

Routledge Studies in Twentieth-Century Philosophy

EARLY ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY

ORIGINS AND TRANSFORMATIONS

Edited by
James F. Conant and Gilad Nir



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The past few decades have seen considerable interest in the history of analytic philosophy. As this field has developed, complex and provocative questions have emerged about the very nature of analytic philosophy, challenging long-standing assumptions and spawning new research paradigms.

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Early Analytic Philosophy: Origins and Transformations will be of great interest to those studying and researching the history of twentieth-century philosophy, contemporary analytic philosophy, and the philosophy of language and logic.

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Origins and Transformations

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Editors' Introduction

James Conant and Gilad Nir

1 The emergence of a new form of self-consciousness within analytic philosophy

The aim of this volume is to provide new perspectives on some old questions – in particular, questions concerning the central texts and figures in the analytic tradition. Hence its aim is not to collect essays which merely reinforce or fill in details of extant interpretations of canonical figures. It also does not propose to fill out our picture of that tradition by focusing instead on less canonical or hitherto unjustly neglected figures – as a number of excellent recent volumes on the history of analytic philosophy have profitably done. Rather the aim of this volume is threefold: (1) to revisit supposedly well-covered ground, bringing together a series of essays on the least controversially canonical figures from this period, with the aim of opening up new ways of understanding their work and therewith the origins of analytic philosophy; (2) to challenge or at least reframe the prevailing interpretative orthodoxies regarding those figures and thereby to unsettle our contemporary Whiggish accounts of the birth of this now dominant tradition of philosophy; and (3) thereby to offer a volume that shows as a whole the extent to which "the history of analytic philosophy" remains not only an exciting area of research and scholarship but also one which continues to hold open the promise of transforming analytic philosophy's present understanding of itself as a tradition.

Analytic philosophy, over the first century of its development, remained fairly resistant to the very idea that it could so much as have a history (in the relevant sense of what it means to say of a tradition that it "has a history"). Of course, no one denied that some authors lived before others and influenced successors who in turn lived and worked at some later point in time. In this trivial sense of what it means to "have a history", analytic philosophers were always happy to regard what they did as participating in an ongoing enterprise that possessed a beginning, middle, and progressively unfolding present. Indeed, they tended to be deeply committed to a certain tidy account of what that history must have been, how its beginning, middle, and present were related, who the founding fathers were, what the defining statements of

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the tradition were, which pieces of writing continued to constitute paradigms of philosophical analysis, etc. This simplified ahistorical conception of the "history" of the tradition – enshrined in numerous introductory textbooks and encyclopedia articles – has long played a constitutive role in various analytic practitioners' understandings of the very enterprise that they themselves sought to inherit and advance when doing (what they themselves still want to call) "analytic philosophy". What such analytic philosophers tend to resist is the idea that their contemporary retrospective narration of the history of their own tradition involves any form of fundamental distortion – for example, that it might be self-servingly Whiggish through and through. To touch for a moment on just one aspect of this mode of retrospective narration, it requires that a supposedly canonical text of the tradition – say Frege's "On Sense and Reference", Russell's "On Denoting", or Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* – can just be picked up and read by a contemporary analytic philosopher, without one's having to bring to one's encounter with the text any of the interpretative tools of the historian's trade. It can prove surprisingly unsettling to the analytic philosopher of today to learn that such forms of historically informed textual sensitivity might be needed in order to get at the truth about the episodes which are most cherished and enshrined in their tradition's collective memory of the supposedly landmark moments in analytic philosophy's origin story.

The past few decades have seen the ever-burgeoning emergence of that area of research to which this volume itself is devoted and which has now come to be known through the appellation "the history of analytic philosophy". That phrase has come to refer to an area of research quite different in character from the one it originally denoted. With this new chapter in its emancipation, it has also achieved a new degree of intellectual autonomy, coming into view as an area of philosophical research in its own right *within* the ongoing pursuit of contemporary analytic philosophy. As that "area" has gradually developed, so too has a new form of historical self-consciousness on the part of many analytic philosophers – even among those who do not work in that area. It has become increasingly difficult for an analytic philosopher to regard the philosophical tradition in which she works as one whose fundamental commitments have remained comparatively unchanged or one whose essential continuity is constituted by a prevailing consensus regarding its fundamental questions, doctrines, or methods. That is to say, there has come to be an increasing appreciation that the present philosophical moment of her tradition is historically parochial, not just with respect to its place within the history of philosophy as a whole but even with regard to its location within the development of more recent chapters of the analytic tradition itself.

The advent of this new form of historical self-consciousness on the part of analytic philosophers has given rise to the possibility – for practitioners and students of analytic philosophy alike – of experiencing prior episodes in that tradition's own history as turning on philosophical preoccupations that can at first appear remote and even alien, so that a confrontation with this

history itself becomes an occasion for philosophical reflection and renewed self-interrogation. The writings of this new sort of philosophical practitioner (the so-called "historian of analytic philosophy") afford two new sorts of perspective at once. The first of these gives rise to *a new form of history of philosophy* and the second to *a new form of analytic philosophy*. Part of what makes the very concept of the history of analytic philosophy (as a description, for example, of the mode of inquiry practiced by the contributors to this volume) difficult to comprehend is the manner in which, at its best, it succeeds in being both of these two new things at once. The advent of this new field of philosophical self-understanding requires the emergence of something that is, at one and the same time, both a new kind of history of philosophy and a new area of research *within* (and not just *about*) analytic philosophy.

What analytic philosophers used to call "the history of philosophy" – prior to the rise of the discipline of the history of analytic philosophy – was understood to be a discipline whose proper concern was the "the rest" of philosophy, i.e., those stretches of the history of philosophy either prior to or parallel to analytic philosophy, but in any case somehow supposedly fully independent of it. Such a conception of the "history of philosophy", as concerned solely with non-analytic philosophy, whatever it might reveal about the traditions of philosophy it investigated, was thereby assumed to be incapable of posing any fundamental challenge to analytic philosophy's own self-conception. The advent of the history of analytic philosophy as a serious discipline in its own right is marked by the moment when this assumption comes under threat – the moment at which it begins to become clear that there could be a form of historical-philosophical inquiry which might not leave analytic philosophy's own self-understanding untouched.

The essays in this volume collectively challenge various features of analytic philosophy's standard conception of its own tradition: for example, that that history has been largely, continuous, cumulative, and progressive in character. This volume seeks to enable various moments of incommensurability within that historical development – not only in the transition from one chapter of the history to another, but even within a supposedly homogenous moment of that history – to begin to come into view. For example, a number of the essays in this volume enable us to discern the degree to which various pairs of major figures in this tradition – Frege and Russell, Russell and the author of the *Tractatus*, early Wittgenstein and Carnap, Carnap and Quine – simply talk past each other, even in their most fervent and earnest attempts to talk with each other. When we come to appreciate this, the dynamic in accordance with which this tradition unfolds begins to appear to be of a very different sort than that which one finds recounted in potted histories of its origin. One source of this "talking past each other" lies in the remarkable extent to which the fundamental terms of art employed by one of the conversation partners in each of these pairs (Frege and Russell, etc.) cannot be translated into the terms of art of the other's philosophical edifice. Their

shared terms of art turn out to be mere verbal twins, bearing fundamentally different senses. As this heterogeneity of forms of philosophical understanding already present at the outset of the tradition comes more sharply into focus, its founding myths – its myth about its revolt against idealism (what this revolt was about, what it was against, and how widely it was joined), its putatively shared logicist research program (and the idea that there is some single such program which, say Frege, Russell, and Ramsey all promoted), the supposedly common commitment to the role of analysis in philosophical elucidation (and hence what the terms "analytic", "analysis", and their cognates so much as mean for these figures, and wherein their significance is thought to lie), the alleged overarching understanding of what logic is and how it is to serve as an instrument of philosophical demonstration (and whether "logic" should be understood to be, in the first instance, a branch of philosophy or one of mathematics), etc. – each of these calls out not only for renewed *historical* but also for renewed *philosophical* reflection. In their respective investigations into these matters, the essays in this volume serve to make clear that there is no single set of ideas shared by all the figures often grouped together today as the early analytic philosophers. Once the tradition enters its second and third generations, this remains no less true: there is still no fully shared set of ideas among figures such as Ramsey, Carnap, Quine, Ryle, etc., about where that tradition came from, what it was opposed to, or what it supposedly stood for. As this comes to be ever clearer in the light of recent research, we now find ourselves in need of a radical reconception of the analytic tradition's origins and transformations.

The vocation of the historian of analytic philosophy can appear to both the contemporary analytic philosopher and the contemporary historian of (non-analytic) philosophy to fall between two stools. It can seem, on the one hand, to be too preoccupied with matters of mere "history" to count as genuinely analytic philosophy, and yet also to be too narrowly preoccupied by the methods, concerns, and aims peculiar to the analytic tradition to count as serious scholarly work in the history of philosophy. What exemplary work in the history of analytic philosophy demonstrates, however, is the extent to which this area of inquiry demands the cultivation of both the characteristic virtues and trademark tools of the scrupulous historian of philosophy and those of the sophisticated participant in contemporary analytic philosophical practice. Good historians of analytic philosophy can show where and how the assumptions and concerns of contemporary analytic philosophers are not those of their analytic forefathers only if they have attained a fully integrated mastery of both of these forms of philosophical competence. Such a twofold fluency is essential if they are to be able to reveal how the analytic tradition's methods and aims have shifted over the course of its history, and to identify and illuminate cases in which forms of philosophical statement employed by contemporary analytic philosophers belong to frameworks of thought very different from those which conferred meaning on the apparent linguistic twins of those statements in the writings of their analytic predecessors or

contemporaries. Each of these two tasks – that of carving out and identifying cases which are philosophically illuminating in this way and that of spelling out the forms of philosophical illumination they may yield – in turn further requires both historical sensitivity and forms of philosophical acuity not hostage to the prevailing dogmas enshrined in the contemporary analytic journal literature. The historian of analytic philosophy therefore not infrequently finds him- or herself having to think and work against the grain of the sensibility of the contemporary analytic philosopher.

Part of what proves unsettling here to many contemporary analytic philosophers is the discovery that what prior generations of analytic philosophers meant when they employed terms that continue to circulate widely throughout the writings of analytic philosophers today – terms such as "sign", "symbol", "logical syntax", "logical constant", "semantics", "proposition", "tautology", "concept", "meaning", "reference", "language", "judgment", "thought", "belief", "inference", "justification", and the like – may be nothing like what those terms now mean in current analytic writing. Analytic philosophy has tended to want to imagine that it does not have a history characterized by this sort of opacity: the sort of history in which its recent past necessarily occludes the character of its original conception of itself. It has wanted to believe that the animating concerns of its philosophical past remain fully transparent to its philosophical present. This would require that, at least for the most part, its guiding assumptions and central questions – and hence the terminology required to formulate and pose them – have not undergone fundamental shifts in philosophical paradigm, let alone numerous such shifts.

As noted above, the analytic philosopher has wanted to imagine that any canonical text from an earlier part of her tradition might simply be placed into the hands of her students and be read and understood by them, without any prior effort on her part to properly orient herself or her students in relation to a way of thinking that is now philosophically foreign to her. The assumption that analytic philosophy's past must be transparent in this way to its present goes together with the supposition that there is no special need for analytic philosophers, when reading a text from an earlier moment in their own tradition, to seek out the expertise of someone called the historian of analytic philosophy. As long as we know what we now mean by the terms that occur in that text, we thereby also know how those authors must have meant them. Similarly, as long as we know what we regard as a good argument or explanation for a philosophical claim, we can be sure that our canonical author himself would have been happy to measure his own achievement by the extent to which it accords with our present conception of how to do philosophy well. According to a certain uncritical understanding of wherein the continuity of the tradition lies, this is just what it means for later and earlier analytic philosophers all to belong to the same tradition.

The task of having to work directly against the grain of such expectations is part of the burden that any serious historian of analytic philosophy assumes. A good historian of analytic philosophy is therefore never merely

a historian of ideas.[1] She always also must be an analytic philosopher – but one of a certain remarkable sort – and necessarily so, for several reasons. First, the task of grasping the philosophical power of a way of thinking occluded by the present preoccupations of analytic philosophy must always be a philosophical as well as a historical one. Second, any fundamental reconception of the "history of analytic philosophy" will bring to light ways in which claims which are philosophically *obvious* to a contemporary analytic philosopher only recently acquired that status. This means both that the current dispensation of contemporary analytic philosophy is far more historically parochial than the current picture of its supposedly continuous relation to its past permits us to appreciate and that even its relatively recent past is far less philosophically accessible to us than we may be apt to suppose. To bring out the parochiality of its present moment, the historian of analytic philosophy must not only be steeped in the contemporary analytic literature, but must also have the necessary philosophical perspicacity to see how currently prevailing assumptions might be open to an internal critique, deploying philosophical resources drawn from deeper within that same tradition. This, in turn, requires forms of philosophical circumspection and rigor which analytic philosophers have always cherished and championed, only now applied to new ends, carefully distinguishing how terms (such as "sense", or "reference", or "concept", or "thought", or "judgment", etc.) systematically shift their significance from the writings of a Frege, to a Russell, to a Carnap, to a Wittgenstein, to a Ryle. The authors of the papers collected in this volume therefore labor to make forms of thinking in the analytic past, which may appear familiar but in fact have become alien to many today, newly available as resources for understanding what analytic philosophy might or ought to be in the future. Hence many of the contributors to this volume are as concerned with redirecting and reshaping a possible future for analytic philosophy as they are with setting the historical record straight about episodes within its past.

Each of the essays contributed to this volume is written by its author with one eye trained on certain past figures and episodes, while the other eye looks forward to how his or her historical inquiry might transform the shape of ongoing contemporary philosophical debate. The very existence of this sort of philosophically double-sided inquiry, looking both backwards and forwards at once, is not new to philosophy as such, but it does constitute a genuine and significant development within the analytic tradition. It involves the emergence of a philosophically self-conscious form of historical inquiry in the history of analytic philosophy conducted by analytic philosophers writing primarily for an audience of analytic philosophers.

Good historians of analytic philosophy will by no means simply converge upon some single alternative to the currently institutionalized account of the history of analytic philosophy. Here, as elsewhere in the practice of history, uncovering the historical past involves appreciating the revelatory powers of different forms of account. These differences notwithstanding, each of our contributors seeks to characterize that historical episode of thought which

preoccupies them as part of a single ongoing and internally evolving tradition, with all of the internal complexity and disagreement apt to characterize any interesting historical tradition of thought – be it literary, scientific, mathematical, or philosophical.

The title of this volume, *Early Analytic Philosophy: Origins and Transformations*, is misunderstood if taken to mean that its contributors are jointly concerned to participate in a shared re-narration of a single revised alternative understanding of wherein the origins and significant transformative transitions of the analytic tradition consist. On the contrary: the presence of the plural form in "Origins" and "Transformations" is intended to indicate that a variety of origin stories and narrations of moments of decisive transition within the analytic tradition are here on offer. The task of evaluating the extent to which these stories and accounts are – or are not – jointly compatible with one another is left to the reader of this volume. This task, too, is itself no less a philosophical than a historical one.

Any attempt to embark on this evaluative task will necessarily implicate one in reflections regarding what it means to single out some stretch of the history of philosophy as constituting something worthy of the title of a "tradition" – hence as properly designatable with an expression such as "*the* analytic tradition". Taken together, the essays in this volume suggest that the unity and identity of a tradition is not specifiable in terms of a collection of features that each of its members fortuitously happens to instantiate. The discernible physiognomy of such a tradition is explicable only through a mode of understanding that seeks to grasp a specific sort of historical development – one in which each moment is linked to others in a significant way. Reflection on the significance of each such moment possesses the power to illuminate the significance of any other – but only when they are collectively considered in the light of their partially overlapping and mutually intertwining relations with one another. Such a concept of a tradition proves its worth only when, through concerted attempts to engage in such reflection, we find our appreciation of each of the elements deepened in this mutually illuminating way. When such acts of reflection bear fruit in this manner, what they uncover is revealed to be not merely a "series of historical episodes", but rather the internal aspects of an unfolding tradition, each of whose moments must be understood in relation to many of its others for it to be understood as constituting the sort of whole that it does. It is such a deepened form of self-understanding of the analytic tradition which this volume seeks to promote, precisely by provoking the aforementioned sorts of reflection and enabling the aforementioned forms of mutual illumination they can confer.

