


Giving a Damn



ESSAYS IN
DIALOGUE WITH
JOHN HAUGELAND

EDITED BY ZED ADAMS AND JACOB BROWNING

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13 Appendix: The Transcendental Deduction of the Categories

From the *Critique of Pure Reason*, B edition (an outline and interpretation)

John Haugeland

Editors' introduction: While at the University of Pittsburgh, John Haugeland participated in a long-running reading group on Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* with James Conant and John McDowell. The following is an outline of the second edition Transcendental Deduction that Haugeland put together as the result of this reading group. Although the outline is incomplete, the overall thrust of the reading is clear and easy to follow.

Background and overview

The Aesthetic argues that, if anything is to be an object for us, it must be a spatiotemporal object, intuited under the forms of space and time.

The first half of TD-B [Transcendental Deduction, B edition—Ed.] argues that if anything is to be an object of intuition (at all) it must a possible object of judgment—the condition of the OSUA [objective synthetic unity of apperception—Ed.]—thus subject to the categories.

The second half of TD-B argues that being presented in space and time is a sufficient condition for being an object of judgment.

The Aesthetic (§§1–8) argues that objects can be presented to *our* senses only in accord with the formal conditions of space and time. The legitimacy of such notions as “intuition” and “sensibility” is simply taken for granted in this discussion.

Chapter 1 of the Analytic of Concepts (§§9–12) identifies the categories—the pure concepts of the understanding—by identifying them with the logical functions of judgment; but it does not justify this identification or show the legitimacy of the categories as *a priori* concepts.

The first segment of the deduction chapter (§§13–14) explains the problem of legitimating the pure concepts by broaching the possibility that objects might be presented to our senses (*a la* the Aesthetic) whether they accord with the pure concepts (categories) or not. To put the worry another way: Why couldn't there be sensible (intuitable) objects that aren't subject to the conditions (pure concepts) of the understanding (that is, aren't intelligible)?

The first half of the deduction in B (§§15–20) addresses the question: What are the conditions on anything's being a *representation* at all? It argues that the ability to represent presupposes the ability to judge. The argument is this: to be a representation is to have an object; but an object is that in which more than one representation can be united; and judgment is just the ability to unite representations (in an object). To say that more than one representation can be united in an object is to say that the object itself has (must have) a *synthetic* unity—which amounts to

saying that there can be (synthetic) judgments about it. The *categories* are nothing other than specifications of the possible forms of such synthetic unity. Hence, the ability to represent at all is essentially two-sided: it is *both* an ability to be given a manifold (receptivity) *and* an ability to ascribe unity (spontaneity). *Sensibility* is the ability to represent insofar as it is receptive; and *understanding* is the ability to represent insofar as it is spontaneous—that is, the ability to judge.

Think of this as a rejoinder to, for instance, Descartes and Hume. Descartes said that ideas differ from bodies in that they have objective reality (that is, they are representations); but he had no account of *how* they could have objective reality, or even what that is—he just took it for granted. Hume said that ideas are just faint copies of impressions (items that are somehow impressed upon us), thus leaving no options but to take representationality for granted (as did Descartes) or to deny that there is any such thing—between which he vacillated.

The first half of the B deduction considered representation as such—in the “abstract.” The second half (§§22–26) lifts that abstraction, and undertakes to show that what *we* have are representations in this sense—in particular, that the “intuitions” discussed in the Aesthetic really deserve that title. (An *intuition* is, by definition, an immediate *representation* of a single object.) So, in effect, the question to be answered is whether the prospect raised in §13, that objects might be presented to *our* intuition (in space and time, as described by the Aesthetic) that are not subject to the conditions of the understanding (that is, are unintelligible), is a genuine one. And the answer to that question is: No! The reason is that the forms of *our* intuition, space and time, are themselves intuitable objects (formal intuitions), and so are subject to the conditions of the understanding. In other words, they must have the synthetic unity prerequisite to being the objects of synthetic judgments (namely, the synthetic a priori judgments of geometry and arithmetic). But that means that any object presented *in* space or time must, as conforming to the forms thereof, *ipso facto* also participate in that synthetic unity—which is none other than the unity that the categories specify. Therefore, any object that is so much as presented to our intuition is subject to the categories—the

conditions of the understanding. (Hence the use of the terms “intuition” and “sensibility” in the Aesthetic was legitimate all along.)

Here’s another way to see essentially the same dialectic. Someone (a defender of the prospect raised in §13) might acknowledge that to be a representation is to have an object, and that to be an object is to have a synthetic unity (that is, to be representable by more than one representation), but maintain that the resources of the Aesthetic alone provide for this. In particular, to conform to the forms of space and time is already to have all the unity that an object needs in order to be an object. But obviously, the unity of space and time themselves cannot be accounted for in this way. So the second half of the B deduction can argue that any unity that an object could inherit from the forms of intuition would just be the unity that the categories specify, but at one remove. *There is only one unity.*

Analytic of Concepts

Chapter II: The deduction of the pure concepts of the understanding

The aim of the deduction is to show that every object apprehensible by us (every *empirical* object) is determined in respect of the categories (and is, therefore, subject to laws). Thus, it will be shown that the categories apply to such objects, hence have objective validity.

