A Revised Proposal to the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation
for a Sawyer Seminar at the University of Chicago

Inquiries in Aesthetic Theory, Forms of Representation, and
the Logic of the Humanities:

The Problem of Non-Discursive Thought
from Goethe to Wittgenstein

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“Philosophy and poetry must become one.”
(Friedrich Schlegel)

I. Thematic Introduction

What is the difference between the way a picture conveys a meaning (so that there is something which counts as understanding what the picture shows) and the way a proposition conveys a meaning (so that there is something which counts as understanding what the propositions says)?? Philosophers and linguists have arrived at a fairly detailed appreciation of how linguistic expressions (and discursive representations, more generally) are able to embody and convey meanings – of how, that is, individual concrete objects, such as sentences, can say or mean something. It is still much less clear, however, how a non-discursive representation, such as a picture, is so much as able to convey a determinate intelligible content – a content that admits of understanding or misunderstanding. (There was once a popular answer to how pictures are able to do this: pictures resemble the things they are meant to represent. But that answer has proven unsustainable.) The question that interests us here, in its most general form, extends well beyond the intelligibility of pictures. PThe question, posed in its most general form, is the following, it asks: how can a concrete particular non-discursive particular item have general significance? This problem of what we may call (following Hegel) the concrete universal arises in a host of different ways in almost every discipline: it arises in one way in mathematics (a diagram of a geometrical construction shows something general: how things are in all cases of a certain kind, not just how things are with respect
to this triangle here and now); it arises in a different way in physics (physics instruction proceeds through the exhibition of what Thomas Kuhn calls paradigmatic examples); and in yet a different way in poetry (it is constitutive of something’s being a constitutive characteristic of a poem is that it means more than it merely says, and thus it is not be identical with any of its possible paraphrases); and so on.

Although our Sawyer Seminar will be interested in getting a handle on this question in its full generality, our way into the question will be an historical, genealogical, and comparative one. Indeed, it is our conviction that the broad interdisciplinary relevance of our theme can only emerge in a fruitful way if it is anchored in historical inquiry. The historical point of departure for the Seminar will be a moment in the German Enlightenment – a moment in which (we want to claim) the question of the nature of concrete universals was first posed in its full generality and thereby came to assume a sudden urgency. Under the pressure of this question, there was a tremendous explosion of (what might be anachronistically termed) interdisciplinary inquiry—culminating in the German Romantic conviction that physics, biology, philosophy and poetry must all become fused into one single interrelated field of inquiry. Though nothing like such a utopian unification of disciplines any longer seems feasible, it is nonetheless striking that contemporary theorists across the humanities, from philosophers to art historians, have become increasingly concerned to take up anew some aspect of the puzzle regarding how concrete universals are so much as possible. The genealogical aim of the seminar will be to trace the roots of various contemporary intellectual obsessions with this question to their origins in this previous moment in the German Enlightenment, and to uncover and understand the various mutations and transformations that the proposed answers to this question have undergone during the intervening two centuries. The primary comparative focus of the seminar will be to compare and contrast the form in which this question specifically arises in the two historical moments that frame this genealogical inquiry: the moment of its initial inception in the German Enlightenment and the moment of its contemporary resurgence in Anglo-American humanistic studies – especially in philosophy, the theory of literature, the theory of visual representation (cinematographic and photographic, as well as painterly), and in the theory of aesthetic value more generally.

II. Historical Introduction Origins

Immanuel Kant argued, in the Critique of Pure Reason (1781), that only two fundamental kinds of representation were possible for humans: singular and immediate representations (which he called intuitions) and mediated general representations (which he called concepts). Kant went on to frame and concede the bare possibility of a further sort of representation (which he alternately called
an intuitive understanding or intellectual intuition) that partook of some of the qualities of each of the other two: a sort of representation that could somehow be both immediately given to the knower (in the manner of a perception) and yet of itself already possessed of a sort of generality that would enable it (like a concept) to apply to more than a single particular case. The mere enjoyment of such a representation, however, would (unlike both mere perceptions and mere concepts) of itself yield knowledge—knowledge of a sort that could be attained without the mediation of any intervening process of conceptualization or generalization. Kant further argued that the nature of finite human cognition precluded the possibility of our entertaining such representations and therefore that such a representation could be enjoyed, at most, by some form of non-finite knower, such as God.

From that moment on in the history of thought, various philosophers, poets, and scientists became concerned to argue, each in their different ways, not only that humans ought to be capable of some version of this further kind of representation—one which immediately combines aspects of singular perception with those of general thought in a single apprehension—but also that the very possibility of philosophy, or poetry, or science, or some combination thereof, depends upon such a non-discursive form of representation or apprehension. It is this tradition of thought, from Goethe to Wittgenstein, and its ramifications through various sorts of disciplines up until the present day, that our Sawyer Seminar will be concerned to explore.

