. That a group of human beings *stimmen* in their language *ueberein* says, so to speak, that they are mutually voiced with respect to it, mutually *attuned* top to bottom."150 Such agreement does not rest on *mere* agreements or mere conventions. Talk of "mere conventions" immediately suggests the sorts of agreement which might, "without disrupting the texture of our lives," simply be changed (or broken off) "where convenience suggests a change." The agreement of which Wittgenstein speaks, Cavell suggests, is not only not one that can be abrogated at will, it is one concerning which we can form no coherent conception of what it would mean to abrogate it. To withdraw from the relevant form of "agreement" here would entail shedding one's capacity to harmonize with others, becoming completely dissonant with one's fellow beings. The attempt to imagine one's distancing oneself from one's form of life is, on this view, not a task that one is obviously equal to. It is tantamount to envisioning one's withdrawal from the human race and entering into a condition in which one is stripped of the natural reactions and propensities that we share with others and which permit us to lead a shared life.

To bring our form of life into imagination thus involves imaginatively exploring the limits of what is conceivable to us. In running up against these limits, we expose to view the ground of what Cavell calls our "mutual attunement" with others, and what Wittgenstein calls our "agreement in judgment." The fact of such attunement rests on the brute fact of our ability to see what another person sees, feel what

he or she feels, follow her lead, catch on to the direction in which he wishes to point. Our capacity to catch on in these ways is a necessary precondition of our being able to participate in civilization. Wittgenstein writes: "If a child does not respond to the suggestive gesture, it is separated from the others and treated as a lunatic."[151] Yet an exploration of the ground of our capacities for agreement with others will also yield moments of inexplicable dissonance with others, when we become opaque to one another. Hence, Putnam argues, any exploration of *our* mutual attunement in judgment must always be conducted in the voice of the first-person singular. Yet it will continue to be a voice that speaks in the name of *our* judgments, of *us,* and of what *we* are capable of sharing-where the "we" represents whoever is able to recognize himself or herself in the descriptions proffered. (It is a voice that claims to articulate what is obvious and yet invisible to us; hence it can seem to speak from a position of unforgivable.arrogance.) Each time Wittgenstein reports that his spade is turned, he invites us to discover whether the same is not true for us. In reporting that he has reached bedrock-arrived at a moment of obviousness-his own aim is not to bully us with the assertion of a dogma, but rather to issue an invitation to us to gauge the range of our mutual agreement in judgments. Putnam writes: "Recognizing that there are certain places where one's spade is turned; recognizing, with Wittgenstein, that there are places where our explanations run out, isn't saying that any particular place is *permanently* fated to be one of these places, or that any particular belief is forever immune from criticism. This is where my spade is turned *now*. This is where my justifications and explanations stop *now*."*152*

There is a widespread tendency to read such moments in Wittgenstein as if they amounted to a declaration that justification simply amounted to an appeal to a brute fact of communal agreement (at least for the time being). In declaring that his spade is turned, however, Wittgenstein is not announcing the absence of justifications so much as a perplexity concerning what could count as a further justification here. His spade does not uncover a gaping void, it hits solid rock-it is turned back. He is standing on firm ground. He has reached a point at which it is no longer obviously possible to continue to dig any deeper. If pressed at such a point, nevertheless, to give a justification for what he does, Wittgenstein writes: "Then I am inclined to say: 'This is simply what I do.'"

Cavell finds that Kripke's interpretation of Wittgenstein can be understood as shifting the position of the idea of inclination here-as

if there were no significant difference between Wittgenstein's own formulation and something like the following: "Then I am licensed to say: 'This is simply what I am inclined to do.'"[153] Once Kripke has armed himself with such a formulation of Wittgenstein's remark, he then goes on to interpret inclination as the fundamental court of appeal for Wittgenstein. On this reading, Wittgenstein is seen to be endorsing the idea that all justification amounts to is an appeal to the presence of a community-wide inclination. On such a view, establishing norms of correctness simply amounts to determining whether any (potential) member of a community shares the same inclinations to respond in certain ways that the rest of the community has. The nature of his inclinations is the ground upon which it is decided whether he should be ruled in or ruled out of the community. Such a conception of what validates our community's norms, Putnam argues, cannot allow adequate room for the possibility of genuine progress. Any modification of the norms of the community would amount to nothing more than a mere change in the direction of our collective inclinations; there would no longer be any meaningful sense, however, in which the change could be thought of as an *improvement*. In a number of the essays collected here, Putnam follows Cavell in challenging the adequacy of Kripke's view of Wittgenstein's (or, as Putnam prefers to call him, Kripkenstein's) account of the character of human agreement (as well as in contesting the attribution on Kripke's part of any such account to Wittgenstein). Against such a view, Putnam writes: "From within *our* picture of the world ... *we* say that 'better' isn't the same as '*we* think it's better.' And if my 'cultural peers' don't agree with me, sometimes I *still* say 'better' (or 'worse'). There are times when, as Stanley Cavell puts it, I 'rest upon myself as my foundation.'"[154]

The passage from *The Claim of Reason* that Putnam is alluding to here turns out to be the one that immediately precedes the passage that climaxes with the conclusion that philosophy can be thought of as "the education of grownups." It begins by reflecting on the significance of the fact that Wittgenstein's parables in *Philosophical Investigations* are pervasively concerned to depict scenes of instruction; it ends by reflecting on those moments in such scenes of instruction when one's spade is turned:

> Wittgenstein's stories using mathematical imagery ... read, from a step away, as though their characters are children. It is appropriate, in writing so fundamentally about instruction, and in which a cen-