Section 1 [common to the first and second editions]

13. The principles of any transcendental deduction

To *deduce* a concept is to show its *objective validity*—that is, that it applies to *objects*. A deduction is *transcendental* if it is shown *a priori* that the concept applies to objects. It's no particular problem to deduce the a priori concepts of space and time, since objects can't even appear to us except under the pure forms of intuition (= space and time). But deducing the pure concepts of the understanding is tougher, since it seems [prima facie] that intuited objects need not accord with the conditions of understanding (= be intelligible).

- Jurists distinguish the question of right (*quid juris*) from the question of fact (*quid facti*).
 - Proof of the former (the right) is called a deduction.
- To deduce a concept is to show the legitimacy of using it in regard to objects.
 - That is: to show that it has *objective reality* or *meaning*.

The terms *objective reality* and *objective validity* are notoriously hard to interpret; but there's a reading that works fairly well. First, both are terms for the “objective purport” (intentionality, meaningfulness) of representations—without which, of course, they wouldn't be *representations* at all. *Objective reality* is used for all representations *other than judgments*; so, to a first approximation, it means what it did for Descartes. *Objective validity*¹ is used for *all* representations, *including judgments*. For the latter, it means: having a truth value (that is, purporting to represent an objective fact). This is important, because Kant's account of judgment lies at the heart of the philosophical breakthrough in the first *Critique* (and hence lies behind his radically new accounts even of concepts and intuitions).

- For most empirical concepts, no deduction is needed (though some are problems).
- For pure a priori concepts, however, whose legitimacy can never be proven empirically, an explicit deduction is always needed—to show how they can relate to objects at all.

—Showing how such concepts can relate a priori to objects is a *transcendental* deduction.

—We already have two kinds of concepts that relate to objects completely a priori:

—The concepts of space and time, as forms of sensibility;
and

—The categories, as concepts of understanding.

—So, if they need deductions [which they do], these will have to be transcendental.

- We are indebted to Locke for opening up the field of psychological investigation of how we come to have the concepts we have, including general concepts, as a result of experiences.

—But such derivation is not deduction [since it establishes only origins, not legitimacy].

- But is a deduction (transcendental, to be sure) of pure a priori concepts really *needed*?

—For instance, we have given [in the Aesthetic] a transcendental deduction of the concepts of space and time—that is, explained and determined their a priori objective validity.

—But geometry doesn't *need* philosophy to be (and know that it is) legitimate a priori.

—That, however, is only because a priori intuition provides immediate evidence of the pure form (= space) of the outer sensible world.

—And geometry, applying, as it does, only to that world, and indeed only as regards its pure form (spatiality), is grounded in that immediate intuition.

—It is, however, quite different with the *pure concepts of understanding*.

—Since they speak of objects through predicates of pure a priori thought (not of intuition or sensibility) they apply to objects [*Gegenständen*] universally.

—That is, they are not limited to objects given under the conditions of *our* sensibility.

—Hence, there can be no a priori [formal] intuition that grounds their synthesis—that is, establishes their objective validity.

—In fact, this very generality of the pure concepts of understanding also leads to a tendency to employ the concept of space beyond the conditions of our sensibility.

—Which is why a transcendental deduction of space and time was needed after all.

- It wasn't that hard to explain why the concepts of space and time, though a priori, must nevertheless relate to [empirical] objects, and even enable synthetic knowledge of them.

—For, if any object [*Gegenstand*] is going to appear [to us] at all, it's going to have to be an Object [*Objekt*] of empirical intuition, and thus to accord with the a priori conditions of [our] intuition—namely, space and time.

Kant seems to distinguish (in the B edition, anyway, not in A) between *Objekt* and *Gegenstand* (both of which are rendered as “object” by Kemp Smith). Again, it's not very clear—but here's a reading that works fairly well. *Objekt*² is a formal term for that which a representation purports to represent. It means: “whatever is represented” (if anything). To be a representation at all is to have such an *Objekt*—so the two terms are coordinate. A *Gegenstand*³ is an object that is (or could be) *given to us*—that is, one that is (or could be) intuitively apprehended *by us*, and thus be known. In *particular*, to be an *empirical* object (in space and time) is to be a *Gegenstand*.⁴ I will mark the distinction by capitalizing “Object” when it is *Objekt*.

To show that a representation has objective validity, it suffices to show that it has an *Objekt*—which is just to show that it is indeed a representation. But to show that a *synthetic* representation has objective validity *a priori*—hence universally—it must be shown that all possible *Gegenstände* would be among its *Objekte*.

It is worth bearing in mind that, in the preface to the B Edition, Kant explicitly says (twice, at Bxvii) that things as objects [*Gegenständen*] of experience (appearances) are the very same things as things in themselves.

—So the synthesis that takes place in such objects [*Gegenstände*], qua appearances, has objective validity.

- But it's going to be a lot harder to deduce the categories of the understanding, for they do not [ostensibly] represent conditions under which objects can so much as appear to us.