This tradition of thought was arguably inaugurated in Jena on July 7, 1794, when, according to an anecdote recounted by Goethe, he and Schiller happened into conversation as they were leaving a lecture on botany. At issue was the appropriate mode of representing nature scientifically. Schiller's keen interest in the matter prompted Goethe to outline his as yet unpublished conception of the morphology of plants and to draw “with a few characteristic strokes of the pen” what he claimed was the very image of the primal plant (Urpflanze), the archetype of all particular plants. After attentively studying the image, Schiller objected that what Goethe had endeavored to depict was “not an experience, but an idea,” alluding to the Kantian notion of an idea of reason that has no “congruent” representation in experience. Goethe, irritated by this frontal assault on one of his most deeply felt convictions, took pause, allowing his umbrage to subside, and then replied: “It's fine with me that I have ideas without knowing it and furthermore can even see them with my own eyes.” The response is noteworthy because it acknowledges the justness of Schiller's criticism and yet holds fast to the notion assailed: the notion, that is, of a kind of experiential seeing that nonetheless has as its object not a particular empirical entity, but rather something that must be qualified as 'general' or 'conceptual.' And just this (from a strict Kantian point of view) impossible notion was destined to become the centerpiece of Goethe's conception of a morphological science, the key to an investigatory method devoted to apprehending what he famously called the
This anecdote takes us to the nerve of the subject matter we shall investigate in the proposed seminar proposed herewith. Our intention is to organize a collective exploration of the notion of non-discursive representation—a ‘seeing’ of ‘concepts’ or ‘ideas,’ of ‘general’ configurations—as it is articulated in an intellectual tradition that commences with Goethe and continues, with modifications, through the work of Wittgenstein. Goethe and Wittgenstein: their names represent here two staggeringly important bodies of work in which the question, let us say, of perspicuous insight—of a synoptic grasp, what Wittgenstein sometimes termed Übersicht—stands at the center of discussion. But the names of Goethe and Wittgenstein also represent the primary disciplines (literary studies; philosophy) that the proposed seminar will bring into dialogue with one another. And it is for this reason that the proposal takes as its epigraph the dictum of Goethe’s contemporary and finest critic Friedrich Schlegel: “Philosophy and poetry must become one”—a dictum that Schlegel himself took to summarize the most central consequence of the proper philosophical development of Goethe’s insight regarding the need to overcome Kant’s strict distinction between intuitive and conceptual representations.

The question of non-discursive representation emerged as a central issue on the intellectual agenda of post-Kantian philosophy, aesthetics, and scientific theory in response most specifically to considerations put forward by Kant in two notoriously difficult paragraphs, 76 and 77, of his Critique of Judgment (1790). In this series of dense reflections, Kant tries to refine and clarify his earlier distinction between discursive understanding (which forms judgments through the application of concepts to an intuited sensuous material) and what he, again, alternately refers to as an “intuitive understanding” or an “intellectual intuition,” types of cognition which, although thinkable (and perhaps attributable to a divine intellect), are not available to human intellect. These pages of Kant’s, intended to establish the inevitability of his earlier distinction between two mutually exclusive forms of representation, had the opposite effect: his characterization of a kind of thinking not supposed to be possible for humans, instead proved immensely suggestive to subsequent generations of philosophers, poets, and scientists, starting with Goethe, who sought to characterize the fundamental sort of insight to which their own endeavors aspired. This pivotal Kantian demarcation—between discursive representation, on the one hand, and a form of intuition that grasps conceptual or ideal configurations, on the other—is vigorously contested in the work of the major idealist philosophers who endeavored to think beyond Kant’s strictures on human cognition.

Building on Goethe’s claim that an “intuitive understanding” (“anschauende Urteilskraft”) is central to the method of natural science (especially morphology and optics), Hegel extends the point to several other areas of human intellectual endeavor. The first step is taken, in Glauben und Wissen (Belief and Knowledge, 1802), in a passage devoted to the
elucidation of the concept of beauty. Hegel writes (note the echoes of Goethe’s and Schiller’s conversation): “Since beauty is the Idea as experienced, or more correctly, as intuited, the form of opposition between intuition and concept falls away. Kant recognizes this vanishing of the antithesis negatively in the concept of a supersensuous realm in general. But he does not recognize that, as beauty, it is positive, it is intuited, or, to use his own language, it is given in experience.” The intuition of the idea, which in Goethe’s experience took place in the apprehension of archetypical natural forms, is here discussed in terms of aesthetic experience, in which, in Hegel’s view, the Kantian distinction between intuition and concept and therewith the limitation imposed on human (discursive) representation “falls away.” Similar contestations of the strictures imposed on human cognition in those two crucial paragraphs of the Critique of Judgment can be found in all the major post-Kantian thinkers: in addition to Goethe and Hegel, Fichte, Schelling, and Schopenhauer. The possibility of non-discursive representation is centrally at issue throughout every stage in the development of post-Kantian thought. Immediately thereafter, it comes to form the crucial theoretical background of German Romanticism. A century later, it is no less at the center of the sudden and striking panoply of attempts to rejuvenate and re-inherit this tradition in the work of figures as diverse as Walter Benjamin, Martin Heidegger, and Ludwig Wittgenstein.