> tral character is the child, that we have dramatized for us the fact that we begin our lives as children. Those tribes of big children can put us in mind of how little in each of us gets educated ...
>
> When my reasons come to an end and I am thrown back upon myself, upon my nature as it has so far shown itself, I can, supposing I cannot shift the ground of discussion, either put the pupil out of my sight-as though his intellectual reactions are disgusting to me-or I can use the occasion to go over the ground I had hitherto thought forgone. If the topic is that of continuing a series, it may be learning enough to find that I *just do;* to rest upon myself as my own foundation. [ISS]

The difference between ourselves and half-grown children is one of degree, not of kind. The asymmetry of our positions in the scene of instruction breaks down at a certain point. The philosophical hunger for justification is tied to a fantasy that this asymmetry could be prolonged indefinitely, that some equivalent of our parents will never cease to occupy a position of authority for us. There is a part of each of us that is horrified at the thought that we might play some role in determining what is right and wrong: we want to be instructed by authorities, Yet even at those moments when the child's source of authority finally tuns out of things to say, when we come to a juncture at which we have to say to the child, "this is what we do," *that,* too, can provide instruction. By marking the limit at which his question begins to lose its sense, we help to teach the child the sense of those questions that can be asked about us and about what we do in the world and why we do it. Thus the child learns who we are and what a world is. We thus bear a terrifying responsibility for the shape of the world the child comes into. We initiate him into a (the, our) world; but there comes a point at which we exhaust our authority. Cavell continues: "But if the child, little or big, asks me: Why do we eat animals? or Why are some people poor and others rich? or What is God? or Why do I have to go to school? or Do you love black people as much as white people? or Who owns the land? or Why is there anything at all? or How did God get here? I may find my answers thin, I may feel run out of reasons without being willing to say 'This is what I do' (what I say, what I sense, what I know), and honor that."!"

In the face of such questions, I am a child-a child in a world without grown-ups to educate me. In such a world, each of us is confronted with the task of occupying both the position of teacher and that of pupil. There comes a point at which *we* bear the responsibility for

initiating ourselves into our world. In the face 0£ the questions pressed by the child in us-a child that still requires education-and in the absence of a community of our elders, we are left wondering whether our questions even make sense. Still too much of a child to accede to a posture of authority with respect to our childlike questions, too much of an adult to simply ignore them, each of us struggles with the twin perils of becoming either a precocious child or a dismissive adult-either a dogmatist or a nihilist. In the face of this challenge, Cavell proposes that philosophy be understood as the task of living with these questions, that it stand as the name of our willingness to acknowledge the confused child in each of us. Our revulsion toward philosophy is a mark of our shame in the face of the incompleteness of our education. Our attraction to philosophy is a mark of our sensitivity to our own needs. We need to learn to overcome our shame at the childishness of the questions we are moved to ask; yet we also need to resist overindulging the child in ourselves, humoring his every whim. The difficulty in educating the child in oneself is in some ways the difficulty that all parents experience: to attend to him without spoiling him. Faced with the task of rearing ourselves, unsure of what authority we can lay claim to, what ground we may occupy, "in this light," Cavell writes, "philosophy becomes the education of grown-ups. It is as though it must seek perspective upon a natural fact which is all but inevitably misinterpreted-that at an early point in a life the normal body reaches its full strength and height. Why do we take it that because we then must put away childish things, we must put away the prospect of growth and the memory of childhoodr'"?

This is the definition of philosophy-the education of grown-ups-that Hilary Putnam says he favors most. If the presence of a confused and inquisitive child within each of us is a constitutive feature of our being human, then this definition has the virtue of securing a permanent role for philosophy in our lives. Even those who believe that the human being can, in principle, outgrow the child within himself should be willing to concede that there is no discernible limit to the extent of either his present confusion or his present propensity to inquire. Insofar as an acknowledgment of this fact excites in us an appetite for education, and insofar as such an acknowledgment is a precondition of a reflective life, surely Putnam is right to conclude that philosophical discussion "is not going to disappear as long as reflective people remain in the world."

In light of his endorsement of this definition of philosophy, what stands out most in the essays collected here is Putnam's insistence that

his education not be allowed to come to an end, that it marks a betrayal of the philosophical calling to decide the question once and for all concerning what can or should belong to philosophy's curriculum-what it is that we grown-ups require in the way of education. I am thinking here not only of Putnam's unwillingness to allow his possibilities for philosophizing to be funneled by the constraints of his own original philosophical education (the resources of which he no longer finds equal to the tasks at hand) but of two further features of his practice that are in evidence in this volume as well. The first is his faithfulness to his original motivations to the subject-to what excited him about, to what attracted him to, and to what he hoped for from philosophy-at a point in the history of our culture when so many of philosophy's official practitioners have come to accept the idea that compromising their original sense of excitement and hope is simply an inevitable part of the cost of the professionalization of their subject. The second is Putnam's commitment to Kant's thought that the philosopher, in the ideal, should approximate the archetype of the *teacher-someone* who is able to minister to the youthful soul in each of us, who is able to preserve (in a fashion that does not deceive us) our fragile sense that both hope and excitement are not completely inappropriate responses to our condition. Although many of the essays in this volume are concerned with matters of detail regarding some specific controversy, some particular topic in contemporary philosophy, in each case the guiding concern is how the terms of the controversy in question have come to deform our overarching conception of human flourishing. To this extent, the conception of philosophy that informs these essays can be said to be, in many respects, a remarkably classical (though no longer an orthodox) one-one, that is, that harks back at least to Plato and Aristotle-which sees philosophy's fundamental task to lie in the quest for the good life.!"

Part I

Metaphysics