The bracketed qualifiers in this and the next few items flag an interpretation of the point of this paragraph (A89f/B122f)—namely, that it sets up the task of the deduction by putting forward a seeming possibility which the deduction will then show not to be genuine. This possibility could be called the possibility of *rogue appearances*—that is, the possibility of appearances (objects of intuition) that are *unintelligible*, in the sense that they do not accord with the conditions of the understanding (that is, the forms of the unity of thought or judgment—namely, the categories).

—So it's hard to see how *subjective conditions of thought* could be conditions of the possibility of all knowledge of objects [*Gegenstände*], and [so] have a priori objective validity.

—For [one would suppose] appearances can certainly be given in intuition independently of the functions of the understanding.

—The concept of cause, for instance, signifies a special kind of synthesis whereby two quite distinct appearances must relate to each other in accord with a rule.

—But it's certainly not obvious a priori why they should have to do that.

—(Nor could experience help, since what we're after is a priori objective validity.)

—Appearances might very well [it seems] be in such a confusion that nothing presented itself that would answer to the concept of cause and effect.

—But, since intuition as such [on this assumption] doesn't need the functions of thought, those appearances would still present objects [*Gegenstände*] to our intuition.

- In the meantime, it would be useless to try to evade the issue, by suggesting that the concept of cause might instead be abstracted from experience, since that concept itself demands strict necessity and universality—which can never be established through experience alone.

14. Transition to the transcendental deduction of the categories

The basic strategy of the deduction will be to show that the categories are conditions of the possibility of experience (empirical knowledge of objects [*Gegenstände*]) after all.

- There are only two cases in which synthetic representations and their objects [*Gegenstände*] can make contact, relate to one another in a *necessary* way, and, so to speak, meet each other:
 - Either the object alone makes the representation possible;
 - Or the representation alone makes the object possible.
 - In the first case (which includes appearances, in regard to that in them that belongs to sensation), the relation is only empirical, and the representation cannot be a priori.
 - In the second case, the representation itself would not *produce* its object, in the sense of causing it to exist (since causality by the will is not in question).
 - Rather, the representation determines the object a priori, in the sense that, only through the representation,

is it possible that anything is *an object to be known*.

- Now, there are two conditions under which alone knowledge of an object is possible.

—First: *intuition*, through which an object is given (though only as appearance); and

—Second: *concept*, through which an object corresponding to this intuition is thought.

Don't think of these as two independent conditions. Rather, they are two essential aspects of any finite knowing—two sides of one coin.

—As has been shown, the first condition—under which alone objects can be intuited—does indeed lie a priori in the mind as the ground of Objects [*Objekten*] as far as their form is concerned [namely, in the a priori forms of intuition].

—So, the question is: Might a priori *concepts* likewise be conditions under which alone anything can be, if not intuited, at least *thought* as an object [*Gegenstand*] at all?

—If so, all empirical knowledge of objects would have to conform to them, since they would be presupposed by the possibility of anything being an *object of experience*.

—To be sure, all experience does contain, in addition to the intuition in which something is given, also a *concept* of an object as being thereby given—that is, as appearing.

—Thus, concepts of [what it is to be] an object at all [*überhaupt*] do lie at the basis of all empirical knowledge as its a priori conditions.

—So, the a priori objective validity of the categories rests [as will be shown] on the fact that experience becomes possible only through them.

- The transcendental deduction of all a priori concepts has therefore a guiding principle: these concepts must be recognized as a priori conditions of the possibility of experience—whether of

the intuition or of the thought. [That is, they must be recognized as conditions of *both*.]

- Locke and Hume both held that all concepts of objects had to be derived from experience.
 - Locke included pure concepts of the understanding among these, and, not seeing that this would gravely limit those concepts, gave way to enthusiasm in their application.
 - Hume, appreciating that pure concepts could not be so derived, despaired of finding any pure concepts applicable to objects at all, and so gave way to skepticism.
- The categories are concepts of [what it is to be] an object [*Gegenstand*] at all, and through which the intuition of an object is regarded as determined in respect of one of the logical functions of judgment.
 - So, for instance, from a merely logical [“formal”] point of view, either concept [either term] of a categorical judgment could be a subject, and the other a predicate.
 - But, if a concept is brought under the category of substance, it is determined such that its empirical intuition can only be considered as subject, and never as mere predicate.

Section 2 [as restated in the second edition]

Transcendental deduction of the pure concepts of the understanding

15. The possibility of combination in general

Here begins the “first half” of TD-B (the transcendental deduction in B). The aim of this half is to show that, insofar as anything is an Object [*Objekt*] of a representation at all, it is determined in respect of the categories (that is, the categories apply to it).

§ 15: Combinedness of representations is never given, but must be spontaneously supplied.

The *act* of combining is called *synthesis*; the *ability* so to combine is called *understanding*.

Such synthesis presupposes [hence implies] a synthetic unity, which is *very* fundamental.

- Though a manifold can be given in intuition, its combinedness cannot.
 - Thus, the combinedness cannot be already contained in the pure form of sensible intuition either.
 - The form of intuition, though it lies a priori in our ability to represent [our faculty of representation], is no more than the mode in which we are affected.
 - Combining, on the other hand, is a spontaneous act of our ability to represent.
 - This *ability* to represent, insofar as it is thus spontaneous, we call *understanding*.