III. Thematic Focus of the Seminar

The issues at stake in the remarks by Goethe and Hegel cited here are not limited to aesthetics or to the apprehension of the morphology of natural forms. Rather, they are perfectly general, bearing on the question of what it is for human beings to grasp a content in general, to have intelligible experience. It may be the case, in other words, that to understand how human beings come to have shareable experiences or to participate in a common intelligibility requires a model kindred to that of Goethe’s “intuitive understanding” or the idealists’ “intellectual intuition.” Just such a model, in fact, has recently been proposed by the philosopher John McDowell, who argues that spontaneity (of the sort implied in the use of concepts) and receptivity (of the sort implied in the intuition of sensuous material) must not be conceptually sundered if we are to grasp how human beings make sense of the world in experience. Such considerations are often inspired by and traceable to the work of Wittgenstein. In many themes of his thought—in his account of aspectual seeing, in his elucidation of what it is to grasp a meaning, in his conception of philosophical inquiry as attaining to forms of perspicious overview, and in his understanding of how shareable forms of intelligibility are bound up with shared forms of life—Wittgenstein can be read as pursuing a program of inquiry that is cognate with the considerations of the German Idealists generally, and of Goethe and Hegel in particular. Moreover, the form in which these considerations come to be inherited and elaborated in the work of Wittgenstein has, in turn, proven to be of immense influence not only in
contemporary philosophy, but throughout the humanities. It is for these reasons that the seminar on non-discursive representation proposed here orients its agenda around the twin historical landmarks represented by the work of Goethe and Wittgenstein.

Although the work of these two writers will provide the dual focus of the seminar, the set of issues we intend to explore is by no means limited to Goethe and Wittgenstein scholarship. On the contrary, we are interested both in tracing the lines of intellectual inheritance and development in philosophy and literary theory from Goethe to Wittgenstein, as well as in the general significance of the question of non-discursive representation for the understanding of human transactions with the world generally. It is our hope both to disclose and trace the contours of a tradition of reflection on this question that has been underappreciated (indeed, has yet to receive an adequate historical assessment), as well as to appraise and explore the implications of the central insights of this tradition for both contemporary philosophy and literary theory (with the additional hope of initiating and fostering a dialogue on these topics between philosophers and literary theorists).

The thematic focus of the seminar will bear on three complexes of issues:

1. aesthetic theory
2. forms of representation
3. the logic of the humanities.

Regarding the first, it is noteworthy that it was Kant’s theory of aesthetic judgment (as developed in the *Critique of Judgment*) that provided one of the key reference points for the development of a theory of non-discursive representation in idealist thought. This is evidenced by the passage from Hegel cited above, but it holds as well for Goethe, whose theory of artistic form is closely linked to his notion of the morphological idea. In Schopenhauer (who, like Goethe, was an important reference for Wittgenstein), the two aspects are combined in the notion that the aesthetically intuited Idea is an archetype of the metaphysical Will in one of its paradigmatic objectifications. The central notions of aesthetic theory as it develops from the idealists to the early twentieth century provide, then, a rich laboratory for the exploration of non-discursive representation. It is, however, our intention not merely to attend to theoretical formulations, but also to explore concrete manifestations of non-discursive representation in the arts and literature. Hence our second major theme: forms of representation. What is it to grasp an artistic form? How is, for example, the unity of a pictorial object or a poem understood? These are matters best discussed, we feel, in terms of concrete cases and with the collaboration of historians of literature and the arts. The third theme we intend to trace out during the seminar is what we have termed the “logic of the humanities,” a phrase we have adapted from a book by the neo-Kantian Ernst Cassirer. It is our contention, in other words, that a sustained exploration of the notion of non-discursive representation will yield
VI. How the Seminar Will Foster Interdisciplinary Work

This topic has particular importance today, given the situation in both literary studies and philosophy. Contemporary literary studies presently finds itself at a crossroads. The excitement surrounding the postmodernist or poststructuralist moment in literary studies has subsided and conceptual problems inherent in this direction of thought have become increasingly evident. This has led to a sometimes frantic search for new paradigms and to a proliferation of often ill-considered intellectual borrowings. In several quarters, however, the inability of such partial and ad hoc models to account for the central questions of traditional literary scholarship has inspired a renewed engagement with the major works of aesthetic theory and a sustained reflection on the relationship, for example, between literature and morality. Questions of literary form are increasingly being taken seriously. Finally, just those thinkers whose works had been considered the source texts for the poststructuralist intervention—writers such as Nietzsche, Heidegger, Rosenzweig, and Benjamin—have become the focus of provocative new re-readings. A notable feature of these developments is the intense engagement with Kant's work, which has become a key point of reference even for specialists in the English literary tradition. But this renewed interest in Kant, however salutary, typically does not include a sufficient awareness of the post-Kantian tradition extending from Goethe to Wittgenstein.

