



KANT AND THE PRINCIPAL OF SUFFICIENT REASON

There are conflicting interpretations of what Kant even means by the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR). Beatrice Longuenesse (2005) equates it with the “causal principle” explicated in the Transcendental Analytic of the first *Critique*, while Omri Boehm (2016) identifies it with the “supreme principle of pure reason” that runs through the Transcendental Dialectic. On my reading, it is important to recognize that PSR appears in both of these guises in the *Critique*. I set this reading against Kant’s criticisms of the Wolffian metaphysicians for having failed to prove the version of PSR that they needed to prop up their metaphysics. I then explain how, by specifying PSR as both the causal principle (for the faculty of the understanding) and the supreme principle of reason, Kant has found a way to preserve the chief roles that Leibniz would like PSR to play in metaphysics while avoiding the Wolffian pitfalls.

HUAPING LU-ADLER

GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY

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