2 The birth of (something called) "History of Analytic Philosophy"

Before there could be something called the history of analytic philosophy, there first had to be something called analytic philosophy. But the term "analytic philosophy" does not really come into use until the 1930s, through

attempts to bring under a single heading perceived affinities between philosophical figures and movements that emerged over the previous three decades or so. Indeed, a number of the earliest overt uses of the term (in anything like its contemporary sense) were by figures who were critics of the burgeoning movement. They called upon this form of words in order to have some way to denominate an intellectual tendency which they noticed was on the rise and which they wished to resist.[2] Where and when was the term first used? Arguably first in Britain in 1933. Michael Beaney, one of the leading contemporary historians of analytic philosophy, has made a case for these claims.[3] He summarizes his findings as follows:

> The first use of the term 'analytic philosophy' to refer to at least part of what we would now regard as the analytic tradition occurs in Collingwood's *Essay on Philosophical Method* of 1933. He uses it to refer to one of two 'sceptical positions' …. What he has in mind, in particular, is the view according to which philosophy aims solely to analyse knowledge we already possess. He … mentions Moore and Stebbing as advocates of this view. It is a 'sceptical position', he argues, because it denies that 'constructive philosophical reasoning' is possible…, and he criticizes it for neglecting to examine its own presuppositions.[4]

Collingwood's primary targets of criticism are G.E. Moore and Susan Stebbing, but the broader tendency he wishes to set his face against is the one represented more broadly by the revolt against idealism first led by Moore and Russell.[5] Stebbing herself is at this time at least as concerned to promote recent philosophical developments out of Vienna as she is comparatively local ones, stemming from her academic backyard in Cambridge.[6] When the term "analytic philosophy" gains currency over the coming years in the United States, it is generally used to comprehend a much broader European philosophical tendency of which the British branch forms only a very small part.[7] By the time Feigl and Sellars compile their influential anthology, *Readings in Philosophical Analysis*, in 1949, a wide range of philosophers operate with a conception of analytic philosophy far more capacious than Collingwood's. Their anthology certainly includes Moore and Russell, but also features authors such as Frege, Carnap, Schlick, Reichenbach, Waismann, Hempel, Tarski, Quine, Stevenson, Feigl, and Sellars. The term "analytic philosophy" is now clearly no longer merely an epithet wielded by critics of the movement. It is self-ascribed by many of those anthologized by Feigl and Sellars, as well as by many other midcentury thinkers – that is to say, by a great many figures whom we now retrospectively classify as analytic philosophers.

In the 1950s (something that can be called) "the history of analytic philosophy" becomes a contested field – as do questions regarding backward extension of the term "analytic philosophy" to a set of figures who can be regarded as having been developing such a form of philosophy before anyone called anyone an "analytic philosopher". Are the philosophical origins of this

tradition primarily Anglo-American and only secondarily Austro-German? Or is it the other way around? Is it rooted primarily in a set of doctrines or methods – in a metaphysical or epistemological vision – or primarily in a methodological commitment to the priority of logic, and/or perhaps the philosophy of language? Starting in the 1950s, questions such as these were no longer of merely historical interest. To the participants in this debate, they were regarded as having philosophical stakes. This means that the participants themselves were not merely historians of philosophy endeavoring to furnish an accurate history of a certain philosophical movement at a certain time. Rather the contesting parties were themselves analytic philosophers whose conceptions of the following two matters came to seem suddenly to depend on one another: (1) their conception of the kind of philosophy they wished to champion and exemplify in their own philosophical work, and (2) their conception of the first half-century or so of the historical trajectory of the tradition they now saw themselves as seeking to inherit and carry forward.

A now largely unread book which was influential in shaping the anglophone postwar understanding of analytic philosophy was J.O. Urmson's *Philosophical Analysis: Its Development between the Two World Wars*. It established a narrative (which still prevails in some quarters today) according to which the most formative movement in the early history of analytic philosophy was "logical atomism" – a term Urmson takes from Bertrand Russell and uses to denote a conception of philosophy first developed by Russell and then enshrined in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. That conception, on Urmson's telling of the history, provides the crucial backdrop for the forms of critique of traditional epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics which then unfolded in the subsequent generation of the analytic tradition. Urmson's book was not published until 1956. But it encapsulates a picture of the character of the analytic tradition which had already become entrenched, especially in British philosophical circles. It was a narrative according to which Hume was a far more important precursor of analytic philosophy than Kant, in which Russell played a much more formative role in the emergence of the tradition than Frege, and in which Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* was therefore a far more Russellian than Fregean work.

Gilbert Ryle and Michael Dummett were among a number of influential figures who, in reaction to this narrative and ones not unlike it, sought to advance an alternative story of the history of analytic philosophy. In doing so, they arguably gave birth to the very discipline to which this volume seeks to contribute some further chapters: the history of analytic philosophy. Ryle and Dummett were joined by many others – among those whom we will touch on immediately below: Elizabeth Anscombe, Max Black, and Peter Geach – who also sought to accord Frege and Wittgenstein a different sort of importance in the telling of the story. Not infrequently, on these alternative tellings, both members of that Austro-German pair were cast as philosophical opponents – rather than fellow travelers – of G.E. Moore and Bertrand

Russell. Some form of this debate and further related ones continue to this day. What is decisive about this period is this: these two questions – the historical one (how the story of the history of analytic philosophy should be told) and the philosophical one (what analytic philosophy at present really is and how it should be practiced) – have, for many within the tradition, become indissolubly intertwined.

To get a sense of how this began to happen, let us start with Ryle's writings – especially two things he penned in 1952, as they present particularly clear and illuminating instances of this suddenly new genre of philosophical work. In focusing on Ryle as our central example of what happens in this period, we are taking advantage of the fact that Ryle as historian of analytic philosophy is part of the topic of Michael Kremer's contribution to this volume. Kremer documents how precarious and fitful the reception of Frege's thought was over the first half of the history of analytic philosophy and how it was only at the midcentury mark – halfway through the development of that tradition – that Frege begins to emerge as a figure whose writings every analytic philosopher comes to think of him- or herself as needing to study in order to understand what analytic philosophy is.

Kremer draws our attention to a relatively unknown 1952 paper of Ryle's bearing the title "Logical Atomism in Plato's 'Theaetetus'".[8] That paper goes well beyond what its title might seem to announce.[9] For the purposes of the introduction to this volume, what is most of interest is how the essay reveals the extent to which Ryle, in his own very particular way, was deeply concerned – already in 1952 – to invent a new genre of philosophically informed history of analytic philosophy: a kind of history which sought to completely reorient the analytic philosopher's understanding of his or her own tradition. Hence what begins as an essay on Plato quickly becomes an essay primarily concerned to explore the relation between six figures in the history of philosophy: four of whom (Moore, Frege, Russell, and early Wittgenstein) are analytic philosophers and two of whom (Plato and Meinong) are not. Ryle's essay seeks to show that all six of them had considerably more in common with one another than several of them would have wanted to believe. More importantly, that essay seeks to show how Frege and Wittgenstein each successively seeks to overthrow a certain set of philosophical problems – ones which Ryle sees as originating in Plato, coming to a certain fateful head in Russell's doctrine of logical atomism, and targeted by Wittgenstein as candidates for philosophical dissolution. One of Ryle's subsidiary aims here is to demonstrate that, contrary to the tendency of the time, early Wittgenstein ought not to be read as subscribing to that doctrine of Russell's, but should be read rather as seeking so thoroughly to uproot it that such a form of atomism would no longer take root again.

In making this case, Ryle discusses how Moore's 1899 essay on "The Nature of Judgment" provides an account of the distinction between propositions (in a non-linguistic sense of that term) and concepts (taken to be the elements of propositions) – an account which Ryle takes to have been fatefully influential

for the subsequent half-century of analytic philosophy. Ryle is out to show that that account doesn't work – indeed that it runs into essentially the problem which figures in the *Theaetetus* as the problem of how we can think that which is not. Ryle further argues that what we find in Meinong's treatment of "objectives" and Russell's treatment of "facts" (especially in his *The Philosophy of Logical Atomism*) are unsuccessful attempts to resolve this problem by continuing to frame it in the manner in which Moore takes it up. He contrasts this with the approach to the problem we find first in Frege and then, to an even clearer degree, in the *Tractatus* – one which resembles to a surprising degree that proposed by Socrates in the dialogue (at least on Ryle's reading of it). Ryle then summarizes what he has shown thus far as follows:

> I now urge that it is pretty clear that the issue that Socrates was discussing is the same as, or at least overlaps, with the issue that was being discussed fifty to thirty years ago by, among others, Meinong, Moore, Russell and Wittgenstein; and that Socrates at least adumbrated certain ideas very much like those which were rendered necessary by some of the inherent defects of the theories of objects or concepts originally put forward by Meinong and Moore.
>
> (Ryle 1990, p. 42)

To defend a claim of this form requires making clear the affinities between the philosophical preoccupations of those who are traditionally counted as analytic philosophers and those who are not. To the extent that one judges Ryle's attempt to do this to be successful, one must also concede that it permits one to see the form of a widely shared philosophical problem more clearly than one had before. Once affinities of this sort between the analytic and the non-analytic past are brought sharply into view, this may enable us to discern more clearly not only the historical landscape but also the philosophical landscape. For it can enable a clear apprehension of the very form of a philosophical problem for the first time – allowing us to separate the real form of the problem from the superficial guises through which it simultaneously manifests itself in the work of apparently very different thinkers. In this and other ways, the work of the good historian of analytic philosophy may contribute to the achievement of new and surprising modes of philosophical progress.

It is already remarkable enough that this 1952 lecture of Ryle's should have fallen completely out of view – especially given that it contains such a clear account of why the *Tractatus* does not propound, but rather seeks to defeat logical atomism. In his contribution to this volume, however, Kremer discloses an even more surprising discovery. He pairs that 1952 paper on logical atomism with a further document which Ryle pens in 1952 – one which has somehow managed to fall even more completely out of view than his earlier effort from that year. In that latter piece, published six months later, Ryle reviews Geach and Black's *Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege*.[10] In that review, Ryle now sees the context principle, as it

comes to be reformulated in the *Tractatus*, to cut more deeply than he had previously appreciated.[11]

For the purpose of this introduction, the aspect of that review of most interest lies in the way it proposes to renarrate the origin story of analytic philosophy. On most tellings of it, at least at the highest level of abstraction, the transition from Frege to Russell and then from Russell to the *Tractatus* is presented as comprising three successively progressive steps along a single philosophical trajectory. The shape of Ryle's alternative account can already be garnered from the following two remarks from the review: (1) "the greatest difference that Frege has made to philosophy … will probably turn out to be the impact that he made upon Wittgenstein", and (2) "when a commentary on the *Tractatus* comes to be written, the dominant background against which this baffling work will have to be interpreted will not be so much Russell's *Principles*, *Principia*, and *Logical Atomism*, as Frege's books … and his articles …"[12] On Ryle's telling, the transition from Frege to Russell is a backward step, against the grain of the direction of philosophical progress; while the next transition, to the *Tractatus*, figures as one in which insights from Frege (which Russell was insufficiently able to appreciate) are recovered, deepened, and then turned against the foundational assumptions not only of Moore and Russell but also of much of the subsequent 50 years of anglophone analytic philosophy.

When Ryle penned the words quoted above, he was declaring war not only against the analytic philosophy of his time, but also against its midcentury understanding of its own history: in particular, against the contemporaneous (and for many decades thereafter) dominant logical atomist reading of the *Tractatus*, as well as against the then prevailing conception of the relative priority of the influence of Russell over Frege in shaping early Wittgenstein's philosophical outlook. In making these remarks newly re-available, and helpfully contextualizing their significance, Kremer shows how Ryle, in effect, anticipated a line of intellectual filiation from Frege to Wittgenstein, along with the entire framework for interpreting the *Tractatus* which goes along with it. Ryle emerges, on Kremer's telling, not only as a thinker whose philosophy is reshaped by a reencounter with certain lost aspects of the past of analytic philosophy but also as a figure who in the wake of this encounter shaped our contemporary conception of what has proved philosophically most lasting in that tradition's legacy. Kremer thereby demonstrates the extent to which Ryle – in a manner which had almost completely been lost from view – deserves credit for both (1) contributing to a midcentury transformation of analytic philosophy's self-understanding, and (2) initiating a kind of historico-philosophical work of which this volume seeks to provide further instances.

The midcentury transformation of analytic philosophy's self-understanding Ryle helps to initiate in 1952 is advanced by others who join on roughly Ryle's side of the debate, but who each have their own axes to grind with him. Ryle offers one narrative about how and why Frege should be regarded as the founder of analytic philosophy. Michael Dummett offers what

becomes an even more influential telling of the story: Frege possesses special pride of place in the history of philosophy in virtue of his being the first practitioner of a putatively entirely new form of philosophical discipline — the philosophy of language – one which only emerged in the wake of (what Dummett called) "the linguistic turn".[13] This, on Dummett's telling, precipitated the emergence of an entirely new dispensation of philosophy: "What distinguishes analytical philosophy, in its diverse manifestations, from other schools is the belief, first, that a philosophical account of thought can be attained through a philosophical account of language, and, secondly, that a comprehensive account can only be so attained" (Dummett 1993, p. 5). Part of what was new, according to Dummett, was that now for the first time this newly rigorous branch of philosophy – the philosophy of language – not only came into being, but became the central part of philosophy: the part to which all of the areas of philosophy must now look for their methods and guiding principles. On Dummett's telling, the linguistic turn's central methodological assumption was that we must first turn our philosophical attention *toward language*. Only once we do this are we properly able to *separate thoughts from the mind* can we work out to proper understandings of the nature of thought, on the one hand, and the nature of the human mind, on the other. Only once such a separation is in place can *thought* be treated as a philosophical topic in a resolutely non-psychological fashion. Only once it is in place can we attain proper answers to questions such as: What is a thought? What is it to have a thought? What is the structure of a thought? What is it for a thought to be about an object? Equipped with the proper method – initiated by Frege – for answering such questions, analytic philosophy, according to Dummett, is born.

Ryle and Dummett therefore offer two partially overlapping, but also partially diverging, origin myths regarding the birth of analytic philosophy. Ryle's and Dummett's respective stories about how and why Frege and Wittgenstein ought to be regarded as the fathers of analytic philosophy jointly have an enormous influence on analytic philosophy's subsequent narrations of its own history – shaping both the tradition's retrospective understanding (regarding what it means to inherit and continue the tradition), and its prospective one (regarding what it is that we analytic philosophers should be doing). As these new counter-narratives become further elaborated and refined, gradually entrenching themselves as a new form of orthodoxy, they in turn serve to engender a new version of the illusion that a certain retrospective understanding of what is definitive of analytic philosophy is one which the tradition has harbored of itself all along.

3 Six ways the history of analytic philosophy can be philosophically illuminating

Seventy years later, the history of analytic philosophy is still a no less essentially contested and only slightly less ideologically loaded topic. It still continues to be practiced as a form of inquiry which is simultaneously a form

of history and a form of philosophy at one and the same time. The contributions to this volume exemplify the diversity and richness of *recent* work in the history of analytic philosophy.

It is worth distinguishing six dimensions along which they open up new perspectives on our understanding of what analytic philosophy today is or might be. The six dimensions of investigation respectively challenge (1) contemporary analytic philosophy's origin myths, (2) its often ideologically self-serving modes of inheritance of its own past, (3) its understanding of what belongs to the non-analytic past rather than to the analytic present of philosophy and hence how the two are actually (as opposed to merely mythically) related, (4) its self-conception of how it resembles and differs from (and hence what, if anything, it can possibly owe to) the parallel – often so-called "Continental" – traditions it tends to conceive of as distant philosophical others, (5) its current conception of what ought to count as philosophically self-evident, and (6) its own recently emergent historical self-consciousness as a tradition.

Taking these six points in order, some of our contributors seek to provoke a rethinking of what analytic philosophy is by arranging a revealing encounter with one or more of the founding figures of that tradition, where what the encounter in question reveals is that one or more of those figures turn out to be a very different philosophical character than the one we are nowadays inclined to suppose he must have been. Another way in which some of our contributors destabilize the prevailing origin myth is to show how the relation between analytic philosophy's early history and its later understanding of one or more of its canonical founding figures is not as seamless as we may have been led to suppose. For example, was analytic philosophy's understanding of who Gottlob Frege was or what he thought a more or less stable matter? Or did it undergo considerable evolution? Were the same texts of his always singled out as his most formative contributions to that self-understanding or not? Were his writings continuously studied, philosophically inherited, and widely assigned to students or not? Were there moments in which those writings had to be rediscovered and, if so, what obstacles lay in the way of the philosophical *re*-inheritance of the work of the thinker in question? Questions such as these can be fruitfully posed about the history of analytic philosophy's unfolding relation to the writings of, say, Moore, or Russell, or Ramsey, or Wittgenstein, or Ryle.

This last set of issues raises questions not only about whether analytic philosophy's present moment and its earlier moments are as neatly linked as its origin stories would have us believe, but also about how its supposedly central guiding ideas have been transmitted over the decades of its history and whether its self-understanding of those ideas has remained of a piece throughout. Hence, a second way of complicating standard versions of the history of analytic philosophy comes when prevailing accounts of that tradition's modes of transmission are subjected to closer scrutiny, so that what is advertised as an episode of mere inheritance or teasing out of the insights

of the prior generation in fact involves their complete transformation at the hands of the members of the later generation.

Many of the contributions in this volume are concerned with how a later figure in the analytic tradition's understanding of the ideas of an earlier figure in that tradition involves such a complete transformation of the earlier philosophical conception, so that the entire vocabulary and system of concepts of the earlier thinker come to mean something quite different in its later and more familiar incarnation in the analytic tradition. Michael Kremer's contribution to this volume forms an exception, however, since it explores a very different way in which analytic philosophy sometimes goes about inheriting its own past. It shows us how Gilbert Ryle's sustained engagement over a number of decades with the writings of Frege and early Wittgenstein – and his attempt to recover insights in their philosophy which he felt had been insufficiently received – came to transform Ryle's own conception of what analytic philosophy should be and how it should be practiced. In this regard, not only does the Gilbert Ryle who emerges from these pages no longer neatly fit the category into which he is most often forced (and therewith often dismissed) – namely, that of "ordinary language philosophy" – but he comes into view as arguably one of the first, if not the first, practitioner of the sort of history of analytic philosophy which this volume as a whole seeks to demonstrate can be immensely philosophically fruitful.