At the same time, unlike in previous decades, the topics explored by literary scholars are receiving equally intense scrutiny by philosophers. For contemporary Anglo-American philosophy also finds itself at a crossroads. The dominant tradition of philosophizing in Britain and the United States—the so-called analytic tradition—has reached a stage of crisis. Symptoms of this crisis can be seen, for example, (1) in the current proliferation of recent work on the history of analytic philosophy (an area of research which analytic philosophers—for reasons deeply internal to the fundamental commitments of analytic philosophy itself—have traditionally spurned), (2) in the recent exploration of affinities between the thought of major figures in the analytic tradition and that of major figures in the (allegedly) alien Continental tradition (which analytic philosophers have traditionally professed to disdain), (3) in the increasing number of publications devoted to demonstrating the internally incoherent, or for some other reason unsatisfiable, nature of the aspirations underlying the central projects of the analytic tradition (among some of the most influential authors of this latter sort are Stanley Cavell, Cora Diamond, Thomas Kuhn, John McDowell, Hilary Putnam, Richard Rorty, and Charles Taylor). Central to all of these developments has been the reception within Anglo-American philosophy of the work of Wittgenstein. Indeed, it is in no way an exaggeration to say that the reception of Wittgenstein’s work is at least partially responsible for the outbreak
of each of the symptoms of crisis noted above. This, in turn, has sparked an interest on the part of recent analytic philosophy in the roots of Wittgenstein’s work and in the cognate philosophical conceptions to be found in the post-Kantian moment in German philosophy. Thus, in a striking and hitherto untheorized development, many leading Anglo-American thinkers, including all of the ones mentioned above, have at some point in their work drawn upon moments in the afore-mentioned German tradition of thought to find a way out of (what they take to be) the current impasse of contemporary philosophy.

All of these recent developments within contemporary philosophy permit the possibility of a rapprochement between analytic philosophy and literary studies of a hitherto unprecedented order. Yet, at a time when many of the same authors (Kant, Goethe, Hegel, Rosenzweig, Benjamin, Heidegger, Wittgenstein) and, indeed, the very same passages from these authors, currently stand at the forefront of attention in both philosophy and literary studies, there is astonishingly little communication across the institutional divide that separates these fields. One aim of the proposed seminar will be to help initiate this badly needed dialogue by fostering discussion on these common topics of interest.

As noted above, the seminar is conceived as a comparative inquiry, examining the affinities and differences between the two historical moments epitomized in our title by the names of Goethe and Wittgenstein. It is our belief that an historical comparison of these two specific intellectual situations promises to illuminate the conceptual issues presently exercising theorists across a variety of disciplines. But another axis of comparison that will be of major concern to us bears on the inherently multi-disciplinary ramifications of our theme. As indicated above, the two disciplinary perspectives that will be most prominent (and that are represented by the organizers of the seminar) are philosophy and literary studies. It is, however, also the case that the question of non-discursive representation is central to several other fields, most notably what might be termed the image-oriented disciplines such as art history (and criticism) and cinema studies. Likewise, if we recall the “primal scene” related in Goethe’s anecdote, then the interest of our topic for historians of science, who have increasingly become concerned with the complexities of scientific representation, comes clearly into view. (It is no accident, in our view, that Goethe's historical introduction to his Theory of Colors has been found to contain remarkable anticipations of many of the central ideas of Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.) Nor is it surprising that the paths of relevance leading outward from the concept of non-discursive representation traverse across the terrain of so many disciplines; for, as Cassirer argued in the book cited above, perhaps the defining feature of the humanities in general is the apprehension of form (in contradistinction to causal explanation). And it is for this reason that we have identified the logic of the humanities as the broadest thematic horizon of the seminar. The great advantage of the theme of non-discursive representation, it seems to us, is that it allows us to look toward this horizon from very specific vantage points in both our recent historical and our present disciplinary landscape.
V. The Four Phases of the Seminar

The core component of the Seminar is a series of weekly meetings extending across two academic quarters (Fall of 2006 and Winter of 2007). The participants in these meetings will include both graduate students (who will take the seminar for credit) and faculty from the University of Chicago as well as some neighboring universities. We expect this group to remain fairly stable across the two quarters, although there will undoubtedly be some fluctuation in faculty attendance. The seminar meetings themselves will be of two types. During odd-numbered weeks, the local participants will meet for preparatory sessions, the purpose of which is to establish the framework for the visitor-centered discussions, which will take place during the even-numbered weeks. This latter type of session will pair a local scholar from the University of Chicago or its immediate academic environs and a distinguished visitor from further away, both of whom have expertise on a particular aspect of the Seminar theme. Both the specific topics and the personnel for this sequence of meetings are detailed below. This core component will be framed by two conferences: a preliminary conference that will take place during the academic quarter prior to the series of weekly meetings (Spring of 2006) and a concluding conference to be scheduled during the academic quarter thereafter (Spring of 2007). The aim of this unusual structure is to allow for an initial joint conversation between all of the primary participants (at the preliminary conference) in which the central questions of the Seminar are first identified and broached, followed by a careful discussion of each participant's considered contribution to some aspect of the topic (during the core component of the Seminar), and ending with a synthetic discussion (at the concluding conference) of the findings of the Seminar as a whole. Since the participants in these two conferences will be just those scholars who will serially co-teach the bi-weekly guest-centered discussions, this overall structure should guarantee a maximum degree of thematic continuity and dialogue. The Seminar will conclude with two final meetings, during the Spring Quarter of 2007, in which the results of the second conference will be discussed and evaluated.