The same ability to represent, insofar as it is receptive, is called *sensibility*. So, like, concept and intuition, understanding and sensibility are two sides of one coin—namely, the spontaneous and receptive side, respectively, of the ability to represent (or, as we could also say, of the *finite* ability to know).

- The *act* of combining we call *synthesis*.
- Combining cannot be given through objects, but is only ever executed by the subject.

To *combine* (synthesize, conjoin, unify) representations is not to gather, merge, or fasten them together, but rather to *take* (conceive, think of) them as *belonging* together, as a function of what they represent.

- The concept of combining includes [presupposes] the concepts of:
 - the manifold [what gets combined];
 - its synthesis [the act of combining]; and *also*
 - the [synthetic] *unity* of the manifold [as so combined or combinable].
- Combining is a representing of the *synthetic* unity of the manifold.
 - Thus, the representation [concept] of this unity can't arise from the combining.
 - Similarly, this unity cannot be [what is meant by] the *category* of unity, since the combinability in question is presupposed by all concepts, hence all the categories.
- Therefore, we must seek this unity higher up, in whatever contains the ground of the unity of all sorts of concepts in judgment (and, hence, of the possibility of understanding at all).

16. The originary synthetic unity of apperception [OSUA]⁵

In order for anything to be a representation *of mine*, it must be possible for me to be conscious of it (for my “I think” to accompany it). This is the *analytic* unity of apperception.

But I can be conscious of representations as mine only insofar as I can consciously conjoin them—unite them—with one another in one self-consciousness (one apperception). The implied unity (in the synthetic *unifiability*) of all *my* representations *as mine* is the *originary synthetic unity of apperception—the OSUA*.⁶

- It must be possible for the “I think” to accompany any of my representations [insofar as they are anything to me at all].

—Intuitions are representations—namely, ones that can be given prior to any thought.

Intuitions are representations by definition. It remains to be shown, however, whether—or, rather, *how*—we can actually have such representations.

—Thus, all intuitions given to any subject bear a necessary relation to its “I think.”

- But the “I think” is an act of spontaneity.
 - This [the act, the “I think”] is called *originary* or *pure apperception*.
 - It is called that because it is *self-consciousness*—namely, the self-consciousness that:
 - generates a priori* the “I think” (which can accompany any other representation), and
 - cannot itself be accompanied by any further representation.
- The *unity* of this apperception is transcendental, in the sense that a priori knowledge can arise from it.
 - The many representations given in intuition, if they are to be all *mine*, must belong to one self-consciousness.
 - Thus, insofar as they are mine, they must conform to whatever conditions there may be on standing together in one consciousness.
 - From this [prerequisite, hence necessary] originary combinedness [or: combinability], many consequences follow.
- The identity [one-ness] of the apperception of a given manifold [many-ness] contains [presupposes] a synthesis, and is possible only through the consciousness of that synthesis.

This *numerical identity* or *one-ness* of apperception—of the *one* “I think” that can accompany *many* representations—is later called the “*analytic unity*” of apperception (as opposed to its *synthetic unity*: the *OSUA*). The presupposed synthesis will turn out to be the transcendental = productive synthesis of imagination (see §24, pp. B151f; and cf. A118f and A124f).

—For, in what way are the many representations to be related to the identity of the subject?

—Not through any accompanying empirical consciousness
—that’s too inconstant.

—Rather, the many representations are related to one and the same subject only insofar as that subject *can* conjoin them with one another, and be conscious of so doing.

—Only insofar as I *can* unite [actively synthesize] many given representations in one consciousness, *can* I so much as represent the one-ness of that consciousness.

—Hence, the *analytic* unity of apperception presupposes a *synthetic* unity [or: *unifiability*].

- Thus, the thought that the many representations given in intuition all belong to me—are all *mine*—is equivalent to the thought that *I can unite* them in one consciousness.

—So, (a priori) synthetic unity of the manifold of intuitions is the ground of the [analytic] identity of apperception—which, in turn, precedes a priori all *my* determinate thought.

- The principle of [the necessary originary synthetic unity of] apperception [*POSUA*] is the highest principle of human knowledge.

—Though it is itself an analytic proposition, it reveals the necessity of [i.e., it presupposes] a synthesis without which the identity of self-consciousness could not be thought.

—This necessary synthesis is called the *originary synthetic unity of apperception* [*OSUA*].

—All representations given to me must stand under this unity of apperception—but they have to be brought there by a synthesis.

The originary synthetic unity of apperception is the necessary objective *unifiability* of the manifold given in intuition; it replaces what was called the transcendental *affinity* of the manifold in TD-A (compare pp.~ B134f to pp. A113f and, especially, A122f). In each case, the affinity/unifiability is inferred from the fact that, otherwise, I would be able to have representations of which I *could not* be conscious—grasp as “mine”—which is incoherent. That is, the synthetic unity is inferred from the analytic unity (because the latter presupposes it). Thus, the synthetic unity is really more basic—the synthetic unity *grounds* the analytic unity.