This brings us to a third way of upsetting certain conceptions of how analytic philosophy must be related to its philosophical past – and hence what sort of radical new beginning in the history of philosophy is marked by the advent of the analytic tradition. This third way of unsettling settled historical narratives may be achieved by looking more closely at how certain pivotal figures in the tradition themselves understood their relation to their putatively pre-analytic precursors. It can emerge upon closer scrutiny that many aspects of the thought of a canonical early analytic figure partake of philosophical sympathies, influences, commitments, and methods which we associate with some form of non-analytic philosophy. Ryle in his 1952 piece on logical atomism is concerned to bring out connections that trace back all the way to Plato, and which are reshaped in important ways for the analytic tradition in the work of Meinong. A further example of such a cross-filiation of traditions is touched upon briefly in Kremer's contribution: namely, how Husserl – as much as Frege, Russell, or Wittgenstein – deserves credit for being the figure who most shaped Ryle's early conception of logical grammar.[14] In other essays in this volume, we will be invited to consider how Russell turns out to be more of a German Idealist, or Wittgenstein more of a Heideggerian, than we might have previously imagined to be possible. Correlatively, when we look closely at the very early thought of a major figure, it turns out that they in some ways resemble the opposite of whom we now remember them to be. Hence the following historical considerations will each have a role to play in the contributions to this volume: Moore and Russell begin their philosophical lives as card-carrying British idealists, Wittgenstein as

a Schopenhauerian, Schlick and Carnap as neo-Kantians. More interesting still, several of our contributors will seek to show us how we can properly understand the sources, character, and vehemence of their subsequent respective critiques of, say, British Idealism, or Schopenhauerianism, or neo-Kantianism, only by coming to see how that critique is actually a self-critique of the relevant figure's own – sometimes rather idiosyncratic – earlier understanding of what was supposed to have been philosophically attractive about the original doctrine in question.

Yet a fourth way of complicating the analytic philosopher's self-understanding of his or her own tradition is by exploring its relation to a parallel, supposedly philosophically alien, tradition. The history of relations between analytic philosophy and its neighboring traditions is no less tangled than that of analytic philosophy itself. Analytic philosophy did arise in part as a reaction to these other forms of philosophy – and yet, as so often in the history of philosophy, it bears deep traces of the very traditions it sought to resist and replace. No less significantly, some later practitioners in the analytic tradition sought to reincorporate insights from those same traditions – insights they thought their analytic predecessors had either unduly neglected or too hastily rejected. This subsequently gave rise to the re-emergence of developments within the analytic tradition that would have astonished many of its earlier figures – developments bearing such labels as Analytic Kantianism, Analytic Hegelianism, and Analytic Pragmatism. Russell and Moore understood the tradition they were seeking to inaugurate in philosophy to be a revolt again Idealism – and against Kant, Hegel, and the British Idealists in particular. A half century later, Sellars and Strawson saw themselves as trying to recover insights from Kantian Idealism and to reincorporate them into the analytic tradition; while some contemporary analytic philosophers, such as John McDowell and Robert Brandom, in the generation thereafter, have become no less concerned to recover and revive what they regard as philosophically valuable and vital in Hegel. While Russell and Moore sought to distinguish themselves sharply from American Pragmatists like William James and John Dewey, and while the pragmatists of the next generation (such as C.I. Lewis) often tended to distinguish themselves sharply from their analytic contemporaries (such as Hans Reichenbach and Carnap), many recent analytic philosophers (notably Hilary Putnam and Richard Rorty) see no essential tension between the best insights of analytic philosophy and those of Pragmatism and seek to develop philosophical syntheses of elements drawn from each. But these are all relatively recent developments, of which an early analytic philosopher could not have had any inkling. It is a historical truism to say that the early analytic philosophers themselves did not yet have (because they could not have had) a historical consciousness of their own work as forming the first chapter in a more extended intellectual adventure – an adventure that would eventually become what we now call "the analytic tradition". Hence they were in no position to reflect on that tradition, or compare and contrast it with other sustained philosophical traditions. This important point, upon

a moment's reflection, is an obvious one, but it is often overlooked or at least underappreciated. The founding fathers of analytic philosophy did not take themselves, and could not have taken themselves, to be founding what we today think of as the analytic tradition. If we let this point sink in sufficiently, we will find ourselves able to cultivate new forms of interest in the following question: What then did they each think they were doing?

The fifth way in which the history of analytic philosophy can allow for a philosophically eye-opening form of intervention in the philosophical present is through the exposure of philosophical assumptions that appear to the practicing contemporary analytic philosopher to be no assumptions at all. One way to arrange for such a form of exposure is by starting with some issue that dominates contemporary analytic philosophy – an issue about which it is assumed that it has a certain pedigree within the tradition – and then offering a genealogy of it on which it emerges that our present conception of what is at stake in that issue turns on philosophical assumptions that are not shared by earlier figures in the history of analytic philosophy. This presupposes a commitment to doing the history of philosophy in a manner that is not merely historical, but also at one and the same time philosophical – a conception that has raised the hackles of some historians of philosophy. The genre of history of philosophy practiced by the contributors of this volume is arguably for the most part one which is apt to have this effect: it is a form of *philosophical history of philosophy*. Bernard Williams sought to clarify what is distinctive about this genre of history of philosophy by saying that this kind of history, if successfully practiced, yields not just historical but also *philosophical* insight: "[It] yield[s] … philosophy that can help us in reviving a sense of strangeness or questionability about our own philosophical assumptions" (Williams 2006, p. 260) This requires, Williams says, that it "must maintain a historical distance from the present, and it must do this in terms that can sustain its identity as philosophy" (p. 259). Part of how it sustains its identity as philosophy is by learning how to train its eye on that in the philosophical past which, if properly uncovered, cannot help but productively unsettle the philosophical present.

This requires that one walk a difficult tightrope. One must balance an eagerness to determine a past text's philosophical relevance for the present with a willingness to measure the degree to which it may presuppose a conception of philosophy surprisingly inhospitable to one's own – and thus to the entire philosophical framework through which one is first inclined to approach it. To do this, one must be able to hold in mind, at one and the same time, both the pressing problems of the philosophical present and those of the past thinker's philosophical moment. And, finally, one must appreciate how each of these two sets of problems bears on the other, revealing new resources for making philosophical progress. This is a tightrope which many of the contributors to this volume seek to walk, as they toggle back and forth between our contemporary analytic (often merely implicit) assumptions regarding what the shape of the philosophical problems must be and their own revisionist accounts of how and why our earlier analytic precursors did not share in those assumptions.

The sixth way in which the analytic tradition has come to challenge its own self-understanding is through its gradually emergent historical self-consciousness as a tradition. We touched briefly above on some of the beginnings of this development – for example, on how Gilbert Ryle was a pioneer in this regard, and how Dummett followed up Ryle's vision of the analytic tradition with his own alternative. One can find some version of especially the latter in many philosophical encyclopedia articles concerning the "history of analytic philosophy". We there learn, as if everyone had always believed it, that Frege is the first analytic philosopher because he is the first true "philosopher of language" – and that he thereby supposedly set some one thing everyone now calls "the linguistic turn" into motion. We also touched above on how Ryle's and Dummett's visions of the tradition served as counter-narratives to the sorts of account one finds, for example, in Urmson. No sooner than these pictures of the analytic tradition emerged – at the hands of figures such as Ryle, Dummett, Urmson, and others – did they begin to be challenged. That they have needed to be challenged so many times, and in so many different ways, is itself a testament to the tenacious hold on analytic philosophy's origin story that these midcentury narratives (and related variants on them) have been able to exert. Over the past 65 years, every decade has seen penetrating challenges to these origin myths presented. But these more historically nuanced challenges, at least until recently, have not been able to compete with the legends – to exercise anything like the same hold on the analytic philosopher's imagination of the intellectual arc of his own tradition. As the myths continue to reassert themselves, one is reminded of the remark from the close of John Ford's *The Man Who Shot Liberty Valence*: "When the legend becomes fact, print the legend!" (Ford 1963).

As a way of making this tenacity of legend a bit more vivid, consider the following three texts – each of which marked at the time of its publication a proposal for a significant transformation in the analytic tradition's self-image: (1) G.E.M.Anscombe's (1959) book *An Introduction to Wittgenstein's* Tractatus, (2) James Griffin's (1964) book *Wittgenstein's Logical Atomism*, and (3) Peter Hylton's comparatively recent 1990 book *Russell, Idealism and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy*.[15] These were arguably three of the most important books in this vein over the roughly 30-year period from 1959 to 1990. The internally propagated narratives that these three authors aim to subvert, in their three remarkably different books, each stand in a different sort of relation to each of the then dominant self-understandings of analytic philosophy. Each helped in a small way to reshape analytic philosophy's understanding of its past. But their initial impact in each case was much less than it deserved to be. Over the next 30 years, from 1990 to 2020, the number of such books has exploded in number, in their rate of appearance, and in their influence on analytic philosophy's self-understanding of its own history. Due partly perhaps to their sheer volume, these publications over the past 30 years have had a far more considerable impact in unsettling ideological shibboleths regarding the history of analytic philosophy than it was perhaps possible for any of the comparatively isolated publications over the previous three decades to have.[16]

Within the last five years, we have seen yet a new genre of publication emerge – one which earlier historians of analytic philosophy would probably not have imagined possible: books written for the wider general reading public, yet aimed at challenging some aspects of the contemporary analytic philosopher's supposedly now standard understanding of his or her own tradition's history. These books wish to engage the interest of the general reader, while simultaneously contributing to a reconception of our understanding of why analytic philosophy developed in the distinctive direction and manner that it did.[17] The history of analytic philosophy has thereby gone, over the last 60 plus years, from being an entirely non-existent subject (one that would even have struck some of analytic philosophy's most serious practitioners as involving a contradiction in terms) to being a gradually emerging specialist area in the history of philosophy (aimed in no small part to transforming analytic philosophy from within) to now being a subject sufficiently established and familiar to allow for publications whose authors aspire to pen best-sellers (and some of them even succeed in this endeavor).

4 The structure and content of this volume

The individual contributions to this volume exemplify, each in its own way, a synthesis of the six aforementioned ways in which a historian of analytic philosophy may seek to challenge the tradition's currently entrenched understanding of its own origins, history, and present relation to both. A number of them do so by zeroing in on a famous philosophical distinction – one introduced by a canonical figure in the analytic tradition. The challenge to the tradition's self-understanding begins by pressing the question whether some aspect of our current understanding of the supposedly famous distinction actually accords with – that is, whether it is really able to do justice to the depth of – that canonical figure's original understanding of the distinction in question. Other essays in the volume pick up a topic or theme that is thought to be definitive of the tradition and ask whether in one of its early incarnations this topic was originally understood in the manner in which analytic philosophers are apt to suppose it must be construed. The essays toward the end of the volume focus on the more general topic of the respective forms of understanding which certain central figures in the tradition – Frege, Carnap, Wittgenstein, and Ryle – each held of the nature of the philosophical enterprise, the character of the questions to which it gives rise, what counts as solving or dissolving them, and what kinds of sense, if any, they may be said to possess.

Part I: Fregean themes

The first part of our volume consists of three essays, each of which takes up a central Fregean topic and goes on to explore its further implications and lasting significance. The first contribution, by Wim Vanrie, presses the question how we should understand the character of the fundamental logical distinctions which Frege seeks to draw. The second and third contributions,

by Martin Gustafsson and Joan Weiner, explore from very different angles the question of what the term "analysis" originally meant in the writings of Frege. This set of three essays, in turn, pairs up nicely with the first three of the four essays in the next section. That latter trio are partially devoted to those same themes – in particular, the twin topics of the nature of analysis and what is involved in a grasp of the distinctions needed to understand, elucidate, and employ logical notation – only in this case, as those issues arise within the context of Russell's philosophical development.

The Fregean logical distinction most focally at issue in Wim Vanrie's contribution, "Frege's Conception of the Absoluteness of the Logical Category Distinctions", is the one, central to Frege's project, between the logical categories of *concept* and *object*. It plays a crucial role in his reconception of the nature of logic and his alternative account of the fundamental types of judgment which are to be distinguished. It is generally acknowledged that one of the most distinctive and innovative features of Frege's logic resides in the manner in which he rejects the traditional analysis of propositions, according to which propositions contain two terms, one of which serves as a subject and the other as a predicate, where the two are connected by means of the copula. According to this traditional conception, the two terms are not different in kind and both can be expressed by means of a noun phrase. For Frege, by contrast, the proposition is a logical structure within which essentially different roles are served by terms of essentially different kinds.

So far, so good. The challenge to the comparatively standard account of this matter comes when Vanrie focuses on the following question: how, according to Frege, is a logically fundamental distinction of such a sort to be communicated? Can't it just be communicated through a bit of philosophical prose which spells out wherein the distinction in question resides? Vanrie suggests that to think this is both to misunderstand the delicacy of Frege's task in seeking to communicate this distinction and to fail to grasp the essential role of Frege's logical notation in the expression and communication of logically fundamental distinctions and notions. The logical notation Frege introduces, his Begriffsschrift, is designed to *display* the different roles played by expressions belonging to distinct logical categories. This overt difference in the graphical appearance of the notational forms is meant to enable the logical character of such distinctions to *show* itself. This anticipates what would later become a central theme of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*: the distinctions in question are each to be elucidated (not through a set of propositions which *say* what each of them comes to, but rather) through an activity of logical articulation which allows the crucial distinctions in question to *show themselves* through their mode of inscription in the notation. Through this activity of clarification and articulation, it is to become clear that expressions belonging to one logical category cannot be placed in the positions reserved in the Begriffsschrift for expressions belonging to another. How is this to be understood? And how well has it been understood by subsequent analytic philosophers who take themselves to be faithful interpreters of Frege?

Vanrie shows how the reading of Frege that one finds in one of his contemporaries, Benno Kerry, parallels the reading of Frege that most contemporary readers of Frege still have – and that it does so in a manner which should make those readers uncomfortable with their reading. Admittedly, Kerry was seeking to disprove Frege's claim, whereas Frege's contemporary admirers are often of the view that Frege's claim (about the difference between concepts and objects) is perfectly correct. What interests Vanrie, however, is their shared understanding of the logico-philosophical status of the supposed claim in question. Both Kerry and a contemporary reader of Frege are happy to ascribe some thought along the following lines to Frege: "The asymmetry between the roles played by concepts and objects in Frege's logic gives rise to this peculiar result: that we can never say about concepts what we can say about objects". The question at the heart of Vanrie's paper is how we are to understand this supposed something which we cannot say.

Kerry imagines that when we talk about concepts, they can thereby be converted into logical subjects which, though ceasing any longer to figure predicatively in our thought, nonetheless continue to "refer" to the same "things" we were thinking about when we employed them predicatively in the context of a judgment. When Frege objects to Kerry that the only way we can refer to a concept is by employing it as a concept – that is, predicatively within a judgment – this can appear to saddle Frege with the consequence that it is impossible for us to think or talk about concepts. This is the difficulty at the heart of Frege's philosophy which Vanrie aims to show us how to make progress with.

Vanrie shows how we can reconcile Frege's rejection of Kerry's manner of attempting to talk about concepts with an understanding of the more limited sense in which we may still maintain that Frege did think it is possible to talk about concepts. Vanrie demonstrates that Frege's own manner of drawing the distinction between objects and concepts is not meant to preclude the possibility of speaking about concepts *tout court*; rather, its aim is to introduce a clear and regimented way of speaking about concepts which avoids the equivocations of the traditional distinction between subject and predicate terms. Vanrie shows how the Begriffsschrift device of second-level predication is able at one and the same time to allow for concepts to serve as logical subjects *and* yet retain their essentially predicative nature.

This reveals, however, that there are certain logical notions that do apply across logical categories – for instance, across the categories of being a logical subject, of being a function, and of being an argument. On Vanrie's reading, this does not form an exception to the rule that what can be said about an object cannot be said about a concept. For, Vanrie suggests, these notions – unlike other concepts – are logically stratified. And although logically stratified expressions lack a corresponding translation into the Begriffsschrift, this does not mean that Frege fails in providing us with the means for expressing every possible proposition of which we may judge whether it is true or false. For, according to Vanrie, claims involving the logically stratified expressions

do not form a possible subject matter for judgment at all. Rather, they belong entirely to the domain of *elucidation* – an activity which Frege strictly distinguishes from the activity of judgment. Whereas the latter is the domain of science, the former is the domain of the philosopher.