Clearly, the logistical arrangements involved with such a structure will be sufficiently complex that the success of the Seminar will hinge on adequate preparation: not merely securing the commitment of a dozen major scholars to come to Chicago three times (to participate in the two conferences and one weekly session of the Seminar), but also scheduling the bi-weekly meetings with visiting scholars during the core component (which will be quite complex in itself), preparing a bibliography, gathering and scanning reading materials, and formulating a “working paper” that provides a detailed outline of the conceptual issues. Moreover, because of the overlap in personnel, it will only be possible to organize even the first conference, once the entire schedule of the ongoing
Seminar in all its phases is fixed. One unusual feature of this proposal, therefore, is that we wish to allocate plenty of time for adequate preparation. With these considerations in mind, we propose the following calendar:

Phase I: Fall and Winter Quarters, 2005-6: Advance Preparation of the Seminar, contacting participants and potential visitors, organizing and scheduling guest-centered sessions, structuring the schedule of events and readings of the ongoing seminar, fixing the precise dates of both conferences, and, finally, planning and organizing the proceedings of the initial four-day conference.

Phase II: Spring Quarter 2006: The Initial Four-Day Conference designed as a “discussion conference” with three papers per day and a great deal of time reserved for discussion among participants. The purpose of this conference will be to acquire a preliminary assessment of the various dimensions of the problem of non-discursive representation. The conference will be followed by two preparatory meetings of the Seminar to evaluate the results of the conference, to identify major issues to be treated in the ongoing Seminar during Phase III, and to assign summer readings in preparation for Phase III.

Phase III: Fall and Winter Quarters 2006-7. The Core Component of the Seminar, the weekly meetings of which are detailed below, with its alternating rhythm of preparatory and visitor-centered sessions.

Phase IV: Spring Quarter 2007. The Final Four-Day Conference, with the same format as in Phase I, followed by two concluding Seminar meetings.

VI. Structure and Schedule of the Weekly Meetings of the Seminar (in Phase Three)

The Seminar will be conducted by James Conant and David Wellbery, both of the University of Chicago. In addition to handling the planning and organization of the Seminar, Conant and Wellbery will together moderate the preparatory sessions held during the odd-numbered weeks of its core phase (Phase III), often with the assistance of local faculty with the corresponding expertise. (See the list of participating local faculty below.) The preparatory sessions will be devoted to detailed discussions of assigned readings by major figures in the tradition as well as by contemporary authors, in particular the invited visitors. All readings will be scanned and made available to members of the Seminar through the University of Chicago’s e-reserve system.
As indicated above, the visitor-centered discussion sessions held during even-numbered weeks will be jointly conducted by a distinguished visiting scholar, whose research interests bear on an important aspect of the general theme, and a local scholar (that is, from the University of Chicago or the greater Chicago academic environs), whose work and interests intersect with that of the visitor. Each such session will be followed by an informal reception, which, in turn, will be followed by a dinner, during all of which discussion of the topics will continue. There will be a system for signing up for dinner that permits those faculty and graduate students most interested in a given topic to participate in the evening discussion.

The core component of the Seminar will be divided into three parts. In the first, the focus will be on the historical origins of the problematic. The second part will focus on a series of pair-wise comparisons between topics and figures in the age of Goethe and German Idealism, on the one hand, and in Wittgenstein and currents in contemporary thought inspired by him, on the other. The third and final part will explore a variety of contemporary debates that are rooted in the problems and issues explored in the first two parts of the core component of the Seminar.

PROPOSED SCHEDULE OF THE CORE COMPONENT (PHASE III) OF THE SEMINAR:

The combinations of pairings of local (L) and visiting (V) scholars during even-numbered weeks and the correlative seminar topics for which they will lead the discussions, as we currently foresee them, are as follows (the order, of course, is not absolutely final):

PART I: THE HISTORICAL EMERGENCE OF THE PROBLEM OF NON-DISCURSIVE REPRESENTATION

1. Preparatory Session devoted to crucial background texts by Kant and Goethe (Conant/Wellbery)
2. Kant, Goethe, and the Origins and Development of the Problem of Intellectual Intuition in German Idealism: Eckart Förster (V); David Wellbery (L)
3. Preparatory Session devoted to selections of Kant's Critique of Judgment (Conant/Wellbery)
4. The Relation Between Aesthetic Judgment and Teleological Judgment from Kant's *Third Critique* to the Present: Hannah Ginsborg (V); Andrea Kern (L)

5. Preparatory Session devoted to selected writings by Goethe (Conant/Wellbery)

6. The Relation Between Scientific, Poetic, and Philosophical Understanding in Goethe's Writings: Joseph Vogl (V); David Wellbery (L)

PART II: COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN CONCEPTUAL HISTORY AND REPRESENTATIONAL PRACTICES

7. Preparatory Session devoted to the German Idealist background (Conant/Wellbery)

8. Accounts of the Possibility of Non-Discursive Understanding in Kant, Maimon, Fichte, Hegel, and Rosenzweig: Paul Franks (V); Terry Pinkard (L); Eric Santner (L)