17. The POSUA is the supreme principle of all employment of the understanding

The principle of the synthetic unity of apperception [POSUA] is this: in order for anything—in particular, [anything presented in] any intuition—to be a knowable Object [*Objekt*] for me, it must conform to the condition of the originary synthetic unity of apperception.

- There are two parallel supreme principles, which can be presented and compared this way:

The supreme principle of the possibility of all intuition, in its relation to	
sensibility	understanding
—that is, insofar as the manifold of intuition	
are <i>given</i> to us—	must allow of being <i>combined</i> in one consciousness—
is that all the manifold of intuition should be subject to	
The formal conditions of space and time	conditions of the OSUA [whatever those might be]

Note that *both* principles concern the possibility of *intuition*—in its relations to sensibility and to understanding, respectively.

- *Understanding* is the *ability to know* [the faculty of knowledge].
 - Knowing consists in the determinate relation of representations to an Object [*Objekt*].

Determinate in the sense of determining. Thus, in a synthetic judgment, the predicate is not contained in the subject, and so further determines it.

—An *Object* [*Objekt*] is that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is *united*⁷.

—Since any unification of representations demands [*synthetic*] unity of consciousness [apperception] in their synthesis, that unity alone constitutes [*ausmacht*]:

- i. the relation of representations to an object [*Gegenstand*]
- ii. the objective validity of representations, and
- iii. the fact that they are cognitions [modes of knowledge] at all

—Hence, upon it [OSUA] rests the very possibility of understanding [the ability to know].

- Accordingly, the mere form of outer sensible intuition, space, is not yet knowledge.

—It is only a manifold of a priori intuition for a possible knowledge.

—Even to know something purely spatial—a line, say—I must *draw* it, and thus synthetically bring to a stand [make “sit still”] a determinate combination of the given manifold.

—The unity of this act = the unity of consciousness [= OSUA] (as in the concept of a line).

—And, through this unity, an Object [*Objekt*] (a determinate space) is first known.

—So, OSUA is an objective condition of *all* knowledge [even a priori knowledge of space].

- OSUA is the condition under which [anything presented in] any intuition must stand in order to *become an Object [Objekt] for me*. [This is the POSUA].

[Repeats that, though the POSUA presupposes a synthesis, it is itself analytic:]

[Points out that POSUA wouldn't apply to a creative understanding, such as God's.]

18. The objective unity of self-consciousness

The OSUA is *objective*: that is, the implied unity is in the *Objects* of knowledge themselves.

- The OSUA is not only transcendental but *objective*, in the sense that, through it, the manifold given in a [unitary] intuition is united into a concept of an Object [*Objekt*].
 - This must be distinguished from the empirical unity of consciousness, as in [Humean] association, which has merely *subjective* validity.

19. The logical form of all judgments consists in the objective unity of the apperception of the concepts which they contain

To be a *judgment* is to be a cognition in which other cognitions are brought to the *objective* unity of apperception—synthesized in virtue of its necessary unity. That is, they are represented as combined *in the Object* (not just as associated *subjectively*). This, for instance, is what the copula “is” means. [The real question is how we can so much as *mean* that “... is ...” (about *empirical* objects).]

- To define a judgment as a representation of a relation between two concepts, is (whatever else is wrong with it) utterly hopeless in that it does not say what that relation consists in.

- The relation among the given cognitions [intuitions, concepts, or clauses] in a judgment is nothing other than the way of bringing them to the *objective* unity of apperception.
 - This relation is distinguished, as belonging to the understanding, from any relations according to laws of [Humean] association (which are merely subjective).
- This is what is intended by the copula “is”:
 - It distinguishes objective unity of given representations from subjective unity, and
 - It indicates their relation to originary apperception and its *necessary [synthetic] unity*.
 - The latter is so, even if the judgment itself is empirical and therefore contingent.
 - The point is not that the representations in the judgment go together necessarily *with each other*, but rather that they go together at all [in a judgment] only *in virtue of the necessary unity of apperception* [= the OSUA].
 - Only in this way does there arise from the relation among the representations a *judgment*—that is, a relation with *objective validity*.

Thus, judgments, as representations of an *objective* unity of given cognitions, are objectively valid by definition. So the issue is not to show that judgments are or can be objectively valid, but rather to show that any object that can be given to our intuition—any *Gegenstand* (including any possible objects of experience)—must be a possible *Objekt* of a judgment.

- For example: consider the cognitions [concepts] “body” and “weight.”
 - If these cognitions were to become subjectively associated for me (due to constant conjunction in my perception), then all I would be in a position to say would be: “Were I to [represent] hold[ing] a body, I would feel [come to represent] weight.”

—But I would *not* be in a position to say: “It (the body itself) is weighty” [=a *judgment*].

—To say [that is, to *judge*] the latter is not to say that the representations have always been conjoined *in me*, but rather that they are combined *in the Object* [*Objekt*] (regardless of what’s in me).

20. All sensible intuitions are subject to the categories, as conditions under which alone their manifold can come together in one consciousness

Summary and conclusion of the first half of TD-B.

Therefore, since the manifold given in any intuition must be subject to the OSUA, it must also be determined in respect of a category— that is, subject to the categories.