Obviously, what philosophical "analysis" is – or is supposed to be – cannot help but be a central topic in any understanding of what is supposedly distinctive of the "analytic" tradition. To the extent that the notion of analysis admits of radically different understandings, so too will our understanding of what analytic philosophy is and whether that notion serves to capture some single continuing feature of the identity of the analytic tradition over time. Martin Gustafsson's contribution, "Why Worry about Weierstrass? Frege on the Paradox of Analysis", concerns Frege's conception of the activity of philosophical analysis. The current tendency is to read Frege as having a conception of the layout of logical reality which precedes our logico-linguistic practices and to which they must answer, if they are to achieve logical precision, clarity, and truth. This, in turn, induces a certain conception of the relation between logical reality and ordinary language: the latter is judged to be imperfect just to the degree to which it fails adequately to mirror this antecedent structure – one of which the realm of thought already anyway partakes. This further invites a very particular picture of the relation between ordinary language and Begriffsschrift: the role of Begriffsschrift is to introduce a form of notation which more faithfully reflects the structure which the denizens of the realm of thought have, independently of the particular form of linguistic expression in which we happen to clothe them – thereby overcoming the manner in which ordinary language disguises the inner logical structure of the thoughts to which it aspires to give expression. Finally, this, in turn, gives rise to a very particular set of candidate options for how to understand what "analysis" could possibly be – or at least ought to be, if it is to be really possible.

Gustafsson's discussion of this topic is framed by a consideration of what has come to be called the paradox of analysis: while, on the one hand, any analysis which simply *preserves* the meaning of the original terms would be trivial and superfluous, on the other, one which substantially *adds* anything to the content expressed by those original terms would for this very reason appear no longer to be a correct analysis of those terms. Frege clearly rejects the first horn of this dilemma: for him, finding the correct definition, at least in philosophically more interesting cases, is far from a trivial matter. This raises the question whether he can avoid the second horn of the dilemma: in what sense, then, are his definitions *correct*? Gustafsson's aim is to find a middle path between two approaches to understanding Frege's position. On the one hand, Michael Beaney (2004) has argued that Fregean definitions are not designed to preserve the senses which are expressed in the definiendum; rather, Frege is to be seen as engaged in a revisionary activity, of a kind which anticipates the one which Carnap and Quine speak of in terms of explication. On the other hand, Tyler Burge (2005) has argued that analysis aims to capture the senses which are already expressed in our language, though the manner

in which they are there expressed is to be understood in terms of teleological or normative commitments: the philosopher aims to capture the meaning which, in our current practices, we only imperfectly grasp.

Gustafsson offers a fresh look at this debate, by taking a closer look at Frege's polemic against Weierstrass's analysis of the concept of number. Gustafsson highlights Frege's charge against Weierstrass that his work attests to his "thoughtlessness". The point of deploying this term of criticism, Gustafsson shows, is not to accuse Weierstrass of mere ignorance of the true nature of number, but rather to point out his failure to achieve a goal to which his own practice would commit him. Gustafsson's reading of Frege's engagement with Weierstrass brings out the extent to which Frege himself would deny that aiming for logical perfection is a separate element which is added on to whatever it is our current linguistic practices consist in. Rather, on Gustafsson's interpretation of Frege, our linguistic practices themselves must be understood as constituted by the striving toward perfection. This uncovers a very different strand in Frege's philosophy – in particular, in his conception of what is involved in the articulation of thought through its expression in Begriffsschrift – than that which is highlighted in the aforementioned standard reading. On the standard reading, the corresponding ideal of logical perfection resides in the adequation of expression of thought to a logical structure whose layout is fully exogenous to whatever our linguistic practices happen to be. On Gustafsson's reading, Frege himself already paves the way for a form of philosophical conception more commonly ascribed to Wittgenstein – one according to which the achievement of logico-philosophical clarity resides in a form of self-understanding fully immanent to our linguistic practices, rather than one which requires their subordination to, and reform in the light of, an ideal of perfection altogether external to them.

Whereas Gustafsson suggests a set of lines along which to read Frege which move him closer to Wittgenstein – even to the later Wittgenstein, Joan Weiner's contribution, "Fregean Logicism and Quinean Explication", reads him in conjunction with and as in some ways bearing greater affinities to Quine. In particular, she shows how Frege's understanding of the nature and role of definitions may be clarified if compared with Quine's conception of the nature and role of (what Quine calls) explication. Like Quine, Weiner's Frege is willing to admit that more than one definition (or in Quine's case, explication) may count as correct. This claim is apt at first to seem puzzling, Weiner admits, as long as one is committed to (what she calls) the "subsentential priority" view: the view that we can attain a clear grasp of the identity and properties of objects of our judgments independently of and prior to our grasp of the role that these objects are given in the context of complete judgments. Weiner contrasts the *sub*sentential priority view with what she calls the *sentential* priority view. These two forms of priority view turn on two different ways of construing Frege's context principle: a comparatively minimal construal and a far stronger one which Weiner takes to be the exegetically sounder and philosophically more insightful option.

She goes on to argue that the subsentential priority view suffers from a variety of exegetical and philosophical weaknesses. Above all, she is concerned to show how it fails to make sense of the role of theoretical terms within scientific inquiry and argues instead that only a "sentential priority" can do so. What may at first appear to be at best a shortcoming and at worst an off-putting peculiarity in Frege's conception thereby emerges as one of its philosophical strengths. One striking feature of the parallel Weiner brings to the fore is the role of stipulative definitions in Frege's and Quine's respective accounts. She puts the point as follows: "Both on Quine's view, and on Frege's view – we are entitled to handle defects by stipulative definition, provided the stipulations are consistent with the work that we want the expressions to do". One particularly striking feature of Weiner's reading of Frege here – one which departs radically from almost all received interpretations of his logicist project – is the extent to which she attempts to take seriously Frege's own most radical claims about wherein he takes the significance of such a project to lie: in particular, his claims about the extent to which his project allows us to confer upon the concept of number a sound epistemological footing of a sort that it had previously lacked. The role of properly chosen stipulative definitions in Frege's project thereby comes into view as part of his larger endeavor of enabling a transformation of arithmetic. Such properly chosen stipulative definitions, on this reading of Frege, emerge as a crucial prerequisite in effecting a desired transition in the science of arithmetic, moving it out of the condition of pre-systematic science and fully into that of systematic science. Weiner illustrates her reading of this aspect of Frege's understanding of what is at stake in his version of a logicist project – and the profundity of the manner in which it revolutionizes the science of arithmetic – with an arresting comparison with the trajectory of the definition of AIDS:

> The status of the predicate "has AIDS" in 1982 was not so different from that of the predicate "is a number" when Frege wrote *Foundations* (or now). Just as we appear to know things about numbers (e.g., every number has a unique successor) it seems that in 1982 we knew things about AIDS (e.g., someone who has AIDS has an increased risk of histoplasmosis). Just as it seems that we can't determine which sets really are numbers or ordered pairs (or whether either are sets), it seems that in 1982 we couldn't determine which people really had AIDS.
>
> (p. 121 in this volume)

The sentential priority view is able to do justice both with respect to the case which primarily concerns Frege (placing arithmetic on a sound footing) and the comparison case which Weiner here deploys (placing AIDS research on a firm scientific footing) in order to illustrate her point. Weiner argues that in both of these cases it is not the subsentential constituents of the sentences of the putative science which confer upon it the status of being a genuinely systematic science. Rather this is a matter of the character of the overall

roster of truths constituting the science. As Weiner puts it: "It is sentences, not object names, that delineate the subject matter of a science". Drawing on this insight, she criticizes Benacerraf's famous puzzle concerning the ontology of numbers (Benacerraf 1965), charging it with turning on an uncritical reliance on a subsentential priority view. The manner in which his problem is posed presupposes that to identify an object and give it a name is a task that requires no theoretical background. Weiner's essay as a whole seeks to show that Frege is concerned to target just this presupposition – one which many contemporary accounts of his philosophy of mathematics continue to ascribe to him. Frege, on this reading of him, thereby emerges as a thinker who would have been profoundly out of sympathy with a number of central tendencies in contemporary philosophy of mathematics which purport to build on his ideas.

Part II: Russellian themes

All four of the papers in this section of the volume seek to revisit, in one way or another, the topic of how to understand the relation between early analytic philosophy and the prior Idealist philosophical tradition – and, in particular, the ways in which the very different responses – and varying degrees of sympathy or hostility toward aspects of Idealism – found in the work of the seminal figures of early analytic philosophy are tied to often overlooked philosophical differences between those figures themselves. The relation to Idealism is usually presented as one in which the analytic philosophers simply led a sudden and open joint revolt against the prior tradition. The first of the four papers in this section, by Tyke Nunez, seeks to reveal the transition in Russell's case actually to have been far more tortured and gradual than on the standard telling. The second, by Peter Hylton, shows how the conception of propositions so forcefully advocated by Moore (in his initial recoil from Idealism), and apparently enthusiastically embraced by Russell (over the subsequent two decades), actually made for an increasingly awkward fit with the other philosophical commitments incurred by Russell's evolving conceptions of logical analysis and generality. The third contribution, Maria Van der Schaar's, is concerned to challenge yet a further aspect of certain Whiggish narratives of the history of analytic philosophy: the manner in which they tend to portray Russell as operating with something closely resembling – or at least not differing all too radically from – the conception of logic which we find in Frege, whereas actually their conceptions of logic are in important respects diametrically opposed. In the fourth contribution, Cheryl Misak complicates standard pictures of this history along a further dimension by attending to some aspects of pragmatism's role in complicating the relationship between Anglo-American Idealism and early analytic philosophy. In particular, she explores some of the ways in which American pragmatism played an essential mediating role in some of the later encounters between Idealist and early analytic philosophers – especially in the encounter between Royce

and Russell in 1914 and in the subsequent transmission of Peircean ideas via Russell to Ramsey.

One might have thought that the one episode in the history of analytic philosophy that no longer requires careful scrutiny is this one: Russell's move away from idealism and toward the logicism championed in those of his works now regarded as among the founding documents of early analytic philosophy. This transition from the very young Russell (who was still an Idealist philosopher) to the slightly older Russell (who is a co-founder of analytic philosophy) is usually dated as having taken place between 1897 and 1900. At the front end of this stretch, in 1897, he publishes his book *An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry* (written in 1896; see Russell 1956a), intended as a contribution to a broadly Hegelian philosophical project. At the back end, in 1900, he starts to publish works which are often cited as the onset of the period in which he has become completely critical of German Idealism (in particular, this is the year in which Russell wholeheartedly endorses in print the broad outlines of G.E. Moore's criticisms of German Idealism).[18] Tyke Nunez, in his contribution "The Doctrine of Internal Relations: Russell's 1897 Rejection", shows that the standard account of Russell's philosophical trajectory is unable to do justice to the character and complexity of his development over this three-year period.

Nunez is concerned to uncover the earliest indications of Russell's turn away from his geometry-focused, idealist philosophy of mathematics of the 1890s and toward the position articulated in the *Principles of Mathematics* on the basis of his newly developed logic of relations. What is well known is that a critical step in this development consists in Russell's rejection of the idealistic doctrine of internal relations. The question is: what prompts this and in how many separate steps does this move of Russell's from being some sort of Hegelian Idealist to being a virulent anti-idealist take place? It has been variously presented in previous scholarship as taking place in a single step, stemming from Russell's 1898 (and thereafter) conversations with Moore, or from ideas Russell developed at that time through reading Leibniz, or both. Nunez shows, however, that a close look at his 1897 book on geometry reveals Russell (in what is still supposed to be his fully Idealist phase) to have *already* become skeptical of the capacity of received Idealist philosophical doctrines to make sense of the character of geometrical representation.[19]

The task of providing a convincing philosophical account of the nature of geometry, in the wake of various nineteenth-century developments, came to be detached from the originally Kantian emphasis on Euclidean geometry as articulating the form of outer sense. Russell's immediate German neo-Kantian predecessors and contemporaries focused instead on the question of the precise character of such representation in *projective geometry* – the study of geometric properties that are invariant with respect to projective transformations. On the version of the history that comes to light on Nunez's account, Russell's dialogue with his contemporaries – with neo-Kantians such as Hermann Lotze and Carl Stumpf, as well as with their foremost

critics, most notably William James – plays a crucial role in Russell's development. While these debates do implicate canonical German Idealist philosophical themes, such as whether space is real or ideal and how to explicate the relation between phenomena and things-in-themselves, Russell's relation to this complex of Idealist themes emerges as nuanced and complex. His early rejection of internal relations is traced by Nunez to his attempt to walk a philosophical tightrope: his determination, on the one hand, to eschew any need for an Idealist philosophical apparatus (and especially for any version of a Kantian distinction between phenomena and noumena), while, on the other, to avoid any form of psychologism that attributes the necessity of the theorems of projective geometry to the character of the human mind and its inability to represent space otherwise than in accordance with them. Nevertheless, the manner in which these questions are posed by Russell in this period – especially in the resolution of what Russell calls "the antinomy of spatial relations" – continues to bear a decidedly Idealist stamp. Rather than simply belonging to the "before" moment of a single sudden conversion from Idealism to anti-Idealism, Russell's philosophical views in 1897 represent a liminal stage in his overall development from self-avowed Hegelian to strident anti-idealist.

On this telling, the overall transition from an Idealist to an anti-Idealist phase in Russell's philosophy turns out to be more gradual, nuanced, stepwise, and surprisingly discontinuous in character than has hitherto been appreciated. Nunez's paper thereby affords a particularly illuminating example of how the history of analytic philosophy may deepen and transform our understanding (1) of the intricacies of connection between the analytic tradition and other traditions, and (2) of the kinds of questions with which the founders of the tradition originally struggled at the tradition's inception – questions that have often remained unmentioned in the theories that they developed in response.

On one canonical telling of the origin story of the analytic tradition, its beginning is to be traced to the rejection of Idealism by Moore and Russell, shortly before the beginning of the twentieth century. Moore's (1899) article "The Nature of Judgment" is often taken to mark the official moment of the tradition's birth. But some scholars have pointed out that an important early step was taken by G.E. Moore already in the dissertation which he submitted to Trinity College, Cambridge, in the summer of 1898. Peter Hylton's contribution to this volume, "Moorean Propositions and Russellian Confusion", focuses on the account of propositions which Moore puts forward in that 1898 dissertation and, more importantly, on Russell's subsequent relation to it. Hylton disputes neither that Russell at first fully embraces the original Moorean account, nor that all the way up until 1918 Russell often says things which imply that he continues fully to accept it. But Hylton shows how much more complicated and confused Russell's actual philosophical relation to the Moorean view of propositions is than his overt professions of fidelity to it might lead us to believe.

In the first two sections of his essay, Hylton lays out the fundamental commitments of the Moorean view and makes clear wherein the attractions of that account lay for Moore himself and why it did indeed play a crucial role in the break with Idealism. After then documenting the persistence of the Moorean view from 1900 on in Russell's thought and explaining the nature of Russell's reasons for wishing to continue to cling to it, Hylton proceeds to build on work by James Levine (2009, 2016) – work which argues that in that same period there are crucial elements in Russell's work which are simply incompatible with the Moorean view of propositions. The two primary such incompatible elements on which Hylton goes on to focus are Russell's post-1900 explanations, on the one hand, of what is involved in giving definitions or analyses (especially of mathematical concepts) and, on the other, of how to make sense of the idea of generality (an idea which plays a central role in the logic that Russell, inspired by Peano, seeks to develop during this period).

Hylton's topic is Russell's series of attempts to negotiate this tension in his thought – a tension which arises between his reasons for wishing to continue to accept the Moorean account, on the one hand, and the various countervailing philosophical pressures which arise in his post-1900 work in logic and philosophy, on the other. This gives rise to a whole host of confusions which Russell at first perceives only dimly. (The tension remains unresolved until 1918, when Russell finally begins to develop a quite different and utterly unMoorean view of propositions.) Hylton succeeds in showing convincingly both that Russell's work from late 1900 until 1918 contains incompatible lines of thought and that Russell himself fails to appreciate this fact to a quite stunning degree. The paper concludes with a brief exploration of the following question: what is it that Russell really believed during this almost two-decade period during which his philosophy is afflicted by this fundamental tension at the heart of his thought? (The answer proposed here is arguably pertinent to an appreciation of the tensions in the thought of other figures such as Frege, Wittgenstein, and Ryle, which are highlighted in some of the other contributions to this volume.) There may be, Hylton suggests, no fact of the matter as to which of the two conflicting lines of thought in his philosophy – the recognizably Moorean one and the strikingly unMoorean one – is the one which Russell came comparatively closer to *really believing*. The very idea of "really believing" is not up to the job – it just is not near clear enough – Hylton suggests, to allow us to say what it is that a philosopher, in the midst of struggling in the way Russell was with such philosophical difficulties, really believes.