9. Preparatory Session devoted to selections from Wittgenstein and Cavell (Conant/Wellbery)

10. The Role of an Appeal to *Sensus Communis* in Kant, Wittgenstein, and Cavell: Stanley Cavell (V); James Conant (L)

11. Preparatory Session devoted to Diderot, Hegel and Fried (Conant/Wellbery)

12. The Concept of the Instantaneous Intelligibility of Aesthetic Experience from 18th and Early 19th Century Theories of Art Until the Present: Michael Fried (V); Robert Pippin (L)

13. Preparatory Session devoted to Galton on composite photography and Wittgenstein's interest in it (Conant/Wellbery)

PART III: CONTEMPORARY DEBATES

15. Preparatory Session on McDowell's *Mind and World* (Conant/Wellbery)

16. Theories of the Respective Roles of Sensibility and Understanding in Perceptual Experience from Kant to Wittgenstein: John McDowell (V); Sebastian Rödl (L)

17. Preparatory Session on Diamond’s *The Realistic Spirit* (Conant/Wellbery)

18. Wittgenstein on Saying and Showing, Rule-Following, and the Sort of Understanding that Consists in the Seeing of Connections: Cora Diamond (V); James Conant (L)

19. Preparatory Session on Thompson's *The Representation of Life* (Conant/Wellbery)

20. The Representation of Life, the Irreducibility of the Concept of the Human, and the Apprehension of Human Form: Michael Thompson (V); Jonathan Lear (L)

VII. Educational Mission of the Seminar

The Seminar will provide a unique forum for graduate students and young scholars to engage in a focused interdisciplinary discussion that will both benefit their individual projects and involve them in debates on the fundamental issues in the humanities. Indeed, the idea for the topic of the Seminar was partly arrived at by noticing the remarkable convergence of current graduate doctoral dissertations at the University of Chicago, across a variety of disciplines (Philosophy, German, Comparative Literature, Art History, Cinema and Media Studies), all of which bear on topics related to the historical and comparative agenda of the Seminar.

In accordance with this educational aim, our proposal contains a request for funding one full-time post-doctoral fellow who would be associated with the Seminar. The post-doctoral fellow should be a scholar who is both engaged in the study of some relevant aspects of German literature and philosophy and who is conversant with the relevant current debates in the humanities. Our aim will be
to find a candidate for the post-doctoral fellowship whose intellectual and professional development would be most enriched by the unique opportunity for sustained exchanges with major scholars of the sort that would be afforded by the Seminar. The steering committee (see below) will advertise the position in professional journals in the U.S. and abroad in the fields of literary studies, art history, and philosophy. We will look for a candidate who can participate fluently in discussions with scholars from all three of these fields and whose research helps to bring them together.

Our proposal also contains a request for funding two dissertation fellowships to be awarded to students whose applications demonstrate the relevance of the Seminar's subject matter to their own dissertations. We expect applications for these fellowships from graduate students at the University of Chicago in departments from across the Humanities and Social Sciences Divisions as well as the Divinity School. The announcement and collection of the applications will be handled through the Graduate Office of the Humanities Division simultaneously with other graduate fellowship applications, but the selection will rest in the hands of the Seminar steering committee (see below).

Drawing upon their specific expertise, the post-doctoral fellow and the two graduate student fellows will each be called upon to help lead one of the odd-numbered meetings of the Seminar during Phase III and to assist in the selection of readings for that session. Each of these three individuals will also be called upon to comment on one of the papers at each of the two conferences.

VIII. Administrative Structure of the Seminar

The Seminar will be conducted by James Conant and David Wellbery, both of the University of Chicago. One of Conant’s major areas of research is the philosophy of Wittgenstein, including its historical background and its influence on contemporary philosophical issues. His other interests include pictorial and cinematic representation, as well as the philosophical significance of the literary form of philosophical writing. Wellbery is a specialist on Goethe and his age, but he has also done work on the history of aesthetics, on issues in literary theory, and on the history of concepts.

In addition, a steering committee will oversee the Seminar throughout the year. James Conant (Philosophy), Andrea Kern (Philosophy, University of Potsdam), Robert Pippin (The Committee on Social Thought), Joel Snyder (Art History), and David Wellbery (Germanic Studies) will form this committee. The Steering Committee will be actively involved in all four phases of the Seminar, including taking responsibility for reviewing the applications for the dissertation fellowships, for recruiting and assessing applications for the post-doctoral
fellowship, for reviewing and selecting among graduate student applications to participate in the core component of the Seminar, and for organizing and coordinating the two conferences.