- The manifold given in any sensible intuition is necessarily subject to the OSUA, since that’s the only way it can be unified (combined in one consciousness). (§17: POSUA)
- But the act of understanding by which any manifold of given representations (intuitions or concepts) is brought under one apperception is just the logical function of judgment (§19)
 - Therefore, insofar as any manifold is given in a unitary empirical intuition, it is *determined* in respect of one of the logical functions of judgment.
 - And the categories are [by definition: A79/B105, B128] just these functions of judgment, insofar as they are employed in the determination of the manifold of a given intuition. (§13 [but does he mean §14?])
- So the manifold in any given intuition is subject to the categories.

21. Remark

Explanation of the relation between the first and second halves of TD-B.

It has been shown that the manifold in any given intuition [qua representation] must be subject to the categories [but it hasn't been shown that any such intuitions are in fact given *to us*]. The demonstration has relied, so far, only on the spontaneity of the understanding, its functions of unity in judgment (the categories), and the generic receptivity of sensibility. No use has yet been made of the *modes* of givenness *to us* (the forms of *our* intuition), through which alone empirical objects [*Gegenstände*] can be presented to our senses. Now it must be shown that insofar as any *Gegenstand* is presented to *our* senses, it too must be determined in respect of the categories—that is, it is something about which we can form judgments. This demonstration will depend on the *modes* of our intuition. Thereby, it will be shown that, when *Gegenstände* are presented to our senses, we indeed *intuit* [represent] them, and that the categories actually function as *concepts* [representations] in us—that is, they have objective validity with regard to all objects of our experience.

- A manifold contained in an intuition that is mine is [that is, would have to be] represented as belonging to the *necessary* unity of self-consciousness [OSUA].
 - Such representing, by means of the synthesis of the understanding, is effected in terms of the category.
 - Hence, the empirical consciousness of a given manifold in a unitary intuition is subject
 - i. not only to a pure sensible intuition—which is a priori,
 - ii. but also to a pure self-consciousness—which is likewise a priori.
 - Hereby a *beginning* has been made of a *deduction* of the pure concepts of understanding.
- Since the categories have their source in the understanding, *independently of sensibility*, this deduction has had to abstract from any *mode* of givenness of a manifold of an intuition.

That mode of givenness—*for us*, anyway—is *our* forms of intuition (in space and time); but conceivably it could be different for other finite knowers.

—In this abstraction, we have concentrated solely on that unity which enters into empirical intuitions by means of the understanding (and thus in terms of the category).

—Now, however, we must consider that mode of givenness itself, and show (§26) that its unity, too, is none other than that which the category prescribes (§20) to the manifold of any given intuition in general [i.e., without regard to any mode of givenness].

The *forms* of space and time are themselves given as (formal) intuitions; but they are given *a priori*, not *sensibly* (not *in* space and time), so the argument of the first half of the deduction already applies to them. So they, at least, must have the unity prescribed by the categories (this is argued in §24).

—Only thus, by demonstrating the a priori validity of the categories in respect of *all objects* of our senses, will the purpose of the deduction be fully attained.

In other words, we must show that there is no *other* source of unity for unitary empirical intuitions, apart from the categories; in particular, the pure forms of intuition do not provide an independent source of unity. The point being that objects cannot even so much as be presented to our senses (whether intelligible to us or not) except as determined in respect of the category—something that an independent source of unity might have seemed to make possible. This, then, will finally repudiate the possibilities bruited in the long paragraph at A89f/B122f: the categories are not merely conditions on what we can understand, but on what can be an object in our experience at all.

- Although the argument in the first half of the deduction abstracted from the *mode* of givenness of the manifold, it did not,

and could not, abstract from the *fact that it is given* (that is, prior to and independently of the synthesis of understanding).

—The only counterpossibility would be God, to whose intuition nothing is given because it is productive of its own objects.

22. The category has no other application in knowledge than to objects of experience

The aim of the second half of the deduction is to show that the categories apply to all and only objects of experience. The “only” is §§22 & 23; the “all” is §§24 & 26. The structure of the argument is to show that the categories can apply to objects because and only because those objects are subject to the conditions of space and time. To put it another way, we can form judgments about objects because and only because they are spatiotemporal.

§22: The categories enable knowledge *only* of objects of possible experience [empirical objects]. In particular, mathematics is knowledge *only* of empirical objects, so not a counterexample.

- To *think* an object [*Gegenstand*] and to *know* an object are not the same.
 - Knowing an object requires two factors:
 - i. the concept through which any object in general is thought (the category); and
 - ii. the intuition through which it is given.
 - If no intuition could be given, the concept would still be a thought (in form, at least), but objectless, and so not usable for knowledge of anything.
- Now, the only intuition possible to us is sensible (see the Aesthetic).
 - So thought can become knowledge for us only insofar as concepts of the understanding are related to objects of the senses.