High-altitude, big-picture narratives of the history of analytic philosophy tend to portray Frege and Russell as working with a broadly shared conception of logic. Whatever their differences over matters of detail, they are often presented as operating with at least roughly the same conception of what logic is and what a logical notation renders perspicuous about the nature of thought, judgment, and inference. Maria Van der Schaar's paper, "Russell on Judgement and the Judging Subject", challenges such narratives by focusing

on the most radically unFregean aspects of Russell's conceptions of judgment and the judging subject. The paper is especially concerned to bring out the radically unFregean character of various of the implicit philosophical commitments of Russell's multiple relation theory of judgment (henceforth MRTJ) – his post-1910 account of the logical articulation of what it is to judge. In recent commentary on the MRTJ, historians of philosophy have commonly taken it to face two problems: (1) "the direction problem" (the theory's inability to distinguish the judgment that Desdemona loves Cassio and the judgment that Cassio loves Desdemona) and (2) "the articulated unity problem" (the theory's failure to guarantee that a judgment is more than a collection of terms, given that not any combination of terms can form a unity). On Van der Schaar's account, these two issues are symptoms of a *deeper* problem which has so far been neglected. Once this deeper problem comes into view, we are in a position to appreciate how far Frege and Russell are from being like-minded co-founders of a single movement animated by a shared commitment to a single overarching conception of logic.

Drawing on the Fregean distinction between two different sorts of account of judgment – a properly logical and a merely psychological one – Van der Schaar observes that from early on (going back to the 1903 *The Principles of Mathematics*), Russell gives up on the prospect of providing (what Frege would regard as) a properly logical account of judgment and instead opts for what she calls the "external", psychological point of view on the phenomenon of judgment. Reviewing the variants of Russell's multiple relation theory of judgment from 1910 to 1918, Van der Schaar concludes that there is a *lacuna* in all these variants. Russell assumes that judgment can be fully understood simply through analyzing the phenomenon of the attribution of beliefs. But as Van der Schaar argues, he never addresses the question of what it is for someone speaking in the *first person* to utter a declarative sentence with assertoric force. This, argues Van der Schaar, makes it "impossible to understand the relevance of judgment and assertion for logic". Russell's account, according to her, consequently suffers from the following three problems:

1 Russell addresses judgment as if it were one among the many propositional attitudes and gives no explanation of the *unique* role that judgment and assertion have in logic.
2 Russell's MRJT analysis of judgment involves a reference to the *empirical* subject. So if judgment is to have a role in his logic, such an account will infect logic with psychologism. Russell associates the term "judgment" with the rationalist and idealist tradition. Russell's preferred term, "belief" is to be construed not in its dispositional sense, but rather in what philosophers today sometimes call its "occurrent" sense. This resolutely external approach to the topic of judgment renders Russell unable to say what distinguishes judging from mere predicating. Moreover, the judging subject is, for Russell, just one object among others. This becomes more explicit after he abandons the MRTJ in 1919.[20]

3 Since judgment in the MRTJ is considered as a *relation* between a subject and independently existing objects, Russell cannot properly account for the logical articulation of what is judged.

In all these respects, Russell's account contrasts starkly with the first-personal, internalist account of judgment which Van der Schaar has shown, in other work of hers (see especially Van der Schaar 2018) to be essential to Frege's conception of logic – in particular, to the role of the assessment of inference through the employment of a Begriffsschrift, and, above all, to Frege's own understanding of the significance of the judgment stroke in his logical notation.

The title of Cheryl Misak's paper, "'My Pragmatism is Derived from Mr. Russell'" is a quote from a 1927 paper by Frank Ramsey (1990a, p. 51) which makes a claim which is apt to seem rather puzzling to those historians of analytic philosophy whose working assumption is that the early analytic philosophers must, of course, have all been staunch opponents of pragmatism.[21] The paper not only explores the complex set of relations between pragmatism and early analytic philosophy, but also suggests that this background throws an illuminating and altogether different light on the relations between figures such as Russell, Ramsey, and Wittgenstein and some of the leading figures in the anglophone post-Hegelian Idealist tradition.

Misak's paper draws on a rich array of sources which are usually neglected in the historiography of analytic philosophy, including the writings and correspondence of James, Peirce and Royce, and notes taken by Russell's students at Harvard University from the period when he was a visiting professor there. Misak's investigative work uncovers evidence for the significant influence exercised by the founder of pragmatism, C.S. Peirce, not only on Frank Ramsey (who was an avowed pragmatist) but also on Bertrand Russell (whose writings on pragmatists such as F.C.S. Schiller, William James, and John Dewey are sharply polemical) and Ludwig Wittgenstein (whose relation to pragmatism continues to remain a topic of considerable dispute). The primary aim of these diverse historical threads, which Misak's article gathers together, is to enable us to understand Ramsey's claim that his pragmatism is derived from Russell – a claim which has bewildered Ramsey scholars for decades.

Misak in no way downplays the extent of Russell's antipathy to the most notorious aspects of the pragmatism of James, and in particular to the connection the latter draws between truth and an individual's will to believe. But that aspect of James's teaching was no less opposed by Peirce. So opposition to Jamesian pragmatism does not, on its own, suffice to prove that Russell was opposed to pragmatism as such. Russell was exposed to Peirce's texts already in 1904, but the decisive moment, on Misak's account, was Russell's visit to Harvard in 1914, during which he lectured alongside and engaged in debates with Josiah Royce. Royce considered himself to be both a pragmatist and a kind of Hegelian Idealist, advocating a position he himself called Absolute Pragmatism. In Royce's irenic reconciliation of these two philosophical tendencies, inquiry is understood to aim at "an ideal picture of a world of

experience" which will be portrayed "as One" in thought (Royce 1968, p. 260). This notion of the One – or the Absolute – is something that Peirce and James were equally dead set against. This difference notwithstanding, Misak seeks to bring out how the debate between this American brand of idealism and American pragmatism was a dispute against a broad background of agreement. Indeed, Peirce thought that Hegel would have made an altogether fine pragmatist were it not for his denial of (what Misak calls) "the bruteness of reality".[22] She goes on to explore what most dissatisfied Peirce about this aspect of Hegel's philosophy, as well as why Peirce himself is not vulnerable to the philosophical counter-charge (of falling into the Myth of the Given) that a Hegelian might wish to level in return against him. This is the debate against whose background Russell's most philosophically fruitful engagement with American pragmatism takes place during his brief tenure at Harvard in 1914. Misak traces how Russell's (1921) *The Analysis of Mind* incorporated the lessons he learned from the pragmatists – ones that he further encouraged Ramsey to take up in his own exploration of the writings of the pragmatists. It was then subsequently through Ramsey, Misak goes on to suggest, that certain pragmatist ideas came to exert a formative role on Wittgenstein's later thought.

Part III: Tractarian themes

The third part of this volume is dedicated to issues stemming from the difficulty of placing Wittgenstein's early work, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, within the analytic tradition. Though it almost never fails to be included in any short list of the formative canonical texts of the tradition, the *Tractatus* remains a text which – both in form and content – defies any attempt to accord it a tidy and self-contained place within the history of analytic philosophy. The two figures whose ideas the *Tractatus* most evidently seeks to take up are indeed the two around whom the previous two sections of this volume are organized: Frege and Russell. But it should also be clear to any alert reader of the *Tractatus* that it is no less eager to engage a good many other philosophical interlocutors – many of whom are brought into play while their names go unmentioned, and many of whom are in no way analytic philosophers. One such figure is Goethe; a second is Schopenhauer; Tolstoy is yet another. (All three are brought into play in this part of the volume.) Yet a further respect in which the *Tractatus* resists easy placement within the analytic tradition – not unrelated to the liminal presence of such figures in the work – is the manner in which it simultaneously treats of logical and ethical difficulties. A certain sort of historian of analytic philosophy is likely to regard "logic" and "ethics" as figuring "together" in the work in a manner which is at best merely serial – so that they are understood to occur in the work merely one after the other, as it were – thereby assuming that the terms "ethics" and "logic" are to be understood as contemporary analytic philosophers understand them: namely, as denoting two distantly related "areas" of the philosophy. This, in turn, allows a

reader to regard the engagement with logical and ethical themes as occurring in philosophically minimally interrelated related parts of the work.[23] Several of the contributors to this volume encourage us to see things quite differently, urging a perspective from which the logical and ethical concerns of the work may come into view as two sides of a single form of difficulty.

The first contribution to this third part of the volume, by Eli Friedlander, picks up on the following three aspects of the book: (1) the enigmatic presence of Schopenhauer in its pages, (2) the work's overall understanding of the character of the twin nexus of logic and ethics, and (3) how its mode of engagement with (1) bears on its treatment of (2). The next contribution in this part, by Jonathan Soen, is no less concerned with uncovering yet a further aspect of unity of concern in the work's twin treatment of the logical and the ethical. In this case, the unity is one that comes into view in the effort to comprehend as interrelated aspects of a single form of difficulty the following three forms of limit: (i) the limit of logical generality, (ii) the (logical/ethical) subject understood as the limit of the world, and (iii) the difficulty of comprehending in thought what it means properly and fully to think from the first person point of view: "I am a man; men are mortal; therefore *I* am mortal".

As we have already seen, several of this volume's contributions devoted to the exploration of Russellian themes touch on the turn-of-the-century debate about internal relations – one in which Moore and Russell opposed the British Idealists. Insofar as this debate is regarded as a milestone in the birth of Analytic Philosophy, the question of how to place the *Tractatus* with respect to it ought to interest us. The third contribution in this part of the volume, by Jonathan Gombin, takes up this question. Rather than offering a further suggestion as to whose side of the debate between Bradley (who championed internal relations) and Russell (who opposed them) it is on which Wittgenstein seeks to enter, Gombin offers us instead a way of reading the *Tractatus* that allows us to see that the aim of the work is to dissolve the debate altogether by revealing how its initiating question is ill-posed. The question of how to understand early Wittgenstein's intervention into the debate about internal relations is related to the wider question of his understanding of the nexus of language, thought, and world. It is often said that the birth of analytic philosophy came with (something called) the linguistic turn. The inception of such a turn is often credited to Frege – most notably by Michael Dummett.[24] The final contribution in this part, by Silver Bronzo, explores some respects in which it is only with Wittgenstein, in aspects of his critique of Frege, that a full linguistic turn is first taken. Bronzo's essay shows us that if we wish to use the expression "the linguistic turn" to indicate a revolution to which Wittgenstein himself wished to contribute, then it needs to stand for something very different than what Dummett claims it does.

Two questions which recur in commentary on the *Tractatus* are the following: (1) How are we to understand those of its sentences which appear to echo those found in the writings of other philosophers (Frege, Russell, Schopenhauer, Tolstoy, etc.)? And (2) to what extent is it possible to understand

the work's teaching on certain "topics" (e.g., ethics) independently of its teaching on others (e.g., logic)? With respect to the first question, the problem revolves around whether we may regard the *Tractatus* as simply incorporating the doctrines of others into this text or whether we are instead to understand each such case of the echoing of the words of another philosopher as calling for some fundamental form of Tractarian transformation in the very way those words are now to be understood. With respect to the second question, the problem is whether we can build out from an understanding of some parts of the book to others, or whether the parts of the book are so interwoven that we are apt to misunderstand each such part unless we properly apprehend it in the light of an understanding of the whole. Eli Friedlander's contribution to this volume, "'The World is My World': Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* and Schopenhauer's World as Will and Representation", advocates for the latter interpretative option on both of these counts.

It is worth taking a moment to say a bit more about an approach to reading the book that Friedlander is concerned to reject. The final portions of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*, which take up questions of ethics and aesthetics, have long attracted the attention of readers who have wanted to find in them key teachings of the work. This has given rise to a now long-standing tradition of readings in which these "ethical" or "mystical" sections are taken up and interpreted as self-standingly intelligible apart from their relation to the earlier five-sixths of the book. This gives rise to the impression that the logical and ethical "parts" of the work are simply awkwardly soldered together, with the former simply tacked onto the latter to form a whole in which the essential ethical teachings are disjoint from the logical ones and vice versa. This also creates a further problem: if we are not going to draw on the rest of the book to understand its handful of concluding remarks on ethical, religious, and/or aesthetic matters, then from whence should we receive guidance in our attempts to decipher them? The answer – according to many commentators – is from the writings of some other thinker who is not Wittgenstein. There are certainly striking affinities between what Wittgenstein says in those final Tractarian remarks and what some other author – e.g., Tolstoy, Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer, etc. – says in his writings. This gives rise to the following interpretative strategy: the presence of such a Tractarian echo of an earlier thinker is first adduced and then is taken to license a reading of Wittgenstein in which one may then simply attribute to him, more or less wholesale, a set of ideas developed at considerably more helpful length in the writings of the supposed secret source of the *Tractatus*'s ethical doctrines. (One might call this the Janik/Toulmin approach to the *Tractatus*, in honor of the book that first pioneered this approach to reading the *Tractatus*, Janik and Toulmin 1973). This allows one to treat the *Tractatus*'s ethical remarks as a mere appendage to the work and affords us the illusion that we can grasp the heart of the work's ethical teaching while fully sparing ourselves the task of having to work through the rest of the book. Eli Friedlander's contribution takes up the question of one such supposed external

source of Tractarian ethical thought – namely, Schopenhauer's *The World as Will and Representation* – but shows how one can explore the character of Wittgenstein's engagement with Schopenhauer in a manner that, contrary to the Janik/Toulmin approach, in no way spares the reader the difficulty of first needing to understand the *Tractatus* as a whole.

In the post-Janik/Toulmin tradition, the tendency is to treat certain passages in Schopenhauer as a fulcrum, which one can hold fixed, and then interpret some of the mysterious moments in the *Tractatus* in light of these passages. This leaves us with a situation in which the rest of the *Tractatus* comes to appear irrelevant to a proper understanding of the significance of these remarks, as if the key to deciphering them lies in texts outside Wittgenstein's own corpus. Friedlander proceeds the other way around: he draws on his own understanding of the *Tractatus* as a whole – as set forth in his book on early Wittgenstein (Friedlander 2001) – and seeks to show how Schopenhauerian themes are integrated into and transformed through the manner in which they are taken up into the internal dialectical development of the *Tractatus*.

The focus of Friedlander's paper is on the manner in which the duality of aspects, which Schopenhauer expresses as "The world is my representation" and "The world is my will", combines to form the single insight Wittgenstein expresses in this enigmatic remark: "The world is my world" (5.641). This is not a mere appropriation of Schopenhauer's thought, but a transformation of it through the manner of its appropriation. Friedlander aims to show how the Tractarian manner of illuminating the character of the nexus formed by the combination of the first personal possessive pronoun "my" with the term "world" in 5.641 results in Wittgenstein's transforming Schopenhauer's original idea into one fully consonant with the teaching of the *Tractatus* as a whole.

Wittgenstein's engagement with Schopenhauer indicates the seriousness with which he approached the central puzzle posed by Schopenhauer's philosophy, namely how the ethical and the empirical domains can retain their independence from each other while not becoming wholly disjoint. There are several distinct contexts in which Wittgenstein's engagement with this problem can be traced. Friedlander draws several connections between Schopenhauer's way of posing this problem and Wittgenstein's way of resolving it. He starts from Schopenhauer's suggestion that the will is "objectified" in the representation of objects, yet continues to make itself felt in reflection on their essences and on the first principles that govern their representation. He connects this with the manner in which, in the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein distinguishes, on the one hand, the dimension of meaning to which our representations of objects belong and, on the other, the dimension of significance to which our reflection on the forms of objects and the logical forms of our representations of objects belong. Further inheritances from Schopenhauer are traced by Friedlander in Wittgenstein's suggestions regarding an ethical attitude toward the world and one's own life, e.g., in the Tractarian remarks on the happy man, as well as in his suggestions, in the *1914–1916 Notebooks*

(Wittgenstein 1984), that we can experience the dimension of significance in our engagement with specific objects through recognizing (what Wittgenstein calls) their "spirit". Friedlander strives to bring out how the themes at issue here do not represent for Wittgenstein sudden irruptions of ethical concerns into the midst of what otherwise would be a merely logical investigation. Rather, what shows itself in an ethical attitude toward the world or from within the happily lived life is elucidated through the work as a whole, in its treatment of what objects, the world, the "I", saying, showing, etc., are.

The year 1929 brought Wittgenstein back to Cambridge and to academic philosophy; it also brought him back to discussing philosophy with Frank Ramsey, who had played a central role over the previous five years in overseeing work on the first English translation of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. Wittgenstein and Ramsey began their intensive conversations in 1923 when Ramsey visited Wittgenstein for the first time in Austria, and their lively exchange continued from then on, partly in the form of a philosophical correspondence, until Wittgenstein's return to Cambridge. According to a fairly standard account, once they become able to resume face-to-face dialogue with one another in Cambridge in 1929, this is what happens: Wittgenstein promptly joins Ramsey in renouncing the theory of generality which Ramsey had attributed to the *Tractatus* and had found wanting. The ground on which the theory is supposed to founder is that it assimilates generalized propositions to logical products, without taking into account the question of whether the quantification in question ranges over finite or infinite domains. Jonathan Soen's contribution to this volume, "Death and the Variable: A Logico-Existential Commentary", complicates the standard narrative of this episode and its supposed relation to Wittgenstein's overall philosophical development.