Margot Browning, the Associate Director of the University of Chicago Franke Institute for the Humanities (see below), has supervised the administration of previous Sawyer Seminars and has agreed to continue in this capacity on our behalf. We have also made provision for the funding of clerical support (see Budget below) to assist in the preparation and organizational work involved in the running of the Seminar. These funds will be used primarily to hire an additional staff member who will be responsible for coordinating and overseeing all matters pertaining to clerical support for the Seminar. This individual will be assisted by members of the Franke Institute staff, the Wittgenstein Workshop graduate student coordinator (see below), Professors Conant’s and Wellbery’s research assistants

IX. Institutional Framework

In addition to the main resource of interested scholars and students at the University of Chicago, our Sawyer Seminar will benefit from the support and cooperation of the following seven institutional partners:

1. The University of Chicago Franke Institute for the Humanities
2. The University of Chicago Wittgenstein Workshop
3. The University of Chicago Center for Interdisciplinary Research on German Literature and Culture
4. The University of Chicago Department of Germanic Studies
5. The University of Chicago Department of Philosophy
6. Chicago-Leipzig Transcoop Project on the History of Forms of Representation
7. The University of Chicago Division of the Humanities

All six seven of these institutional partners have pledged to commit resources to our Sawyer Seminar, and the latter five 2-6 have also pledged funds to defray expenses pertaining to accommodations for and meals with visitors during Phase III of the Seminar. Finally, the Dean of Humanities has pledged funds to help defray the cost of a post-doctoral fellow in the academic year 2006-2007.

The Franke Institute for the Humanities (Director: James Chandler) was founded in 1990 as a forum for humanistic inquiry. It will serve as the administrative home of the Seminar and offer guidance and support in organizational matters. It will provide conference space and supplementary
logistical support for both conferences. The Franke Institute will also offer a weekly meeting space for the core component of the Seminar and office space for the post-doctoral fellow.

The two other most significant partners will be the Wittgenstein Workshop and the Center for Interdisciplinary Research on German Literature and Culture. The Wittgenstein Workshop was instituted in 1999 and furnishes a framework in which students and faculty with an interest in Wittgenstein can come together, fostering a variety of forms of both properly philosophical and more broadly interdisciplinary research—both historical and systematic—which take their point of departure from a shared interest in Wittgenstein’s achievement. The overall aim of the workshop is to provide a forum in which the following three activities can be pursued in conjunction with one another: (1) the careful study of Wittgenstein’s contributions to both philosophy and other disciplines, (2) the discussion of current research by graduate students with related interests, (3) the presentation of work by (and the opportunity for graduate students to come into contact and discussion with) some of the leading contemporary scholars at work in these areas. Every effort is made to achieve an ideal mix of students and faculty from philosophy and other disciplines. The Workshop meets every week during all three quarters of the academic year, and graduate students may enroll in it for credit during any quarter. The Center for Interdisciplinary Research on German Literature and Culture was formed in 2001 to foster research collaborations among scholars working on German material within different disciplinary frameworks. It sponsors lectures, conferences, and mini-seminars devoted to a range of topics from literary history to philosophy, from musicology to art history. An additional goal of the Center is to facilitate intellectual exchange and cooperation between scholars at the University of Chicago and their counterparts at major German universities. Both the Workshop and the Center enthusiastically support the proposal for the Seminar and are prepared to assist with both funding and support staff for the two conferences and the bi-weekly visits by distinguished scholars.

X. Participation

The Seminar held during Phase III will be listed as a regular graduate seminar. Graduate-student participation will be contingent upon documented interest and background in the topic and participation in the events of Phase II.

Although it is unrealistic to assume that all of the University of Chicago
faculty whom we would like to involve will be able to participate in all the meetings of the seminar, we anticipate that the subject matter will elicit broad interest and fairly regular attendance. We have sent out a draft of this proposal and a letter of solicitation seeking the participation of those faculty listed below and have already received an affirmative response from almost everyone contacted.

List of Participating University of Chicago Faculty:

With the exception of those individuals who are marked with an asterisk (indicating that they have yet to reply to us), all of the following University of Chicago faculty have affirmed their interest in participating in the Seminar:

Danielle Allen (Dean, Humanities Division, Classics, Social Thought)
Dan Brudney (Philosophy)
Robert Buch (Germanic Studies)
James Chandler (English)
Ted Cohen (Philosophy)
Arnold Davidson (Philosophy, Divinity, CHSS, Comparative Literature)
Konstantin Fasolt (History)
Frances Ferguson (English)
David Finkelstein (Philosophy)
Michael Forster (Philosophy)
Tom Gunning* (Cinema and Media Studies, Art History)
John Haugeland (Philosophy, CHSS)
Hans Joas (Social Thought, Sociology)
Michael Kremer (Philosophy)
Charles Larmore (Philosophy, Law)
Gabriel Lear (Philosophy)
Jonathan Lear (Social Thought, Philosophy)
David Levin (Germanic Studies, Cinema and Media Studies)
Sandra MacPherson (English)
Francoise Meltzer (Romance, Comparative Literature, Divinity)
Glenn Most (Social Thought, Comparative Literature)
Robert Pippin (Social Thought, Philosophy)
Robert Richards (History, CHSS)
Eric Santner (Germanic Studies, Jewish Studies)
Joel Snyder (Art History, Cinema and Media Studies)
Chenxi Tang (Germanic Studies)
David Tracy* (Divinity School)
Candace Vogler (Philosophy, MAPH)
Robert von Hallberg (English, Comparative Literature)
List of Participating Faculty from Chicago Environs