- Sensible intuition is either pure (space and time) or empirical.
- Through the determination of pure intuition, we can acquire a priori knowledge of objects (as in mathematics), but only in regard to their form (as appearances).
 - Whether there can be things which must be intuited in this form is left undecided.
 - Mathematical concepts are therefore not, by themselves, yet knowledge—not until it is shown that there are things that can be given in these forms: space and time.
- But *things in space and time* are given only empirically.
 - Even, therefore, with the aid of pure intuition (as in mathematics), the categories do not yet afford us any knowledge of things.
 - They afford knowledge of things only through their applicability to *empirical intuition*.
 - That is, they serve only for the possibility of *empirical knowledge* (= “experience”).
- So: the categories, as yielding knowledge of *things*, are applicable only to things that could be objects of possible experience.

23. [No title]

Though, in principle, the categories are not limited to objects given under our forms of intuition, they are in fact—since, without given intuitions, they are empty and useless.

- Space and time, as conditions under which objects can be given to us, are valid only for objects of the [= *our*] senses—hence, only for experience.
 - In theory, the pure concepts of understanding are free from this limit, and extend to objects of intuition in general (whether like ours or not, so long as it’s sensible [= finite]).
 - But this seeming freedom is useless.

—For, beyond *our* sensible intuition, these concepts, as concepts of Objects [*Objekten*], are empty.

—We couldn't even judge whether such Objects would be possible or not.

- Here's why: the OSUA is the whole content of the pure concepts of understanding.

—So, insofar as there could be no intuition to which that unity could be applied (thus determining an object [*Gegenstand*], those concepts would be *mere* forms of thought.

—They would thus lack objective reality [hence they wouldn't really even be concepts].

—Only *our* sensible and empirical intuition can give them meaning and significance.

- Were [*per impossibile*] an Object [*Objekt*] to be given to us outside the forms of our sensible intuition, we could not apply a single one of the categories to it.

—But more of this to follow ...

24. Of the application of the categories to objects of the senses in general

Any object of any intuition whatever must *as such* be subject to the pure *intellectual* synthesis (the form of judgability), hence to the categories. [See first half of TD-B]. But how can this condition actually be satisfied *for us*? How can *we* in fact *have* any judgable intuitions? The answer lies in the fact that, because all of our sensibility is subject a priori to the form of time, the manifold of inner sense [time as a whole] can be synthesized in a more basic way, called the *figurative synthesis* or the *transcendental* [*or productive*] *synthesis of imagination*. This synthesis is the *most basic* application of the understanding to the *objects* of our intuition.

- Through the understanding alone, the pure concepts relate to objects [*Gegenstände*] of intuition in general (whether like our own or not, so long as it's sensible).

—For that very reason [the generality], however, these concepts are [so far] mere *forms of thought*, through which (alone) no determinate object is known.

—The synthesis in them, therefore, though transcendental, is also purely intellectual.

- However, there lies in *us* a priori, at the basis of everything, a certain form [time] of sensible intuition—one which depends on the receptivity of our ability to represent (i.e., sensibility).

—Because of this, the understanding, *as spontaneity*, is able to determine inner sense [itself], through the manifold of given representations, in accord with the OSUA.

—Thereby the understanding can think, a priori, a synthetic unity of the apperception of the manifold of *sensible intuition* [as a whole—a comprehensive horizon of all intuition].

—And that [the a priori thinkable horizon of time] is the condition under which all objects of our human intuition must necessarily stand.

- By this means [as we shall see, §26], the categories—in themselves mere forms of thought—obtain objective reality.

—That is, they obtain application to objects [*Gegenstände*] that can be given to us in intuition.

- This synthesis of the [whole] manifold of sensible intuition is possible and necessary a priori.

—It can be called *figurative* synthesis—in order to distinguish it from [purely] *intellectual* synthesis [the mere forms of thought: what the first half of the deduction was about].

—Both are *transcendental* syntheses, in that they make a priori knowledge possible.

—However, the figurative synthesis, [even] if it concerns merely the OSUA—that is, the unity of thought in the categories—is [still] not the same as mere intellectual synthesis.

The point is that, even though the figurative synthesis is concerned with no *unity* other than the unity of judgability—the OSUA—it is concerned with this unity within the specific horizon of *temporal* givenness; and that makes it different from the mere intellectual synthesis. I think the difference is something like this: the horizon of time provides a unique “locus” for each unification in a judgment. Thus, if I judge that the water is cold, these concepts must be unified *in the object*. But the object isn’t given as an object independent of this unifiability of concepts in it—its being an *object* just is the unifiability of concepts in it in judgments. So, “which” water is said to belong with “which” coldness by this judgment? Well they must at least coincide in time; and, since this is an object of outer sense, they must also coincide in space. The *objective* unity that is the content of a judgment is possible only “at” a time (and, typically, place).

—To emphasize this, it should [also] be called the *transcendental synthesis of imagination*.

- *Imagination* is the ability to represent in intuition an object that *is not itself present*.

Time and space, for instance, are not—at least, not entirely—present.

—Now, on the one hand, since all our intuition is sensible, imagination likewise can give an intuition to concepts *only* under the conditions that sensibility places on all intuition.

—So, to this extent, imagination belongs to *sensibility*.

—But, on the other hand, inasmuch as a synthesis in imagination, like any synthesis, is spontaneous, and spontaneity is determinative (unlike sense, which is determinable only), [transcendental] imagination is an ability to determine sensibility a priori, in accord with the categories.