Soen draws attention to the fact that the *Tractatus* already contains the seeds of quite a different conception of generality than the one which (at least on the currently official telling of the story) troubled Ramsey. The standard view of Ramsey's argument takes it to rest on the realization that we are essentially incapable, due to our finite abilities, of such feats as writing out or verifying an infinite conjunction, surveying an infinite domain of objects, carrying out an indefinitely long calculation, and so on. So – according to this narrative – when it comes to the infinite case, the sense of general propositions is not reducible to the sense of a logical sum or product. In his 1929 "General Propositions and Causality", Ramsey goes even further, however, and proposes that even propositions such as "All men are mortal" and "Arsenic is poisonous", insofar as their scope is not restricted to a range of objects with which we are already acquainted, cannot be analyzed as logical sums of products. Instead, Ramsey's positive alternative proposal is to treat these general statements, which he proposes to call "variable hypotheticals", as essentially subjective expressions, that is, expressions, not of general facts but rather of cognitive attitudes. Hence the assertion of propositions such as "All men are mortal" is now to be understood as the adoption of the rule "If I meet a man, I shall regard it as mortal".

One central issue in Soen's paper is the question whether the view of generality Ramsey attacks is indeed the one adumbrated in the *Tractatus*. Soen argues that when Wittgenstein calls *object* a formal rather than a genuine concept (Wittgenstein 1960, 4.127–4.1272), and when he explicates the nature of the variable in terms of *Urbilder* (proto-pictures), he appeals to a notion of generality which is not reducible to logical sums or products. Soen's reading of this issue is sensitive to a connection present here between Wittgenstein's notion of the proto-picture (*Urbild*) and Goethe's much earlier notion of the proto-phenomenon (*Urphänomen*). It is an excellent example of the sort of connection which historians of philosophy tend to miss when they work too hard at trying to locate Wittgenstein's thought too squarely within the intellectual confines of the analytic tradition. An appreciation of this connection (between *Urphänomen* and *Urbild*) requires that we modify the standard conception of the figures from whom the founders of analytic philosophers drew inspiration. Goethe's morphological method, on Soen's account, sees a range of phenomena as sharing in a space of form, rather than as particular instances of a common concept, rule, or causal nexus: a Goethean archetype makes *itself* manifest *in* phenomenal nature. Similarly, in the *Tractatus*, logical forms make *themselves* manifest *in* the range of expressions that fall within the scope of a variable. Here the generality of the variable is not constituted by the logical sum or product of the individual items (be they finite or infinite), but by the space opened up by each logical form.

A further, central issue in Soen's paper concerns the way in which one's own death, qua the demise of the logical subject engaged in an act of quantification, eludes inclusion within the scope of quantification. When one regards the sections of the *Tractatus* which treat of putatively exclusively "logical" topics as having little or nothing to do with those which treat of putatively purely "ethical" matters, and vice versa, then one is not likely to discern a connection between the work's treatment of quantification and its remarks about how one's own death cannot be seen as an event in life (6.4311) or how the subject forms a limit of the world (5.641). Soen brings these topics together, allowing us to appreciate how my own death – rather than simply being one of the many facts I can effortlessly quantify over in seeking to gather together in a single proposition the supposed totality of facts – resists assimilation into a general thought of the form *things are thus and so*. The logical subject I myself am is not one of the things I comprehend, even obliquely, when I make the apparently utterly banal general proposition "All men are mortal" in thought. Here one finds yet a further connection historians of analytic philosophy are apt to miss – again to another of Wittgenstein's favorite authors, and in this case also a favorite of Heidegger's, namely Tolstoy.[25] Bringing this question of the relation between logical generality and the act of thinking one's own death to the fore, Soen thereby draws out not only the complexity of the relation between two analytic philosophers – Wittgenstein and Ramsey – whose work has seemed to many to be in many ways very close (but whose philosophies, as Soen helps bring out, are respectively animated by a very different spirit),

but also the relation between two thinkers whose work have seemed to most historians of analytic philosophy to have little to do with one another – the author of the *Tractatus Logic-Philosophicus* and the author of *Sein und Zeit* – but whose philosophies are (at least so Soen suggests) closer in spirit than has been generally supposed.[26]

Jonathan Gombin's contribution to this volume, "The *Tractatus* and the Debate on the Nature of Relations", focuses on the manner in which the early Wittgenstein proposed to intervene in the ongoing philosophical debate between Moore and Russell, on the one hand, and Bradley and his followers, on the other. Although this debate on internal relations was still raging when Wittgenstein arrived in Cambridge in 1911, it is rarely asked how exactly it was taken up by the author of the *Tractatus* and exactly how it resembles or differs from the approach taken by his mentor, Bertrand Russell. The mentor had reacted vehemently against a supposedly notorious doctrine he took himself to find in the pages of F.H. Bradley's (1897) *Appearance and Reality* – a doctrine according to which all relations are internal to their terms.[27] According to Russell, all relations are external thereto.[28] What sayeth Wittgenstein?

Those who do raise this question usually suppose that Wittgenstein joins one side of this debate or the other. Some commentators assume that he, of course, must want to end up endorsing some version of his teacher's logical atomism.[29] Others claim to notice striking similarities between Bradley's and Wittgenstein's respective views on the nature of relations.[30] Either way, what is thereby assumed is that Wittgenstein means to provide an answer to the question "whether all relations are internal or external" (cf. Wittgenstein 1960, 4.1251). One can reject this assumption, while still acknowledging that there is something right both (1) in the idea that that there are certain affinities between Bradley and Wittgenstein here, and (2) in the trend in recent scholarship which seeks to call into question the once dominant "logical atomist" reading of the *Tractatus*, along with its implicit assumption that the *Tractatus* sought to carry on the legacy of Moore's and Russell's revolt against British Idealism and their rejection of internal relations. It is, in effect, this task which sets the agenda of Gombin's contribution to this volume. He seeks to show that neither a Russellian atomist nor a Bradley-style idealist interpretation can be sustained in a close reading of the *Tractatus*. In 4.1251, with regard to that very topic, Wittgenstein announces (in light of the previous sections) that we have reached that juncture in the unfolding dialectic of the work at which the reader should now be in a position to see that "the disputed question [underlying the Russell-Bradley debate] has been taken care of". The question of whether there are internal relations has now been taken care of? – Exactly how?

As Gombin sees it, Wittgenstein really means just what he says: rather than joining one side of this debate or the other, the *Tractatus* aims instead at dissolving it entirely by bringing to light the confusion that is responsible for its existence. The underlying confusion he is out to expose turns out to be one between (what Wittgenstein calls) "relations in the strict sense" and

so-called "formal relations". Internal relations do not simply qualify objects; they essentially characterize their nature or essence. Nor are they, like proper relations, asserted by propositions; rather, they show themselves only in our use of propositions. A proper disambiguation of these terms yields the insight that so-called formal or internal "relations" are *au fond* not relations at all. Yet in 4.122 Wittgenstein allows himself provisionally to participate in the philosopher's way of talking about them – as if "internal" relations were simply a further species of the logical genus *relation*. But, as he first begins to do so, he indicates that his acquiescence in doing so forms part of strategy to uncover the source of the philosophical confusion underlying this very way of speaking. Gombin's contribution consists in an attempt to explain the point of pursuing this elucidatory strategy and how it differs from one that flatly denies that internal relations are relations at all. Wittgenstein's philosophical aims, Gombin argues, can be attained only if he engages with the sources of the philosopher's confusion, rather than merely treating and repudiating the results of this confusion. At the origin of the confusion lies a misunderstanding of the notions of form and essence. The misunderstanding lies in the idea that a recognition of the form or essence of an object consists in a recognition of the relations and properties that an object bears. The *Tractatus* deploys, in the context of its own elucidation of these notions, a philosophically self-conscious strategy of shifting its use of the terms "property" and "relation" – a shift which is ultimately meant to lead us to overcome the misunderstanding in question. Once it is overcome, we will no longer feel the need to keep speaking of forms and essences in terms of relations (and properties) at all. If the elucidatory strategy succeeds, it will relieve us of the source of the philosophical pressure which leads us, in turn, to ask whether the supposed so-called "relations" are internal or external. The "solution" to the problem is shown to lie in manner in which the problem itself is caused to vanish.

Silver Bronzo's contribution to this volume, "Thought, Language, and Expression in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*", in effect argues that it is only with Wittgenstein that a full linguistic turn is first taken in the history of analytic philosophy – hence that it is only in the *Tractatus*, and not yet in Frege, that language comes to be regarded as *essential* to the very possibility of thought. In Frege admittedly we do find the idea that a perspicuous linguistic notation is essential to the normative assessment of thought, judgment, and inference. Yet for Frege the nature of thought itself is independent of language. It is due to our nature, and not to that of thought, that we finite beings must clothe our thoughts in a sensuously apprehensible outer linguistic form. This allows for difficulties to arise regarding the inner logical structure of thought and its mere outward linguistic expression. These difficulties do not simply disappear on the Tractarian conception. The *Tractatus* holds that language *expresses* thought (TLP 3.1) and that language *disguises* thought (TLP 4.002), but also that language *is* thought (TLP 4). How can we make sense of this triad? Bronzo's chapter offers an interpretation of the Tractarian conception

of the relation between thought and language that is at the same time anti-Lockean and anti-Fregean. Only once we have overcome the twin pitfalls of Fregeanism and Lockeanism in our conception of the relation between of language to thought can, according to Bronzo, the full linguistic turn be taken.[31]

Bronzo employs the labels "Fregeanism" and "Lockeanism" to refer not only to two false doctrines regarding the relation between thought and language but also to two fairly standard strategies for interpreting Wittgenstein himself. Bronzo thereby, in effect, distinguishes between Lockean and Fregean *readings* of the book. One might have thought these two interpretations were as far apart from each other as two readings of the *Tractatus* could possibly be. Bronzo aims to show rather that these two readings actually share a common conception of the relation between thought and language – one which Bronzo himself seeks to show rests on a dualist assumption which the *Tractatus* itself rejects. The central difference between Lockean and Fregean readings concerns only the question of how to construe the nature of one of the two members of the dualist pair "language" and "thought" – namely, the nature of the latter: *thought*. These two readings disagree as to whether thought is to be taken to be something mental or to be regarded as a mind-independent abstract entity. By contrast, on the reading of the *Tractatus* Bronzo recommends, the thought is *immanent* to the sentence that expresses it. For language to *express* thought is for language to be the embodiment of thought; and for language to *disguise* thought is for signs to disguise how they are used. On this third option for reading the *Tractatus*, the work allows for inner as well as outer embodiments of thoughts, but accords them equal status.

To achieve clarity about these matters requires getting clear about just how the *Tractatus* understands (what it calls) *expression* [*Ausdruck*]. Bronzo seeks to show that Wittgenstein employs a notion of expression according to which what is expressed is immanent to what expresses it. Bronzo sums up how this conception of expression departs from both dualist and relational models of expression as follows: "What expresses itself is immanent to that in which it expresses itself – both in the sense that it may not exist disembodied, and also in the sense that it is constitutive of that in which it is embodied". This, in turn, requires achieving clarity regarding the Tractarian conception of the relation between sign (the sensibly perceptible dimension of language) and symbol (the logically articulated dimension of language). Here is how Bronzo sums up the counterpart point regarding the relation of sign to symbol: "A proposition is the perceptible embodiment of a thought, where this means that (1) a thought may not subsist except as embodied in one way or another, and that (2) a proposition is not describable as a proposition apart from the thought that finds in it its expression". The resulting doctrine is anti-Fregean in the following respect: thoughts are *essentially* embodied. It is anti-Lockean, because the outer linguistic embodiments of thoughts do not owe their meaningfulness to self-standingly intelligible inner episodes of thinking. The result is a conception fully worthy of the title of having taken the linguistic turn – a conception which retains what is correct in

Frege's critique of Lockeanism, with its excessively psychologistic conception of thought, while correcting what is in turn no less excessive in Frege's recoil from the idea that the very nature of thought could in any way be dependent upon our capacity for linguistic expression.

It is worth remarking on one merit of Bronzo's contribution which might otherwise go unnoticed: it helps us to see how the ground for *later* Wittgenstein's famous treatment of *privacy* is already prepared by *early* Wittgenstein. The central target of that later critique is the very idea that there are self-standingly intelligible inner episodes – inner items which are just *there*, and which we just *have*, even if we are unable really to express them. For all of Frege's criticisms of Locke's conception of ideas as beginning with particular sensations and then being turned into abstract concepts, Frege is happy to concede to Locke his conception of the nature of *sensation*. It is something inner, private, and each of us has his own and learns what they are from his own case. Frege does not deny that we have such items in our inner life; he will insist only that they are of no relevance to the logician. The moment Locke suggests that *that* notion of an inner item should be of concern to the logician, Frege will charge him with having gone astray, of conflating the *psychological* notion of *Vorstellung* (as mere psychological inner episode) with a properly *logical* notion of *Begriff* (as something which figures in a truth-evaluable judgeable content). Although Bronzo's contribution presents itself as a reading of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* on expression, it is written by someone who has one philosophical eye looking forward to what is to come in the later treatment of the topic of expression in the *Philosophical Investigations*. It brings out how much early Wittgenstein anticipates the later conception – one in which, in the logically fundamental case of expression, that which is expressed and the expression thereof form a unity. Bronzo shows us how this holds true for early Wittgenstein for any case of *linguistic* expression. In later Wittgenstein, the point is then developed with equal attention to the case of the immediate *bodily* expression of pain, feeling, and emotion. With the hindsight afforded by Bronzo's reading of early Wittgenstein, we come to see how the task of steering between Lockeanism and Fregeanism is necessary not only for avoiding a standoff between psychologism and logicism about the nature of the expression of *discursive* content but also for avoiding Locke's and Frege's shared psychologism about the nature of the *non-discursive* aspects of our inner lives.

Part IV: Later developments

The contributions which appear in the fourth and final section of this volume all pertain, in one way or another, to questions concerning the character of philosophical problems and the sort of sense, if any, of which they may be said to partake. The first of these papers, by Michael Kremer, has already been briefly discussed above. It has a narrower and a wider ambition. With regard to the former, it is centrally concerned, on the one hand, with

a somewhat later figure – namely, Gilbert Ryle – a figure who stands at the midpoint, rather than at the inception, of the history of analytic philosophy. With regard to its latter ambition, it focuses on how the analytic tradition's perspective on one of its supposed founders – namely, Frege – came to be radically re-adjusted, through Ryle's rediscovery of certain Fregean ideas, and thereby partially precipitating the rise of our contemporary picture of who Frege was and wherein the significance of his philosophy lies. The paper is therefore about ways in which aspects of our contemporary conception of the starting point of analytic philosophy begin to be formed at its midpoint. The second paper in this part, by Maria Balaska, discusses Carnap's and Wittgenstein's very different responses to Heidegger. A central theme of this contribution is again the character of philosophical problems and the puzzling forms of sentence to which they tend to give rise. Whereas Kremer shows how Ryle comes to be more of a follower of Frege through his studying Frege's work carefully at a certain point in his career, Balaska shows how Carnap proves rather to be much less of a follower of Wittgenstein than Carnap himself imagines during the very episode in his career in which he tries to follow Wittgenstein most closely. Carnap has, however, been able to exert a good deal more influence on how that episode has been remembered than Wittgenstein. Indeed, Carnap and Wittgenstein are often treated by historians of analytic philosophy as operating, at least in the early 1930s, with a single broadly shared philosophical outlook. Balaska, by comparing and contrasting their respective treatments of Heidegger, brings out – even with regard to that moment in the history of analytic philosophy at which Carnap and Wittgenstein are supposed to have been closest – the depths of philosophical difference between them. Balaska thereby succeeds in showing how very far in his attitude toward philosophical nonsense Wittgenstein ever was from the sort of thinker who could have felt intellectually at home in the philosophical milieu of the Vienna Circle.

The volume concludes with two contributions concerning the post-Tractarian Wittgenstein, both of which take up the topic of philosophical nonsense in yet further ways. Gilad Nir explores Wittgenstein's employment of riddles as fruitful objects of comparison for understanding other cases of puzzling questions. Wittgenstein compares and contrasts the sorts of questions which animate riddles with, on the one hand, philosophical questions and, on the other, certain sorts of mathematical conjectures. Philosophical questions appear to have a puzzling sort of sense (one which can appear to run up against the limits of what can be said in language) and certain mathematical conjectures seem (at least in advance of their being given proof) to hover on the boundary between sense and nonsense. Nir shows how the twofold comparison of riddles with each of these two sorts of cases helps to illuminate Wittgenstein's own conception of the character of philosophical problems and the difficulty of making philosophical progress with them. In the final contribution to this volume, Cora Diamond focuses her attention on the character of the sort of question which serves to initiate

the dialectic of Wittgenstein's rule following considerations and associated issues in the *Philosophical Investigations*. She contrasts two sets of Wittgenstein commentators in this connection: (1) those who take the initiating question to itself be perfectly intelligible but to require a very special sort of Wittgensteinian philosophical response, and (2) those who take what is most crucial and distinctive about Wittgenstein's response to these initiating questions to lie in his endeavor to show us how – in seeking to answer such questions – the crucial trick in the philosophical conjuring game (one to which we, in philosophizing, subject *ourselves*) is precisely the one which this first set of commentators is apt to regard as perfectly innocent.

Many of the papers in this volume are concerned with how a later figure in the analytic tradition's understanding of the ideas of an earlier figure in that tradition involves a complete transformation of the earlier philosophical conception. Part of the interest of Michael Kremer's paper, "Gilbert Ryle's Fregean Inheritance," is how it reverses that frame. Kremer's paper shows us how Ryle's sustained engagement over a number of decades with the writings of Frege and early Wittgenstein affected Ryle's own conception of what analytic philosophy should be, if was going to remain true – in ways that he very much wanted it to – to the original insights of those two figures who, for Ryle, represented the most important sources of that tradition. As noted above, with Kremer's help, Ryle comes into view as arguably one of the first – if not the first – practitioner of the type of work in the history of analytic philosophy which this volume as a whole seeks to exemplify.