Among the scholars from the greater Chicago environs who we expect will be interested in the work of the Seminar and whose participation we shall encourage are:

Steven Affeldt (Philosophy, Notre Dame)
Karl Ameriks (Philosophy, Notre Dame)
Fritz Gutbrodt (German, Indiana)
Stephen Melville (Art History, Ohio State)
Walter Benn Michaels (English, UIC)
Helmut Müller-Sievers (German and Comparative Literature, Northwestern)
Robert Norton (German, History, Notre Dame)
Terry Pinkard (Philosophy, Northwestern)
Fred Rush (Philosophy, Notre Dame)
Sally Sedgwick (Philosophy, UIC)

Possible Invitees from Further Away:

The following is a list of scholars whom we hope to involve in the Seminar either as primary participants (i.e., leaders of mini-seminars and presenters at the conferences) or as secondary participants (i.e., additional participants at either mini-seminars or conferences). Many of the following have also already expressed interest in the possibility of participating in some phase of the Seminar:

Avner Baz (Philosophy, Tufts)
Robert Brandom (Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh)
Jocelyn Benoist (Philosophy, Sorbonne)
Stanley Cavell (Philosophy, Harvard; visiting professor this spring at U of C)
Lorraine Daston (History of Science, Max Planck Institute, Berlin)
Cora Diamond (Philosophy, Virginia)
Stephen Engstrom (Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh)
Eckart Förster (Philosophy, Johns Hopkins)
Paul Franks (Philosophy, Toronto)
Michael Fried (Art History, Johns Hopkins; visiting professor this spring at U of C)
Michael Friedman (Philosophy, History of Science, Stanford)
Ulrich Gaier (German, Konstanz)
Peter Galison (History of Science, Harvard)
Hannah Ginsborg (Philosophy, Berkeley)
Carlo Ginzburg (History, UCLA)
Peter Gordon (History, Harvard)
Anthony Grafton (History, Princeton)
Andrea Kern (Philosophy, Potsdam; current Bosch Fellow, University of Chicago)
Albrecht Koschorke (German, Konstanz)
John McDowell (Philosophy, Pittsburgh)
Marie McGinn (Philosophy, York)
Christoph Menke (Philosophy, Potsdam)
Dieter Mersch (Media Studies and Art History, Potsdam)
Richard Moran (Philosophy, Harvard)
Stephen Mulhall (Philosophy, Oxford)
Jean-Philippe Narboux (Philosophy, Bordeaux)
Günter Oesterle (German, Gießen)
Richard Raatzsch (Heisenberg Fellow, Leipzig, Germany)
Roberto Righi (Law, Rome)
Sebastian Rödl (Heisenberg Fellow, Germany; former Bosch Fellow at U of C)
Joachim Schulte (Philosophy, Bielefeld)
Michael Thompson (Philosophy, Pittsburgh)
Joseph Vogl (Media Studies, Weimar)
John Zammito (History, Rice)
XI. **Budget**

a) **Graduate Student Fellowships:** $18,500 each for a total of $37,000.

b) **Post-Doctoral Fellow:** $35,000. $35,000 of this will come out of our Sawyer Seminar budget. Danielle Allen, the Dean of Humanities at the University of Chicago, has pledged $12,000 towards the expense of a post-doctoral fellow attached to our Sawyer Seminar for the academic year 2006-2007.

c) **Travel Expenses for Bi-Weekly Visitors:** $600 each (on average) for 11 leaders who need to travel to Chicago for a total of $6,600.

d) **Honoraria for Bi-Weekly Visitors:** $1000 each for 7 visitors for a total of $7,000.

e) **Accommodations and Meals for Bi-Weekly Visitors:** $0

f) **Conferences:**

   (i) **Travel Expenses for Visiting Conference Speakers:** $600 each (on average) for 9 speakers who need to travel to Chicago for the first conference for a total of $5,400; and $600 each for 9 speakers who need to travel to Chicago for the second conference for a total of $5,400; for a two-conference total of $10,800.

   (ii) **Honoraria for Visiting Conference Speakers:** $0
(iii) Accommodation for Visiting Conference Speakers: $150 per night for 9 visitors per conference for a total of 18 visitors for five nights each for a total cost of $13,500.

(iv) Lunch for 20 primary conference participants: 4 meals per conference at $20 per person for two conferences for a total of $3,200.

(v) Dinner for 20 primary conference participants: 4 meals per conference at $40 per person for two conferences for a total of $6,400.

Total expenses for two conferences: $33,900, but $9,500 of this sum will be defrayed by our institutional partners, with the remaining cost to be covered by the Sawyer Seminar budget itself: $24,400

g) Clerical Expenses for the Entire Seminar: $10,000.

h) Overview of Sawyer Total Seminar Budget Overview:

Graduate Student Fellowships: $37,000.
Post-Doctoral Fellowship: $35,000
Travel Expenses for Bi-Weekly Visitors: $6,600.
Honoraria for Bi-Weekly Visitors: $7,000.
Sawyer Conference Budget: $24,400
Clerical Support: $10,000.

Total requested from Mellon Foundation: $120,000.