—So, to this extent, imagination belongs to *understanding*.

- Transcendental synthesis of imagination is an action of the understanding on the sensibility.

—It is the first [in other words, the most basic] application of the understanding to the objects [*Gegenstände*] of our possible intuition.

Presumably, this “most basic” application is the ability to judge temporal (and spatial) characteristics of objects: location, relation, extent, and so on.

—Thereby it is the ground of all other applications of understanding to such objects.

—It is figurative in that it involves sensibility [that is, *our* forms of it, *our* modes of givenness in intuition], whereas the intellectual synthesis involves understanding only.

* * *

25. [No title]
[Section left blank.—Ed.]

26. Transcendental deduction of the universally possible employment in experience of the pure concepts of the understanding

If any appearance is to be so much as perceptually apprehensible by us, it must conform to the forms of space and time. But space and time are themselves intuitable as (formal) *objects*—and as such must exhibit the unity prescribed by the categories. Consequently, any appearance, as having spatiotemporal form, must also exhibit this unity. That is, as determined in time and space, an appearance is also something about which we can form judgments. This means they can be *objects*—namely, of *intuitions*. Since this includes all appearances, the categories are valid a priori for *all* objects of experience.

- In the transcendental deduction of the categories [first half], we have shown their possibility as a priori cognitions of objects [*Gegenstände*] of any intuition in general (§§20 & 21) [that is, of *given* intuitions, but without regard to their *mode* of givenness].

—(In the metaphysical deduction [§§9 & 10], their a priori origin had already been proved through their agreement with

the logical functions of thought.)

—We have now to explain the possibility of knowing, by their means, whatever objects [*Gegenstände*] may *present themselves to our senses* [that is, in *our* modes of intuition].

—What's to be explained isn't knowledge of objects in respect of the form of their intuition [that was done in the Aesthetic], but rather in respect of the laws of their combination.

—In effect, this prescribes the law to nature, and even makes nature possible.

This doesn't mean, of course, prescribing the particular "laws of nature" that science discovers (those are empirical, as Kant says at B165). Rather, it means that, as intelligible (in terms of judgable unities), nature must be law-governed, somehow or other. Later (in the Analytic of Principles), Kant will deliver on the promise of synthetic a priori *knowledge*, by extracting from the categories principles that dictate the *forms* of such laws.

- Note first that *synthesis of apprehension* is [by definition] that composition of the manifold in an empirical intuition whereby perception (that is, empirical consciousness of the intuition as appearance) is possible.
 - The synthesis of apprehension must, of course, always conform to the a priori forms of outer and inner sensible intuition, space and time.
 - But space and time are not only a priori *forms* of intuition—they are also themselves *intuited* a priori [that is, they are the *objects* of intuitive representations].
 - These a priori [formal] intuitions contain manifolds, and therefore are represented with the determination of the *unity* of these manifolds (see the Aesthetic).
- This unity, given a priori, is a *unity of the synthesis* of the [whole] manifold of space and time.
 - Consequently, it is also a combination to which everything that is to be represented as determined *in* space and time

must conform. [I think, both *each* thing and *all together*.]

—As such it is the condition of the synthesis of all *apprehension* [that is, *not even* mere apprehension—mere perceptible appearances—escape *this* condition].

—This unity is given not *in* but *with* the [formal] intuitions [of space and time].

The unity is not the *content* of the intuitions (that would be conceptual—see §15), but rather a unity that they themselves *have* and so bring *with* them.

- This unity, however, can be no other than the unity, which (as we saw in the first half) is necessary for any combination of the manifold of a given *intuition in general*, simply by virtue of being subject to the OSUA—but applied, in this case, to our *sensible intuition*.

In other words, the formal intuitions (which we have a priori) are instances of “intuitions in general,” hence fall under the argument of the first half.

—And that unity is a unity in accord with the categories.

—All synthesis, therefore, even that which makes perception [mere apprehension of appearances] possible is subject to the categories.

—And, since experience is knowledge via connected perceptions, the categories are conditions of the possibility of experience.

—Hence, they are valid a priori for all objects of experience.

Notes

- [1](#) Marginal note: “For rep[resentations], x is obj[ectively] valid if x it can figure in an obj[ectively] valid judgment (i.e., if it is a

rep[resentation] of something). Not always used in this precise sense elsewhere in the Critique (i.e., this is the meaning in the context of the TD).”

- 2 Marginal note: “Object considered under some level of abstraction. [First half: from our particular forms of sensibility, but not of sensibility as such (disregarding character of *our* manifold).]”
- 3 Marginal note: “Full Blooded object of intuition (e.g., known object).”
- 4 Marginal note: “Second half: lifting abstraction.”
- 5 Marginal note: “AKA Categorical Unity.”
- 6 Marginal note: “Two phases of this unity: (a) unity of consciousness, (b) unity of the thought. ←These are one and the same unity.
- 7 Marginal note: “To be an object (Geg[enstand]) for us, it must be an Objekt (i.e., fall under unity prescribed by cat[egories].”