As already indicated, Kremer's contribution manages to make two very different sorts of contribution to our understanding of the history of analytic philosophy in tandem – one having to do with the larger historiographical matter of the founding role of Frege in the overall development of analytic philosophy and one having to do with the much narrower historiographical matter of Frege's role in the development of the philosophy of Gilbert Ryle. Starting with the narrower topic, Kremer carefully examines Ryle's shifting understanding of Frege and argues that the change in Ryle's understanding of Frege ushered in a change in Ryle's attitude to his own central methodological idea of category mistakes. The original idea, as Ryle first conceived it, was – as Kremer himself nicely puts it – "that one could declare that a philosopher has put a determinate something into the wrong categorial pigeon-hole". Eventually, Ryle realizes that this is incompatible with what he himself later comes to consider to be most philosophically insightful in Frege's context principle. The dawning of this realization, according to Kremer, depended on a prior breakthrough in Ryle's understanding of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* and the manner in which Frege's insight comes to be sharpened and radicalized in that latter work.[32] Once the aforementioned realization fully dawns, it leaves Ryle in a remarkably awkward relation to what had, at least up until then, been his own account of the nature, source, and logical character of philosophical problems. This leads to the question which occupies that final section of Kremer's paper: What then can we say

about the fate of the idea of category mistake in the light of the history of Ryle's readings of Frege's work?

Kremer starts from Anthony Palmer's reading of Ryle's methodology as "Frege-inspired", yet doomed to collapse due to the tension between the underlying commitments of Ryle's early conception of category mistakes and those of Frege's context principle.[33] Kremer argues that Palmer is right to see the conflict with Frege's principle as explaining the instability of Ryle's original conception of his methodology, but wrong to see Ryle's reading of Frege as the source of that methodology. As Kremer shows, it was Ryle's gradually deepening understanding of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* which leads Ryle to reassess both his original view of Frege and his own earlier conception of how to make progress in philosophy.

Kremer distinguishes three phases in Ryle's reception and appropriation of Fregean ideas:

1 1926–1948: This period coincides with the development of Ryle's own early methodology. During it, Ryle's understanding of Frege's philosophy is limited to those aspects of it that Ryle regarded as paralleling what he himself also found to be most valuable in Husserl and Russell. This involves a very particular picture of who Frege is (one that persists in the minds of many contemporary analytic philosophers), namely someone whose primary philosophical commitments are accurately summarized as and are largely restricted to opposing the twin dangers of psychologism and Platonic realism about logic.
2 1949–1952: This is the period in which Ryle's most influential work, *The Concept of Mind*, is completed and published. In retrospect, Ryle will come to regard his understanding of Frege during this period as continuing to be characterized by an insufficiently acute appreciation of the depth of the distinction between complete and incomplete expressions. Nevertheless, a certain breakthrough in Ryle's understanding of Frege, as well as in his understanding of the *Tractatus*, comes to the fore in 1952, with the publication of the essay on logical atomism and the review of *Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege*. In the latter, Ryle anticipates the connection Geach would later draw between Frege's reflections on the distinction between concept and object and Wittgenstein's on what shows itself but cannot be said.[34]
3 1953–1960: Ryle finally arrives at his clearest formulation of what he comes to view as Frege's most "crucial but difficult point" – namely that the elements of a thought are "abstractible differences" but not "detachable" components.

Kremer argues, in conclusion, that Ryle never fully grasped the significance of this crucial but difficult point, for reasons he develops at the end of his paper.

With respect to the larger historiographical topic, Kremer helps us to see how the Anglophone analytic tradition's self-understanding of its own

history has been one in which Frege has not always been accorded a central role as a founding figure of that tradition. Moreover, to the extent that he has been thought of as having such a role, the tradition's conception of it has itself undergone considerable change over time. Kremer shows us how precarious and fitful the stages in the reception of Frege's thought were over the first half-century or so of the history of analytic philosophy: how only at the midcentury mark – through the efforts of Ryle, along with Anscombe, Black, Geach, and Dummett – Frege begins to emerge as a figure whose writings every analytic philosopher must study carefully for him- or herself in order to understand who Frege is – and hence in what respect he is a founder of the analytic tradition in philosophy. Ryle thereby emerges in Kremer's contribution not only as a figure whose philosophy is reshaped by a reencounter with certain lost aspects of the past of analytic philosophy but also as a figure who himself reshaped our contemporary conception of what ought to be regarded as philosophically most lasting in that tradition's legacy.

Maria Balaska's contribution to this volume, "Wittgenstein on Heidegger on the Nothing", focuses on two sets of remarks from the early 1930s where Wittgenstein clarifies his own philosophical conception by focusing on certain sentences of Martin Heidegger's. The implicit background of those remarks lies in Wittgenstein's seeking to contrast his own philosophical method with its purported application as set forth in contemporaneous publications by Rudolf Carnap. Taking himself to be employing a method of clarification which he had putatively learned from Wittgenstein, Carnap sets out in one particularly famous paper to show how the method is supposed to work by undertaking to apply it to a series of sentences from Heidegger.[35] Carnap represents himself as, in effect, faithfully following Wittgenstein in seizing upon these Heideggerian sentences as characteristic expressions of metaphysical nonsense – ones which purport to say something meaningful and interesting – but which are to be unmasked as meaningless and empty. When Wittgenstein himself later discusses those remarks from Heidegger – the very ones which Carnap had sought to reveal as philosophically confused – to the surprise of the members of the Vienna Circle, Wittgenstein takes a very different attitude toward them.[36] Their differing responses to Heidegger serve to bring out the considerable distance in philosophical outlook and temperament separating Wittgenstein and Heidegger. While Carnap evidently reviles Heidegger, Wittgenstein appears to detect in him a kindred philosophical spirit. Heidegger was regarded not only by Carnap, but also by many of his fellow members of the Vienna Circle, as the antithesis of an analytic philosopher. Carnap is out to show how the methods he learned from Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* reveal logical confusions which Carnap claims Heidegger has unwittingly entangled himself in. Balaska shows how Wittgenstein's response to those very same sentences of Heidegger's is in fact sympathetic, reflecting a recognition of why someone might be drawn to employ the very forms of words here at issue. Unlike that of Carnap, Wittgenstein's response rests on the assumption that Heidegger's employment of nonsense here is witting, rather than

unwitting. Where Carnap seems to imagine that it would come as news to Heidegger that he is speaking nonsense, Wittgenstein regards Heidegger (not unlike Wittgenstein himself in the *Tractatus*) as knowing exactly what he is doing in speaking in the ways he does.

Several recent commentators on Wittgenstein have reached conclusions broadly in agreement with those of Balaska, in as much as they, too, have discerned that Wittgenstein means in his conversation with the Vienna Circle to make it clear that his own attitude toward these sentences of Heidegger's differs entirely from that of Carnap. But how exactly? Balaska sets her own interpretation against one proposed by Gordon Baker (2004). Baker's account still preserves this much of Carnap's original treatment: Wittgenstein is said to regard Heidegger's mysterious expressions concerning "the nothing" as symptoms of philosophical disquietudes that call for therapy – where the desire to practice a form of "therapy" signals wherein the real difference between Wittgenstein and Carnap is supposed to lie. Balaska, by contrast, seeks to do justice to the actual context of Heidegger's expressions. She sees Wittgenstein himself as sensitive to what elicited these remarks: namely, Heidegger's desire to make sense of anxiety as a mode of experience – one which comes to expression in terms of an encounter with nothingness. Balaska further notes the depth of the connection between this experience of anxiety and the experiences Wittgenstein himself describes as partaking of an "ethical" character in the *Lecture on Ethics*. Balaska argues that Heidegger's expressions exemplify characteristic instances of what by Wittgenstein's lights are a humanly intelligible form of response to experiences of this sort. Wittgenstein thereby comes into view, on this reading – in contrast with that of both Carnap and Baker – as in no way being concerned to deprive Heidegger of the entitlement to speak in such ways, nor as being concerned to champion a form of therapy whose goal is to overcome and eliminate an attraction to such ways of speaking. On the contrary: Wittgenstein's insistence that these sentences are non-accidentally nonsensical is revealed to be part of a philosophical conception which seeks to accommodate the full variety of human forms of expression – including ones which partake of a kind of intelligibility for which neither Carnap's nor Baker's readings are able to allow.

Gilad Nir's contribution to this volume, "Nonsense: A Riddle without Solutions", explores a continuity in Wittgenstein's philosophy, tracing the development of a theme which runs from his earliest writings – the *1914–1916 Notebooks* and the *Tractatus* – all the way through to his posthumously published *Philosophical Investigations* and related writings. One finds throughout these texts, both early and late, an insistence on the importance of distinguishing *kinds of difficulty* – philosophical, ethical, logico-mathematical, and scientific. Nir highlights one dimension of this issue by tracing connections between the various contexts in which Wittgenstein discusses *riddles* as forming an interesting family of intellectual difficulty – one which Wittgenstein compares and contrasts with the sort presented by problems which arise in philosophy, ethics, mathematics, and even the natural sciences. Nir shows

how attention to Wittgenstein's interest in riddles helps us see why certain standard objections to his treatment of certain topics are misplaced. Two particularly pertinent sorts of objection to Wittgenstein here are the following – one having to do with the nature of philosophical nonsense and one with the nature of mathematical progress: (1) If early Wittgenstein's conception of nonsense really is an *austere* one (as some commentators have urged),[37] then how is it so much as possible to employ nonsense (as Wittgenstein evidently takes himself to be doing in the *Tractatus*, 6.54) in a manner which can lead to a genuinely satisfying form of clarification of philosophical difficulties?[38] (2) If the middle and later Wittgenstein are right that mathematical conjectures acquire their full sense only once proven, then how, before a proof is completed, can there have already been something we were trying to prove?[39] Nir shows how the *dynamic* character of riddles – comprising, as they do, forms of language of which at one moment in time we *cannot* make sense, while at a later moment we *can* – allows us to see better what sort of transformation of sense our philosophical and mathematical problems undergo over the course of their clarification.

An important background to Wittgenstein's interest in attending to the distinctive character of the sort of difficulty a riddle poses is his more general concern with the extent to which philosophers are apt to misconstrue the nature of the problems with which they deal. These misconstruals issue in part from an assimilation of philosophical problems to other sorts of problems – for example, those of the natural sciences. An outward similarity in the surface form of the question posed by a philosopher and a scientist can lead to a failure to appreciate the extent of the difference in the inner logical character of the underlying problem really at issue. When philosophical problems are thus assimilated to those of the natural sciences, it tends to encourage the idea one could acquire some peculiar yet substantive form of knowledge through succeeding in answering the question the problem seems to force upon us. By contrast, Wittgenstein suggests that we compare philosophical problems not with such questions but rather with the sorts which characterize riddles. For what is characteristic of riddles is that the person to whom they are posed is initially unable to tell *how* they are to be solved: what is lacking is not merely an answer, but a method for finding an answer. Moreover, the expression of the riddle, before it is solved, lacks a determinate sense, and the need to explore the character of our unclarity about what we are being asked is precisely what the difficulty of solving riddles consists in. Yet once we find a satisfying way of determining the sense of the riddle, finding the solution becomes a trivial task. Unlike scientific problems, solving a riddle does not require the acquisition of any new knowledge, but merely the right sort of alteration of our use of language. As Wittgenstein sees it, the expression of philosophical problems, like riddles, turn on questions which at the outset lack a determinate sense, but which are mistaken for questions already possessing one. The treatment of such problems, not unlike the treatment of riddles, turns on attempts to clarify their meaning. This is the central similarity,

according to Nir, Wittgenstein wishes to bring to the fore through his comparison of philosophical problems with riddles. The central dissimilarity between them Wittgenstein wishes to highlight is the following: philosophical problems, unlike ordinary riddles, are ultimately unsolvable in the terms in which they are posed – there is no way of giving that which they apparently seek to express a determinate meaning. Wittgenstein's aim, therefore, is not to help us solve these problems, but to dissolve them.

As Nir shows, the comparison with riddles also plays a central role in Wittgenstein's discussion of mathematical problems, especially in the middle and later periods of his work. Wittgenstein rejects the realist approach according to which every mathematical theorem, whether proven or not, meaningfully specifies a possible fact which would make it true or false. By contrast, he proposes to construe unproven conjectures on the model of riddle phrases, whose meaning, prior to our finding their solution, has not been determined. This brings into view a further important difference between philosophical problems and ones which have a riddle-like character but do admit of a form of answer which can satisfy us. In contrast with the difficulties posed by philosophical problems, those presented by unproven mathematical conjectures are of such a sort that there sometimes turns out to be something which can count as our having made genuine progress with them. This enormous difference notwithstanding, there remains yet a further commonality between such cases – one which Nir argues we must keep in view in order to appreciate what is supposed to be especially illuminating about Wittgenstein's comparison of philosophical problems to riddles. Wittgenstein is concerned to show that there is such a thing as our being *caught up in an attempt to solve a riddle* – that we can remain entangled in such a state of intellectual suspension, struggling furiously to make progress – even in those cases where our riddle-like question lacks a solution. Such forms of struggle themselves constitute an existentially real dimension of our lives – one in which we are tormented by illusions of sense which we may discover only in hindsight, once we have overcome our confusion, to have been illusions.

While some of the other contributions to this volume focus wholly or partially on early Wittgenstein, Cora Diamond's "Some Thoughts about Wittgenstein on Rules" closes this volume with a discussion entirely focused on later Wittgenstein. At its center are questions concerning how to understand Wittgenstein's treatment of a topic which has received an enormous amount of attention over the past four decades, namely, rule following. She shows that despite how much has been written about it, Wittgenstein's discussion of this topic remains poorly understood. The tendency, when approaching Wittgenstein's treatment of this topic, is to come up with a way to read him that would allow one see him as intervening on one side or another of a particular debate – one which has dominated much of analytic philosophy in recent decades – namely, the debate between realists and anti-realists. Applying the framework of this debate to the topic of rule following, the question which commentators generally then take Wittgenstein to be attempting to answer turns out to be some form of the following: *In virtue*

of what does what I do, in purporting to follow a rule, count as a case of my following the rule *correctly*? This, in turn, is taken to be a question which immediately bears on what it takes to provide an adequate philosophical account of the nature of meaning and related topics in the philosophy of language. Once the problematic has been extended into the concerns of contemporary philosophy of language in this way, the underlying issue at stake then comes to be construed as requiring an answer to the following question: *Wherein does* someone's *meaning* one thing rather than another *consist?* Wittgenstein's supposed attempts to pose and answer such questions have been construed by a number of influential commentators – perhaps most notably Saul Kripke (1982) and Crispin Wright (1989) – as eventually culminating in some form of principled philosophical skepticism or extreme anti-realism about the correctness or incorrectness of what we do when we follow a rule or intend to mean our words in a particular way. In response, commentators such as John McDowell (1998a) and William Child (2010) have challenged the guiding premises of these readings on both interpretative and systematic grounds.

Some such anti-skeptical or anti-anti-realist readers of Wittgenstein (such as Child) have left in place the idea that Wittgenstein is indeed trying to answer some version of one or both of the foregoing questions, reading him as defending some form of "realist" response to these questions instead. What it means to read Wittgenstein as a "realist" for such commentators is to read him as offering accounts of rule following and meaning which provide philosophical vindication of the objectivity and epistemic integrity of our everyday practices. Other Wittgenstein commentators (including McDowell) have challenged, both as a matter of philosophy and as a matter of Wittgenstein exegesis, the entire set of premises underlying the aforementioned debate between realists and anti-realists. The level of the challenge here is quite deep: it strikes at the heart of the debate. It turns on the claim that a proper understanding of Wittgenstein's philosophy requires that we give up on the whole idea that he is even in the line of philosophical work to which the aforementioned readers, on both sides of that debate, see him as wishing to contribute. What it means for a reader of Wittgenstein such as McDowell to say of himself that he is offering something which may be termed a "realist" reading of Wittgenstein – or what it would mean for him to claim that Wittgenstein himself is some sort of "realist" – is not that he sees Wittgenstein as wanting to advance a philosophical theory which vindicates our ordinary practices. Rather it means that Wittgenstein seeks to rescue our philosophical thought from the very idea that our practices could so much as stand in need of the form of rescue which traditional philosophical forms of anti-anti-realism seek to provide. The depth of the differences between these two ways of understanding what it means to be a "realist" reader of Wittgenstein – or what it means to see Wittgenstein as defending the integrity of our everyday practices of meaning and rule following – makes for enormous differences between the kinds of Wittgenstein commentators that end up getting grouped together within a single so-called "realist" camp. It is in service of enabling

us better to discriminate between Wittgenstein readers of these two sorts, and specifically between William Child and John McDowell, that Diamond's contribution intervenes into recent discussions of Wittgenstein on rule following.

Diamond attends more closely than most commentators to what she calls "Wittgenstein's treatment of the phenomenology of rule following". This involves her in exploring the form of understanding, from within the practice of following rule, which a bearer of the practice has of what she is doing when she follows a rule. This involves Diamond in a consideration of the question of the place of such practices in the overall shape of human life – hence of the question what it is for something to so much as belong to a phenomenon of human life and to be recognizable as such. It is then in the context of this exploration that she takes up the topic of kinds of Wittgenstein exegete and, in connection with it, the respective degrees to which, in this ongoing debate, Child and McDowell may be deemed to be faithful to Wittgenstein's own understanding of what he is doing in his remarks on rule following.[40] Despite their each flying the banner of realism, she finds that McDowell and Child are considerably further apart than Child recognizes. For Child, the disagreement is over whether semantic facts supervene on non-semantic facts or not. From Diamond's perspective, however, the real difference lies in what position the philosopher thinks she needs to occupy in order to philosophize. Child takes Wittgenstein to be attempting to answer the traditional philosophical question *in virtue of what* do our practices count as correct or incorrect. Diamond argues that this involves a very different conception of "who *we* are in doing philosophy" than the conception of the first-plural subject to which Wittgenstein appeals when doing philosophy himself. In this respect, Diamond finds McDowell to be much closer to the mark as a reader of Wittgenstein. For McDowell, the deepest level at which we may sensibly contemplate the place of language in the world remains one at which there are human interactions that can be characterized only in terms that presuppose meaning and understanding. There is no attempt to explain what meaning and understanding as such *au fond* consist in. Rather the philosophical task here is one of showing how such efforts are misguided and how the questions which underlie them are empty.

Appendices

This volume closes with a pair of appendices. Each has to do with Gilbert Ryle's forms of encounter, or lack of encounter, with another major figure – one within the analytic tradition and one outside of it. The first has to do with Ryle's encounters with Frege's *work*, not the man; the latter with his encounter or non-encounter with Heidegger, the *man*. Ryle was already familiar with and had briefly discussed Frege's work in print a number of times, when the critical re-encounter with his work in 1952 discussed above, and partially documented in our first appendix, took place. The second appendix addresses the long-standing scholarly interest in determining the precise extent of Ryle's

relation to Heidegger. What has occasioned this interest, above all, is the fact that Ryle published a review of Heidegger's *Being and Time* in 1929 – a substantial critical discussion of the book on which he had been at work over the course of the previous year.[41] The question of our second appendix is whether Ryle's intellectual encounter with Heidegger's work – during that period of time or any other – was ever supplemented or enriched by meetings or other forms of encounter with Heidegger in person.

We have already twice touched above on the interest for our volume of the item that constitutes our first appendix. As noted above, it was published anonymously in the *Times Literary Supplement*, August 22, 1952, and was never collected or republished (including in either of the two volumes of Ryle's collected papers), and, indeed, it seems to have been entirely lost sight of. So far as we have been able to gather, no one alive today who works on Ryle or Frege appears to be aware of this piece. The piece in question is a review of a volume brought out by Peter Geach and Max Black, titled *Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Frege*. The volume itself represented a landmark in the translation of Frege's work and, perhaps even more importantly (for the subsequent development of the analytic tradition), a dramatic turning point in the availability of Frege's philosophical writings to the broader Anglo-American philosophical community. That Ryle's review appeared anonymously is not due to his seeking in any way to disguise the identity of its author. It was the convention at the time for such reviews to so appear.

Given the orientation of many of the contributions to this volume devoted to rethinking the interpretation of Frege's and Russell's ideas – and particularly those further devoted to rethinking how those ideas are inherited and/or challenged in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* – this rediscovered review is a striking find for anyone interested in the topic of this volume as a whole. As noted above, Ryle sets forth in it arguments for his prediction that the day will "probably" come when it will be widely appreciated that "the greatest difference that Frege has made to philosophy" is "the impact that he made upon Wittgenstein". As we also noted above, a further interest of this review – which forms a central part of the topic of Kremer's contribution to this volume – is the evidence it provides regarding the ongoing reception of Frege's thought over the course of the history of analytic philosophy. Kremer invites us to see the attempt on Ryle's part which it contains to come to terms with the extent of Frege's philosophical achievement as marking an important milestone in the reception of Frege's philosophy within the anglophone philosophical community, as well as within Ryle's own philosophical development.

For both of these reasons, we deemed it important to include this now forgotten document as an appendix to this volume. Our readers can form their own judgment of the validity of the above claims made on its behalf both by us and by Kremer. However, the review is of interest for further reasons as well. Even a relatively cursory list of the themes and insights which Ryle finds himself impressed by in these writings of Frege ought to include at least the following: Frege's rejection of the Locke-Mill

doctrine of thinking, his alternative de-psychologized account of meaning, and the manner in which it seeks to avoid at one and the same time the twin perils of psychologism and formalism. Ryle immediately appreciates the philosophical significance of Frege's distinction between the *reference* and the *sense* of expressions, as well as the – for Ryle himself, even more important – distinction between *function* and *argument*. Finally, Ryle is not only impressed by Frege's distinction between "concept" and "object", but immediately appreciates three of the ways in which it prepares the ground for some of the central themes of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. The first of these has to do with the centrality to Frege's overall conception of the context principle which undergirds this distinction: We identify the components of a proposition by starting from the meaningful whole and decomposing it into its unsaturated and saturated elements. In his contribution, Kremer singles out Ryle's appreciation of the full implications of this point as a particularly critical moment both in Ryle's own development and in that of the history of analytic philosophy. Only with this review did Ryle come to fully understand Frege's concept-object distinction and to begin properly to attend to how the context principle underlies it. (Indeed, as we noted above, Kremer argues that as Ryle achieves a firmer understanding of the context principle, it forces him to reconceive his earlier conception of a category mistake.) The second thing that Ryle notices is that Frege's procedure here involves a particular form of philosophical clarification – one which requires Frege's reader to see the point of remarks which Frege himself holds cannot be transposed into a properly regimented philosophical notation. This means that a concept is not something about which we might say the things we say about objects. Ryle goes on to remark in the light of this insight that – and this is the third Frege-Wittgenstein affinity the review seeks to bring to light – an appreciation of this difficulty "may well be the main source of Wittgenstein's doctrine of the unsayable".

In our second appendix, "Did Gilbert Ryle Meet Martin Heidegger?", Kremer takes up a purely factual question – one which has seemed to some to bear on the extent to which the analytic tradition has been insulated from other philosophical traditions. Several authors have suggested that sometime before the composition of his 1929 review of *Being and Time*, Gilbert Ryle actually met with Martin Heidegger. Some have gone so far as to speculate that he may even have studied with him. Kremer sifts through the evidence for these claims and shows that they are unsupported. These speculations tend to focus on the idea that Ryle and Heidegger met sometime in 1929 – the year in which Ryle's review appeared. Kremer shows that the closest they actually ever came to being in the same place was during the previous year when Ryle and Heidegger each separately met with Husserl in early January 1928, possibly even on subsequent days. But that is the closest the evidence suggests that they were ever to being in the same place at the same time. Kremer concludes there is no firm evidence of any sort that, either during that period or any other, Ryle and Heidegger even so much as crossed paths in a manner that would have allowed them to exchange gazes, let alone words of conversation. This does not

gainsay the fact that Ryle's study of Heidegger may well have influenced his thought, but only through – as Kremer nicely puts it – his study *of* Heidegger, not through his study *with* Heidegger.[42]

Notes

1 For a related discussion, see Kremer (2013).
2 This is often true for terms which come to refer to whole movements of philosophy – the first use of the term is to be found in the writings of critics of the perceived tendency. The term then comes to be owned and adopted by those who were grouped together by it over the course of their attempts to answer their critics and defend their own conception of philosophy.
3 For his most detailed discussion of this issue, see Beaney (2001).
4 Beaney (2013, pp. 42–43); see the 2005 Revised Edition of the *Essay on Philosophical Method* (which includes Collingwood's Correspondence with Gilbert Ryle), p. 137 for the bit about analytical philosophy denying "constructive philosophical reasoning" is possible, and p. 145 for an example of the claim that it neglects to examine its own presuppositions.
5 Collingwood was in fact already criticizing the philosophical tendency in question – which he had earlier dubbed "scientific philosophy" in his *Speculum Mentis* (Collingwood 1924, pp. 271–281) – but he only began to refer to it in print as "analytical philosophy" in his 1933 *Essay on Philosophical Method*.
6 The text of hers which Collingwood directs his criticism at is her "The Method of Analysis in Metaphysics" which had just appeared in print (Stebbing 1933). She had already singled herself out for such special attention by taking issue with Collingwood's earlier critique of "scientific philosophy" in her "Review of *Speculum Mentis*" which appeared in the *Hibbert Journal* (Stebbing 1924). In fact, the primary aim of her 1933 essay is to compare the conceptions of analysis of the Cambridge School and logical positivism.
7 On the American side of the pond, Earnest Nagel, in a pair of papers published in 1936, is now regarded as probably the one who first contributed to the term acquiring widespread currency in North American philosophical circles. In contrast to Collingwood, Nagel regarded "analytic philosophy" as a more widely European phenomenon – originally "professed at Cambridge, Vienna, Prague, Warsaw, and Lwów" (Nagel, 1936a, p. 6) – then subsequently imported to North America, where, as of 1936, it was just starting to take root.
8 Ryle delivers this paper on February 16, 1952 to the Oxford Philological Society. It is not included in either of Ryle's volumes of *Collected Papers* and was only published posthumously, in Ryle (1990).
9 In Kremer's contribution to this volume, different aspects of this essay of Ryle's are highlighted than those discussed immediately below. There it comes in for attention primarily for how it reveals Ryle's gradually deepening appreciation for what is philosophically most insightful in Frege's context principle – and especially for what becomes of it once it is further refashioned by Wittgenstein – and the effect this has own Ryle's own philosophical development.
10 Ryle's review was published anonymously in the *Times Literary Supplement*, August 22, 1952, and it had not come to the attention of scholars until Kremer uncovered it. It is reprinted below as Appendix 1 to this volume.
11 Indeed, Ryle now sees it as even cutting against his own earlier views about the nature of category mistakes – views which he had originally conceived as building upon philosophical lessons he had taken himself to have learnt from Frege and the *Tractatus*. As we shall see below, this is the aspect of Ryle's review which most interests Kremer.
12 See Appendix 1 to this volume.

13 How to conceive of the turn in question has itself remained an essentially contested matter among historians of analytic philosophy. We return to this topic below when we discuss Silver Bronzo's contribution to this volume.
14 Kremer's discussion of Ryle's indebtedness to his early study of Husserl's *Logical Investigations* draws on work by Amie Thomasson; see her 2002.
15 For a more expansive discussion of these three books and related issues – touched upon only briefly in this Introduction – pertaining to the emergence of the discipline of the history of analytic philosophy, see Conant (2016).
16 Prior to the inception of this genre, the ground for it was set by the emergence of a new genre of biography – one which focused on both the life and the thought of a central figure in the history of analytic philosophy with the aim of seeking to depict and explore the sense in which life and thought form a unity. The work of Ray Monk was path-breaking in exemplifying the possibility of such a form of narration – one which manages to be accessible to a general reader while seriously engaging aspects of substance in the biographical subject's philosophical thought. See Monk's *Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius* (1990), *Bertrand Russell: The Spirit of Solitude* (1996), and *Bertrand Russell: The Ghost of Madness* (2000). These were followed by numerous other such works, including Ben Rogers' *A.J. Ayer: A Life* (1999), Nicola Lacey, *A Life of H.L.A. Hart: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream* (2004), and most recently David Edmonds, *Parfit: A Philosopher and His Mission to Save Morality* (2023).
17 This more recent burgeoning genre of popular book is one which does not just narrate the life of an individual figure from the analytic tradition, but re-narrates and purports to redefine an entire chapter of the history of analytic philosophy – seeking to re-position and re-evaluate the significance of the contributions of a whole cluster of figures, while at one and the same time aiming to entertain the general reader. See, in this connection, David Edmonds' *Schlick: The Murder of Professor Schlick: The Rise and Fall of the Vienna Circle* (2020), Benjamin Lipscomb's *The Women Are Up to Something: How Elizabeth Anscombe, Philippa Foot, Mary Midgley and Iris Murdoch Revolutionized Ethics* (2021), Clare Mac Cumhaill's and Rachael Wiseman's *Metaphysical Animals: How Four Women Brought Philosophy back to Life* (2022), and Nikhil Krishnan's, *A Terribly Serious Adventure: Philosophy at Oxford 1900–60* (2023).
18 For a detailed account of the ways in which Russell's (1900) book *The Philosophy of Leibniz* follows Moore's lead in the rejection of Idealism, see Hylton (1990, pp. 152–166).
19 The evidently Hegelian character of the project of Russell's (1897) book has led commentators to believe that any beginning of a break with idealism in Russell must come later and more suddenly than Nunez seeks to show it does. Commentators have partly been relying here on the broad-brush strokes Russell himself employs in his autobiographical writings, in which he seems to glory in emphasizing just how much of a Hegelian he was in this period. For example, in *My Philosophical Development*, he offers the following retrospective account of what he had then been up to in his 1897 book and how it was supposed to fit into a broader Hegelian philosophical agenda: "I was at this time a full-fledged Hegelian, and I aimed at constructing a complete dialectic of the sciences, which should end up with the proof that all reality is mental. I accepted the Hegelian view that none of the sciences is quite true, since all depend upon some abstraction, and every abstraction leads, sooner or later, to contradictions" (Russell 1959, p. 42). But what is Hegelian here is simply the conception of the nature of scientific progress – of how and why one science comes to replace another. Hylton helpfully summarizes the ambition of this early Russellian project as follows: "The dialectic of the sciences was to be a dialectic, in the Hegelian sense, in which each stage was made up of the ideas of some science. These ideas would be examined

philosophically and found to be involved in inescapable contradictions; the contradictions of any given stage would be removed by employing ideas from another science, which would in turn be examined and found wanting" (Hylton 1990, p. 99). Notice: this conception of scientific progress is perfectly consistent with Russell's also becoming increasingly disenchanted – as Nunez claims – with the philosophical details of particular German Idealist accounts of the nature of the validity of the truth claims of the individual sciences – and, in particular, with the original Idealist accounts of the nature of geometrical truth.

20 From that point on, Russell takes a more resolutely naturalist turn and begins explicitly to think through the implicit empiricist commitments of his external account of judgment all the way through: he now sees propositions as psychological entities, and beliefs as occurrent states of feeling. See Russell (1956b).

21 The main source of this assumption is Moore's and Russell's vehement early critiques of (especially William James's version of) a Pragmatist theory of truth. See Moore (1908) and Russell (1910a).

22 But for this one shortcoming of Hegel's, Misak cites Peirce as saying: "pragmatists might have looked up to him as the great vindicator of their truth" (Peirce 1935, p. 436).

23 For an example of such an understanding of the logical and ethical dimensions of the work, see Hacker (2001, §26).

24 See, for example, Dummett (1993, 5–6).

25 "Ivan Ilyich could see that he was dying, and was in constant despair. He knew in his heart of hearts that he was dying, but not only was he not used to the fact – he simply didn't understand it, he wasn't able to take it in. That syllogism he had learned in Kiesewetter's *Logic*: 'Caius is a man; men are mortal; therefore Caius is mortal', had seemed to him, all his life, to be correct only for Caius, but not at all for himself. That had meant Caius the man, a man in general, and that was all perfectly correct; but he himself was not Caius and not a man in general" (Tolstoy 2015, p. 187; see also Heidegger 2001, p. 254).

26 The relation between these two authors forms the topic of yet another of the papers in this volume, namely, the contribution of Maria Balaska.

27 Gombin notes, "it was Russell who called Bradley's doctrine 'the doctrine of internal relations' (Russell 1959, p. 54), while it is not obvious that Bradley ever put the matter in these terms or ever defended such a doctrine". For Bradley's own responses, see Bradley (1910, 1911).

28 See, for example, Russell (1906, 1910b).

29 Gombin cites in this connection Bergmann (1957), Griffin (1964), Pears (1985), and Proops (2004).

30 Gombin here cites Manser (1982), Ricketts (1996), and Candlish (2007).

31 For some background reading on the topic here at issue – and, in particular, on why the linguistic turn taken by Frege may be said to be at best *partial*, and why the one taken in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* which may be said to be *complete* – see Kimhi (2018, especially pp. 61–66).

32 The dawning of this realization fully comes to a head in the two pieces of Ryle's from 1952 which we have discussed at some length above.

33 Palmer (1988, especially pp. 62–70).

34 See Geach (1976).

35 See Heidegger (1998 [1929]) and Carnap (1959 [1931]).

36 See Baker (2003).

37 See Diamond (1991) and Conant (2002).

38 This objection to the austere reading has been raised by Williams (2004) and Glock (2004). Conant and Diamond (2004) contain a response to Williams; Nir's essay in this volume responds to Glock.

39 For a version of such an objection, see Potter (2011).

40 Particularly relevant here are Child (2019) and McDowell (1998a, 1998b).
41 Ryle (2009), first published in *Mind* in 1929.
42 The editors would like to thank Cora Diamond and David Finkelstein for comments on earlier drafts of this introduction.

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